Opinion
ZARELLA, J.
The plaintiff, Mark Mosher, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the administrative decision of the named defendant, Michael Kozlowski, the commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner),2 suspending his right to operate a motor vehicle for six months pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b.3 On appeal, the plaintiff [457]*457claims that the trial court improperly (1) made factual conclusions beyond the subordinate findings of fact made by the hearing officer and (2) found that his conduct constituted a refusal as contemplated by § 14-227b. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are necessary to a resolution of this appeal. On July 18, 1998, the police received a complaint of a possible drunk [458]*458driver traveling west on Route 156 in Old Lyme. The Connecticut registration reported by the complainant was assigned to a black Toyota Camry. Within minutes of the complaint, Officer Amy F. Jones of the Old Lyme police department observed a black Camry being driven west on Route 156 by the plaintiff, with the same registration as described in the complaint. Jones followed the plaintiffs vehicle for approximately two miles and observed it swerve outside its travel lane and onto the yellow center lines several times. Also, the speed of the plaintiffs vehicle was inconsistent, ranging between twenty and fifty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone, and there was no traffic that would have caused the speed variations.
Jones stopped the plaintiffs vehicle and questioned him. She detected an odor of alcohol on the plaintiffs breath and noticed that his eyes were very red and glassy. Jones asked the plaintiff whether he had been drinking, and the plaintiff responded that he had a drink at the casino. The plaintiffs speech was slurred and he stumbled when asked to step out of his car. Jones administered several field sobriety tests, and the plaintiff failed every test. When another officer arrived, the field tests were again administered with similar results. The plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor and informed of his rights.
The plaintiff was taken to state police Troop F in Westbrook and was asked to submit to a breath test. The plaintiff agreed. The intoxilyzer machine was not working properly and the results would not print. The machine was cleared and a test was again attempted. The machine again malfunctioned. The plaintiff was asked to go to the Old Saybrook police department to submit to another breath test. The plaintiff refused to submit to the breath test at the other police station. The plaintiffs license was subsequently suspended for [459]*459his refusal to take a chemical alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b.
The commissioner, through a duly appointed hearing officer, held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiffs license to operate a motor vehicle should be suspended pursuant to § 14-227b. The hearing officer found affirmatively that the plaintiff had refused to submit to a chemical test of the alcohol content of his blood subsequent to being charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and consequently suspended the plaintiffs license for six months.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which governs motor vehicle appeals. See General Statutes § 4-183; Labenski v. Goldberg, 33 Conn. App. 727, 732, 638 A.2d 614 (1994). The trial court issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the plaintiffs appeal.
I
The plaintiff claims first that the trial court improperly made factual conclusions beyond the subordinate findings of fact made by the administrative agency hearing officer. We agree.
“[ T]he power of the trial court in appeals of this kind is very limited: [T]he Superior Court does not try the matter de novo; it is not its function to adjudicate questions of fact, nor may it substitute its own conclusions for those of the [commissioner]. ... Its function is to determine only if the [commissioner] acted rationally and logically or illegally and in abuse of its discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaplan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 4 Conn. App. 152, 153, 493 A.2d 248, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 802, 495 A.2d 281 (1985).
[460]*460The trial court, in this case, concluded that the evidence in the police report “provides more than conclu-sionary statements by the arresting officer that the driver failed to provide an adequate breath sample and, therefore, refused the test.”4 The hearing officer, however, made no findings concerning whether the plaintiff had intentionally failed to provide a sufficient breath sample. Further, the hearing officer made no findings that this contributed to her determination of the plaintiffs refusal. The commissioner’s conclusion, that the plaintiff refused to submit to a test, was based on the plaintiffs refusal to submit to a breath test at the Old Saybrook police station after the intoxilyzer test at Troop F had malfunctioned. The commissioner made no other findings as to the refusal issue. The trial court, therefore, improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the commissioner with respect to a question of fact. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (“court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact”); Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 380, 400, 610 A.2d 620 (1992) (trial court is not to substitute its judgment for that of commission as to questions of fact); Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 536, 560 A.2d 403 (1989) (this principle is “keystone of administrative appeals”); [461]*461Hansen v. Norton, 172 Conn. 292, 294, 374 A.2d 230 (1977).
Having determined that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the commissioner, we must now decide whether the court’s judgment should nevertheless be upheld. “Judicial review of [an administrative agency’s] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant. . . . Even as to questions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . .
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Opinion
ZARELLA, J.
The plaintiff, Mark Mosher, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the administrative decision of the named defendant, Michael Kozlowski, the commissioner of motor vehicles (commissioner),2 suspending his right to operate a motor vehicle for six months pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b.3 On appeal, the plaintiff [457]*457claims that the trial court improperly (1) made factual conclusions beyond the subordinate findings of fact made by the hearing officer and (2) found that his conduct constituted a refusal as contemplated by § 14-227b. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are necessary to a resolution of this appeal. On July 18, 1998, the police received a complaint of a possible drunk [458]*458driver traveling west on Route 156 in Old Lyme. The Connecticut registration reported by the complainant was assigned to a black Toyota Camry. Within minutes of the complaint, Officer Amy F. Jones of the Old Lyme police department observed a black Camry being driven west on Route 156 by the plaintiff, with the same registration as described in the complaint. Jones followed the plaintiffs vehicle for approximately two miles and observed it swerve outside its travel lane and onto the yellow center lines several times. Also, the speed of the plaintiffs vehicle was inconsistent, ranging between twenty and fifty miles per hour in a forty mile per hour zone, and there was no traffic that would have caused the speed variations.
