Mosley v. Flagstar Bank

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 1, 2023
• Docket: Misc. No. 2023-0031
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BRETT JONES, Petitioner, Civil Action No. 1:23-mc-00031 (JMC) v.

FLAGSTAR BANK, et al.,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff Brett Jones (also known as “Eeon”) filed this miscellaneous action on

behalf of himself and Tracy Mosley against Flagstar Bank, Oceanside Mortgage Company, the

Federal Reserve, and twenty unnamed individual Respondents. ECF 1 at 1. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court dismisses this action sua sponte without prejudice.

Jones’s pleadings are difficult to comprehend, partly because large sections of the

pleadings are smudged and partly because Jones does not clearly explain the nature of his claims.

The pleadings involve a loan agreement between the private Parties and a collateral security that

should have been deposited with the Federal Reserve. ECF 1 at 2. Beyond those general facts,

though, it is difficult to discern the basis of Jones’s claims.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demand more. Rule 8(a) requires civil complaints to

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It

does not expect “detailed factual allegations,” but it does require enough factual information “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007). These procedural requirements promote fairness in litigation—Rule 8(a) is intended

to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id.

1 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Granted, pleadings filed by pro se litigants like

Jones are held to less stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.

See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But even pro se litigants must comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Jones’s pleadings fail to do so. His pleadings do not provide a “short and plain” statement

of his claims (or at least not one that is legible). Even construing Jones’s pleadings liberally, it is

impossible to determine the legal basis for Jones’s case. And if the Court cannot make out the basis

of Jones’s pleadings, it is difficult to imagine any of the Respondents discerning it.

Jones’s complaint is therefore dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with FRCP

8(a)(2). The Court acknowledges that dismissing a case sua sponte is an unusual step, but courts

have done so when plaintiffs fail to comply with procedural rules. See, e.g., Brown v. Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2016) (dismissing a

complaint sua sponte for failing to comply with FRCP 8(a)); Hamrick v. United States, No. 10-

857, 2010 WL 3324721, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2010) (same); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668–69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding no abuse of discretion where a district court dismissed a

claim without prejudice for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)).

The Court hereby

ORDERS that Jones’s Motion to Enforce, ECF 1, is DISMISSED;

ORDERS that Jones’s Motion to Stay, ECF 2, is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

DATE: May 1, 2023

Jia M. Cobb U.S. District Court Judge