Mosley v. Excel Corporation

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·Decided March 27, 1997·No. 96-10303·Published

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-10303

ERNEST MOSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

EXCEL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock

March 26, 1997

Before JOLLY, JONES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a claim against a meat packing company, Excel Corporation (“Excel”), which is a non-subscriber under the Texas Workers’ Compensation system and is therefore liable for negligence to its employees. Excel was sued by Ernest Mosley, an employee who suffers from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome because, according to his contention, Excel negligently failed to provide safe working conditions. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mosley and awarded $360,000 in damages. The trial judge, however, was not impressed with Mosley’s evidence on

causation and granted Excel’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. He further conditionally granted Excel’s motion for new trial in the event the judgment as a matter of law was vacated or reversed on appeal. Mosley appeals and seeks to have the judgment as a matter of law reversed, the conditional grant of a new trial vacated and the jury verdict reinstated. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

Excel operates meat packing plants throughout the country, including a plant in Plainview, Texas. Mosley is employed at the Plainview plant and has been an employee there, in various capacities, since 1981. At the time in question, Mosley worked as a supervisor in the “break area” of the plant.1 As supervisor of the break area, Mosley was responsible for assuring that all jobs in the department were adequately performed.

Mosley, however, contends that chronic absenteeism caused his department to be understaffed. Consequently, he spent between sixty and seventy percent of his time working as a skirt puller,2

1 The break area is the portion of the plant where the beef carcasses are broken down so that they can be distributed to various areas throughout the plant. The break area encompassed several jobs, including wing operator, frank cutter, scaler, rail watcher, and skirt puller.

2 A skirt puller is the individual responsible for cutting the skirt steak out of a beef carcass. In order to perform the job, a

one of several positions in his department, in order to provide adequate personnel for that position. It is this work, replacing the regular skirt pullers, that Mosley contends caused his carpal tunnel syndrome.3 Mosley contends that Excel failed to provide a safe workplace because of the negligent failure to implement adequate “precautionary” measures--such as decreased production rates and increased staff size--that he alleges would have aided in the prevention of cumulative trauma disorders such as carpal tunnel syndrome.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict for Mosley and awarded damages. The trial judge then granted Excel’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that Mosley “failed in [his] burden to produce legally sufficient

puller uses a hook, held in his left hand, to hold a carcass steady as it travels along a suspended chain. As the puller uses the hook to stabilize the carcass, he walks alongside the carcass and removes the skirt steak using a knife held in the right hand. It takes an average of six cuts to remove a steak.

3 The parties do not dispute that Mosley suffers from carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists. In fact, Mosley has undergone three surgeries to alleviate the problem. Excel paid all of the expenses related to the surgeries and the corresponding nonsurgical treatment.

4 Cumulative trauma disorders are injuries that result from the “wear and tear” on the tissue surrounding joints, ligaments, and tendons. These injuries are distinguished within the meat packing industry from accidental injuries that are the result of an identifiable occurrence.

evidence that any act or omission on the part of Defendant, EXCEL CORPORATION, was a cause in fact of [Mosley’s] injuries, and that [Mosley] failed in [his] burden to produce legally sufficient evidence to show that [his] injuries were reasonably foreseeable from the work activities associated with the employment at EXCEL CORPORATION.” Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in favor of Excel. Mosley appeals.5

II

A

We review the grant of a judgment as a matter of law using the same standard utilized by the trial court in granting the motion. Crosthwait Equip. Co. v. John Deere Co., 992 F.2d 525, 528 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 549 (1993). The standard of review, as set forth in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, instructs us to

consider all of the evidence--not just that evidence which supports the non-mover’s case--but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motion is proper. On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion[], that is, evidence of

5 Mosley also appeals the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of Excel on the issues of gross negligence and punitive damages and the conditional grant of a new trial in the event the judgment as a matter of law was reversed. Our resolution of the appeal of the judgment as a matter of law on the liability question renders these other grounds of appeal moot.

such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions, the motion[] should be denied, and the case submitted to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. The motion[] . . . should not be decided by which side has the better of the case, nor should [it] be granted only when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict. There must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury question. However, it is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine the credibility of witnesses.

411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). It is therefore our task today to consider all of the evidence, construed in favor of Mosley, and to determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Upon such review, we conclude that, because of the lack of a “conflict in substantial evidence,” the judgment as a matter of law should be affirmed.

B

Mosley’s sued Excel in federal district court in Texas, basing jurisdiction on the total diversity of the parties.6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Texas substantive law therefore controls Mosley’s negligence claim. Thus, Mosley was required to demonstrate that Excel owed a specific duty to him, that Excel breached that duty,

6 Mosley is a resident of Texas, and Excel is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Kansas. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement of $50,000.

that Excel’s breach caused his injury, and that he suffered damage as a result of Excel’s breach. See El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987). The district court held, in granting the judgment as a matter of law, that Mosley failed to establish causation.

Causation has two components, cause in fact, or “but for”

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