Jones stopped the plaintiffs vehicle and questioned him. She detected an odor of alcohol on the plaintiffs breath and noticed that his eyes were very red and glassy. Jones asked the plaintiff whether he had been drinking, and the plaintiff responded that he had a drink at the casino. The plaintiffs speech was slurred and he stumbled when asked to step out of his car. Jones administered several field sobriety tests, and the plaintiff failed every test. When another officer arrived, the field tests were again administered with similar results. The plaintiff was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of liquor and informed of his rights.
The plaintiff was taken to state police Troop F in Westbrook and was asked to submit to a breath test. The plaintiff agreed. The intoxilyzer machine was not working properly and the results would not print. The machine was cleared and a test was again attempted. The machine again malfunctioned. The plaintiff was asked to go to the Old Saybrook police department to submit to another breath test. The plaintiff refused to submit to the breath test at the other police station. The plaintiffs license was subsequently suspended for [459]*459his refusal to take a chemical alcohol test pursuant to § 14-227b.
The commissioner, through a duly appointed hearing officer, held a hearing to determine whether the plaintiffs license to operate a motor vehicle should be suspended pursuant to § 14-227b. The hearing officer found affirmatively that the plaintiff had refused to submit to a chemical test of the alcohol content of his blood subsequent to being charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and consequently suspended the plaintiffs license for six months.
The plaintiff appealed to the trial court pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., which governs motor vehicle appeals. See General Statutes § 4-183; Labenski v. Goldberg, 33 Conn. App. 727, 732, 638 A.2d 614 (1994). The trial court issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the plaintiffs appeal.
I
The plaintiff claims first that the trial court improperly made factual conclusions beyond the subordinate findings of fact made by the administrative agency hearing officer. We agree.
“[ T]he power of the trial court in appeals of this kind is very limited: [T]he Superior Court does not try the matter de novo; it is not its function to adjudicate questions of fact, nor may it substitute its own conclusions for those of the [commissioner]. ... Its function is to determine only if the [commissioner] acted rationally and logically or illegally and in abuse of its discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kaplan v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 4 Conn. App. 152, 153, 493 A.2d 248, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 802, 495 A.2d 281 (1985).
[460]*460The trial court, in this case, concluded that the evidence in the police report “provides more than conclu-sionary statements by the arresting officer that the driver failed to provide an adequate breath sample and, therefore, refused the test.”4 The hearing officer, however, made no findings concerning whether the plaintiff had intentionally failed to provide a sufficient breath sample. Further, the hearing officer made no findings that this contributed to her determination of the plaintiffs refusal. The commissioner’s conclusion, that the plaintiff refused to submit to a test, was based on the plaintiffs refusal to submit to a breath test at the Old Saybrook police station after the intoxilyzer test at Troop F had malfunctioned. The commissioner made no other findings as to the refusal issue. The trial court, therefore, improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the commissioner with respect to a question of fact. General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (“court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact”); Timber Trails Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 222 Conn. 380, 400, 610 A.2d 620 (1992) (trial court is not to substitute its judgment for that of commission as to questions of fact); Levinson v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 211 Conn. 508, 536, 560 A.2d 403 (1989) (this principle is “keystone of administrative appeals”); [461]*461Hansen v. Norton, 172 Conn. 292, 294, 374 A.2d 230 (1977).
Having determined that the trial court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the commissioner, we must now decide whether the court’s judgment should nevertheless be upheld. “Judicial review of [an administrative agency’s] action is governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (General Statutes, c. 54, §§ 4-166 through 4-189), and the scope of that review is very restricted. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the defendant. . . . Even as to questions of law, [t]he court’s ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . . Although the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law ... it is the well established practice of this court to accord great deference to the construction given [a] statute by the agency charged with its enforcement.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 44 Conn. App. 611, 616-17, 691 A.2d 29 (1997), aff'd, 245 Conn. 149, 714 A.2d 664 (1998).
In this case, a sworn police report was offered at the administrative hearing that stated that the plaintiff refused to be tested on a different intoxilyzer machine at another police station. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence before the commissioner to find that the plaintiff refused to comply with the request that he submit to a test of his blood alcohol content.
[462]*462II
The plaintiff also claims that the trial court improperly found that his conduct constituted a refusal as contemplated by § 14-227b. Because the plaintiff took the required blood alcohol test at Troop F, he asserts that his refusal to submit to another test at the Old Saybrook police station does not constitute a refusal as defined by § 14-227b. The plaintiff claims that § 14-227b should be narrowly construed to require only that a person submit to one test to indicate the ratio of alcohol in their blood. We disagree.
It is undisputed that the intoxilyzer machine at Troop F malfunctioned when testing the plaintiff. The plaintiff was then asked to submit to a breath test at another police station. Section 14-227b requires a person to submit to a chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine. Under the plaintiffs desired interpretation, the requirements of § 14-227b would be satisfied by his submission to a test that yielded no results. Surely, the legislature did not intend such an irrational result. “In construing a statute, common sense must be used, and courts will assume that the legislature intended to accomplish a reasonable and rational result.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ciarelli v. Commercial Union Ins. Cos., 234 Conn. 807, 812, 663 A.2d 377 (1995).
The plaintiff claims that if the legislature had intended that there be a requirement to submit to multiple tests, it would not have used the singular word “test” in the statute. We disagree.
A test is defined as “an act or process that reveals inherent qualities . . . .” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Thus, a result is a necessary part of a test. The only evidence presented to this court is that the machine malfunctioned and yielded no results.
[463]*463We therefore conclude that the trial court did not improperly find that the plaintiffs conduct constituted a refusal as contemplated by § 14-227b.5
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion FOTI, J., concurred.