Mosley v. McDavid

466 S.W.2d 922, 250 Ark. 735, 1971 Ark. LEXIS 1324
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedMay 17, 1971
Docket5-5565
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 466 S.W.2d 922 (Mosley v. McDavid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mosley v. McDavid, 466 S.W.2d 922, 250 Ark. 735, 1971 Ark. LEXIS 1324 (Ark. 1971).

Opinion

J. Fred Jones, Justice.

This is an appeal by Bob Mosley from an order decreed by the Union County Chancery Court restraining him from constructing a proposed building on property he leased from G. M. McDavid and wife; and requiring Mosley to restore a metal canopy which he had removed in preparation for the erection of the proposed building.

On the 16th day of October, 1969, Mr. and Mrs. McDavid entered into a written lease agreement with Mosley under which they let to Mosley a plot of ground approximately 80 x 200 feet for a term of five years beginning on November 1, 1969, with option of renewal for two additional five year terms. This lease contained the following paragraphs:

“4. Lessee has the right, at his sole cost and expense, to erect a building on the above described property for his use as an office. At the expiration of this lease, or any renewal thereof, Lessee shall have the right to remove said building from the premises described in this lease.
5. Lessee agrees that at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, or any extension or renewal thereof, he will return to Lessor the land and the building now located thereon, which is the subject of this lease, in as good condition as it now is, the usual wear and tear excepted.
Lessee agrees that he will not commit waste, nor permit waste to be done to or upon the aforesaid property or premises; that he will not conduct nor permit to be conducted any beer or liquor business thereon; that he will not permit the sale or repair of televisions or household appliances thereon, nor will Lessee operate or permit to be operated or to be located thereon any structure or activity which will constitute a public nuisance; that he will keep said property and the premises about the same in a clean, orderly and sanitary condition; that he will not permit trash or debris of any nature to collect or accumulate in and about said premises, and will, at all times, keep the same in an orderly manner. The parties hereto further mutually agree that Lessee shall not have the right to sublet the premises or any portion thereof at any time to any third party without the consent of Lessor. Lessor agrees that his consent to subletting will not be unreasonably withheld; provided, however, that such assignment or subletting shall not in any way relieve Lessee of any responsibility or liability pursuant to the terms of this agreement.”

Prior to the lease, McDavid had used the premises in connection with a Buick automobile agency, and a metal building, now under lease to other parties, had been constructed on one corner of the lot adjacent to that portion leased to Mosley. The area leased to Mosley was surfaced with asphalt and had a metal canopy, or carport, constructed on galvanized steel posts set in concrete beneath the asphalt surface. The canopy had been built and previously used in connection with the Buick agency. It was approximately 20 feet wide and extended approximately 80 feet along the front, then approximately 40 feet into the depth of the leased property. The canopy was the only structure erected on the area leased to Mosley and constituted “the building now located thereon” as referred to in paragraph five of the lease.

Mosley was in the used automobile business when the lease was entered into. He subsequently acquired a franchise, or dealership, for new Toyota automobiles and under his franchise agreement, he was required to provide a 20 x 45 foot showroom with a glass front for the display of new Toyota automobiles. Mosley advised McDavid of the franchise and the building requirements, and he sought McDavid’s permission to erect the required building on the leased premises. McDavid advised Mosley that he did not want a permanent structure of this nature built on the leased premises. Relying on paragraph four of his lease, Mosley proceeded oward the construction of a steel building to be supported on eight concrete piers two feet square and sunk 16 inches into the ground. The floor of the building was to be a concrete slab four inches thick, 20 feet wide .and 45 feet long, and was to be poured on top of the asphalt surface of the lot.

In order to erect the building on the leased area in the position he wanted it, Mosley found it necessary to remove approximately 40 feet of the metal canopy. He accomplished this by cutting the steel posts at their base with an acetylene torch, and he had removed this portion of the canopy to the rear of the leased premises when Mr. McDavid stopped the work by a temporary restraining order and filed his petition to make it permanent. In his answer to the petition for a restraining order, Mr. Mosley alleged that the building he proposed to construct was for use as an office building as permitted in his lease agreement, and that he had been damaged because of delay in construction by reason of the temporary restraining order. He prayed judgment against McDavid for $1,500. McDavid countered by an allegation of waste committed in connection with removal of the canopy and prayed judgment for $2,500.

After reciting his findings as above set out, the chancellor found that the cutting of the posts and removal of the decking and beams supporting the canopy constituted waste, and that Mosley should be permanently enjoined from building the office, showroom and salesroom, on that portion of the lot where the canopy had been removed, that he should be ordered to replace the canopy and to restore the premises to the condition they were in prior to the removal of the canopy. The chancellor further found that a small portable building which Mosley had placed on the lot, and had been using as an office, did not amount to erection of an office building as contemplated in the lease, and that Mosley, under the lease, had a right to erect a building for an office. The chancellor then decreed, in part, as follows:

“Defendant is hereby permanently enjoined from constructing the building as depicted by Exhibits 2, 3 and 4 on the leased premises, defendant shall restore the property to the same condition it was prior to the removal of the canopy, that defendant has the right under the lease to erect a building on the property for use as an office, defendant shall pay all costs.”

On appeal to this court Mosley seeks reversal on the following point:

"The order and findings of the chancellor are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence and to the law.”

Simple contract law is the only law involved in this case. The chancellor’s duty was to determine the rights of the parties under the terms of their agreement and while we try cases de novo on appeals from chancery, it is our duty and practice to affirm the chancellor’s decree if it is not against the preponderance of the evidence.

Mr. McDavid contends that Mosley leased the premises for a used car lot and was only entitled to erect a small office on the premises, such as is usually found on used car lots. It is his contention that the parties contemplated such office building that could be erected and removed without damage to the leasehold.

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Related

Ward v. Davis
765 S.W.2d 5 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
466 S.W.2d 922, 250 Ark. 735, 1971 Ark. LEXIS 1324, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mosley-v-mcdavid-ark-1971.