Moss v. Davis

794 A.2d 1288, 2001 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 5, 2001 WL 1840778
CourtDelaware Family Court
DecidedJune 5, 2001
DocketCN00-11342
StatusPublished

This text of 794 A.2d 1288 (Moss v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Delaware Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moss v. Davis, 794 A.2d 1288, 2001 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 5, 2001 WL 1840778 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001).

Opinion

CONNER, Judge.

The above parties are before the Court on the petition of C. Moss, Court of Chancery Appointed Guardian 1 for the Person of E. Roth, to annul her marriage to A.J. Davis. These parties were married in Elkton, Cecil County, Maryland, on May 1, 2000, after living together for approximately twelve years. It was a short wedding ceremony. No family or friends attended. No family members or friends were advised of the wedding in advance. No friends or family members on either side were advised of the marriage for several days after it took place. At the time of the marriage, E. Roth was 86 years of age and suffering from moderate Alzheimer’s Disease. A.J. Davis was 76 years of age at the time. The petition alleges that Ms. Roth lacked the mental capacity to consent to the marriage and alternatively was forced to enter into the marriage through duress.

The Delaware Annulment Statute, 13 Del. C. § 1506, on annulment provides in pertinent part as follows:

§ 1506. Annulment.
(a) The Court shall enter a decree of annulment of a marriage entered into under any of the following circumstances:
(1) A party lacked capacity to consent to the marriage at the time the marriage was solemnized, either because of mental incapacity or infirmity, or because of the influence of alcohol, drugs or other incapacitating substances;
(5) One or both parties entered into the marriage under duress exercised by the other party, or a third party, whether or not such other party knew of such exercise of duress;

To have a marriage annulled on the grounds of coercion or duress, there *1290 must be clear and convincing evidence of the duress. Fluharty v. Fluharty, 193 A. 838, (Del.Super.Ct.1937). Duress is legally defined as, “unlawful constraint exercised upon a person whereby he or she is forced to do some act that he or she otherwise would not have done”; Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. Under Delaware law, there are three basic elements of duress: (1) a wrongful act; which (2) overcomes the will of a person; who (3) has no adequate legal remedy to protect their interest; Way Road Development Company v. Savannah Land Company, 1992 WL 19969 (Del.Super.).

The guardian alleges that duress was proven by circumstantial evidence. The chain of circumstances started in February 2000, when Mr. Davis’ daughter’s name was placed on an MBNA CD of Ms. Roth that had matured and was being renewed. When Ms. Roth’s daughters, C. Moss and S. Coates, learned of the titling of their mother’s CD, they took her to her doctor of fourteen years, Gary Beste, M.D. Dr. Beste tested Ms. Roth for dementia and ruled out all causes except Alzheimer’s Disease. He found affirmative evidence of Alzheimer’s from a standardized test, the “mini mental” test. Based on his diagnosis, he supplied a letter which activated a Power of Attorney, executed by Ms. Roth in 1991, designating her daughter, C. Moss, as her attorney-in-fact to handle her financial affairs. Ms. Moss was able to have the MBNA CD re-titled solely in her mother’s name.

Ms. Roth became upset with her daughter invoking the Power of Attorney and removing her financial independence. With Mr. Davis’ assistance, or perhaps at his suggestion, she contacted two attorneys, Piet vanOgtrop, Esquire and Elwood T. Eveland, Jr., Esquire, to inquire about revoking the Power of Attorney. Marriage was discussed with both attorneys. Mr. Eveland prepared a revocation document. Ms. Roth and Mr. Davis went to Elkton, got a license, and returned for a marriage ceremony.

These circumstances do not come close to constituting duress. The subject of marriage was discussed with two attorneys. Mr. Davis may have been very persuasive, but persuasion is not duress. There is insufficient evidence of a wrongful act on his part. There is no evidence of any coercion. Thus, duress was not proven by even a preponderance of the evidence.

Before determining whether Ms. Roth had the requisite capacity to consent to her marriage or lacked the ability to consent because of mental incapacity, the Court must make a threshold evidentiary ruling on whether the specific conversations between Ms. Roth and two Delaware attorneys can be admitted and considered. As alluded to, on March 1, 2000, Ms. Roth and Mr. Davis, both former clients of Piet vanOgtrop, Esquire, met with Mr. vanOgtrop in his office to obtain general information concerning revocation of the aforesaid Power of Attorney that Mr. vanOgtrop had prepared for Ms. Roth in 1991. Mr. vanOgtrop considered both Ms. Roth and Mr. Davis to be his clients. Mr. vanOgtrop engaged in some general discussion at this one meeting, but prepared no legal documents and took no further action on behalf of either Ms. Roth or Mr. Davis.

Elwood T. Eveland, Jr., Esquire, met with Ms. Roth on several occasions between February and December of 2000. According to Mr. Eveland, Ms. Roth was clearly his client and except for the very first meeting, Mr. Davis was present at all of the sessions. The Court must rule on Ms. Moss’ objection based on attorney-client privilege to the conversations between Ms. Roth and Mr. vanOgtrop, and *1291 Ms. Roth and Mr. Eveland being admitted into evidence.

The lawyer-client privilege is set forth at Rule 502 of the Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence. Rule 502(c) provides as follows:

(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client or the successor, trustee or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer’s representative at the time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client.

The above section clearly gives Ms. Moss, as guardian for the client, standing to object to the admission into evidence of the conversations between Mr. vanOgtrop and Ms. Roth, and, Mr. Eve-land and Ms. Roth. Mr. Davis argues that the privilege was waived in regard to the conversation between Mr. vanOgtrop and Ms. Roth, due to his presence. It is tine that an attorney-client privilege may be waived by the public disclosure of information that was formerly confidential; Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel, 264 A.2d 523, (Del.Ch.1970). The mere presence of another client in the lawyer’s office does not rise to the level of a public disclosure. If one of two clients who are meeting with an attorney invokes the attorney-client privilege, the privilege must be upheld regardless of whether it is the other client who wishes that the content of the conversation be revealed. Thus, the presence of Mr. Davis at the sessions between Mr. vanOgtrop and Ms. Roth, and Mr. Eveland and Ms. Roth, does not constitute a waiver of the privilege.

In the case of Mr. Eveland’s representation, Mr. Davis points out that Mr. Eveland, as an attorney in the Court of Chancery guardianship action, submitted an affidavit as an attorney for an alleged infirm person.

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Related

Texaco, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corporation
264 A.2d 523 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1970)
Fluharty v. Fluharty
193 A. 838 (Superior Court of Delaware, 1937)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
794 A.2d 1288, 2001 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 5, 2001 WL 1840778, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moss-v-davis-delfamct-2001.