Mosgrove v. United States

141 Ct. Cl. 666, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1958 WL 7361
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 5, 1958
DocketNo. 609-53
StatusPublished

This text of 141 Ct. Cl. 666 (Mosgrove v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mosgrove v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 666, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1958 WL 7361 (cc 1958).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, a Eegular Army officer, sues for the difference in the active-duty pay of a captain and a major for the period September 12, 1946, to September 14, 1950, less any amounts previously received. Defendant has entered a counterclaim for amounts received by plaintiff, during the period in issue, by reason of his having been paid in the grade of major rather than captain, less amounts already refunded. The sole question presented is whether or not plaintiff, during the period here involved, was either a major de jure or de facto. If so, then he is unquestionably entitled to the judgment he seeks.

The facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim are as follows:

Plaintiff, a dentist, first entered active duty with the Army on June 15, 1942. On November 23, 1943, he was given a temporary promotion to the grade of captain, Dental Corps, Army of the United States. As an incident to processing for release from active duty, he was awarded a terminal leave promotion to major effective December 20, 1945. The next day, December 21, 1945, he was tendered and accepted an appointment to major, Dental Corps, Officers’ Eeserve Corps.

On August 24, 1946, while on an inactive status, plaintiff received and accepted a recess appointment as a captain, Dental Corps, Eegular Army, pursuant to a provision of Special Orders No. 185, which provided in pertinent part:

[668]*668DP announcement is made of tbe recess apmt of the fol-named officers or former officers AUS, RES and NGUS in the.RA eff this date with grade, date of rank, and in the branch indicated.
Acceptance of this commission in the RA will not affect any existing commission in the AUS without component with the exception that those commissions now held as a result of promotions under the provisions embodied in Cir. 10 or Cir. 140 WD 1946 are administratively vacated and apmt in the AUS is hereby effected in the grade held immediately prior to processing for relief from active duty. In those cases where apt in the RA effected by this order is in the same grade as formerly or presently held the RA grade will govern.
In the case of those appointees who hold only a commission in the RES or NGUS, this order constitutes apmt in the AUS without component in the same grade as held in the RES or NGUS.

Thereafter plaintiff received orders to report to active duty. These orders referred to the plaintiff as a major and he performed the duties and received the pay of a major on active duty for four years.1 On September 14, 1950, the Department of the Army issued orders which purported to promote plaintiff to a major in the Army of the United States. This was followed by notice from the Adjutant General that plaintiff had “served in the erroneous grade of major” during the period September 24, 1946 through September 13,1950. Proceedings were then instituted to collect a claimed overpayment resulting from plaintiff’s service in such higher grade. The claimed overpayment amounts to $3,952.69 and has been and is being collected from plaintiff at the rate of $56 per month. It is the amount collected to date which is sought to be recovered.

We think that upon the facts as presented in this case plaintiff was at the very least a de facto major. Special Orders No. 185 made plaintiff a captain in the Regular Army and at the same time appointed him a major in the Army of the United States. This is patently evident from the very wording of the order itself. The first paragraph of Special Orders No. 185, quoted above, vacated terminal leave promo[669]*669tions and for those officers whose terminal leave promotions were so vacated effected appointments in the Army of the United States in the grade which they held immediately prior to processing for release from active duty. That paragraph clearly did not apply to the plaintiff because his terminal leave promotion had already expired when he received Special Orders No. 185. (See finding 4 to which no exception has been taken.) Plaintiff’s only connection with the Army at that time was by virtue of his reserve majority. Under the third paragraph of Special Orders No. 185, appointees who held only Reserve commissions were appointed to the Army of the United States in their Reserve grade. Thus the order on its face appointed plaintiff a major in the Army of the United States. Plaintiff apparently interpreted the Order as effecting a temporary promotion for active-duty purposes in the Army of the United States in a grade higher than his permanent Regular Army grade. We think that such an interpretation was fully justified. No other meaning could be given to the clear and unambiguous wording of the Order. It is not at all unusual for an officer to be serving on active duty in a temporary grade higher than his permanent grade. That the. Army must have also felt this to be true is evidenced by the fact that orders directing him to active duty referred to plaintiff as major. Not until almost four years later did they rule that he was serving in an unauthorized grade. During this period plaintiff was at all times referred to as a major and did in fact perform the duties incident to that office. Under these facte we think that plaintiff acted in good faith and under color of authority when he performed the duties of major and is entitled to be paid commensurate with that position. United States v. Royer, 268 U. S. 394; Chandler v. United States, 70 C. Cls. 690; Badeau v. United States, 130 U. S. 439.

The defendant’s counterclaim will be dismissed, and judgment will be entered for plaintiff in accordance with the above opinion. The amount of recovery will be determined pursuant to Rule 38 (c) of the Rules of this court.

It is so ordered.

MaddeN, .Judge; Whitaker, Judge; LittletoN, Judge; and Jones, Chief Judge, concur.

[670]*670FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Commissioner Currell Vance, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. The plaintiff, Richard Leigh Mosgrove, was appointed first lieutenant, Dental Corps, Officers’ Reserve Corps, on June 6,1938. He accepted the appointment on the same day. As a Reserve officer he was assigned service No. 0367608. On June 15,1942, plaintiff was ordered to active duty in the grade of first lieutenant. He was given a temporary promotion to the grade of captain, Dental Corps, Army of the United States, on November 23,1943. He was given a terminal leave promotion to major, Dental Corps, Army of the United States, on December 20, 1945, incident to processing for his release from active duty. While on terminal leave, on December 21, 1945, plaintiff was appointed to major in the Dental Corps of the Officers’ Reserve Corps. He accepted this appointment on the same date.

2. On August 24,1946, plaintiff received a recess appointment as a captain, Dental Corps in the Regular Army, pursuant to the provision of Special Orders No. 185 which provided in pertinent part:

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Badeau v. United States
130 U.S. 439 (Supreme Court, 1889)
United States v. Royer
268 U.S. 394 (Supreme Court, 1925)
Blue v. McCabe
31 P. 431 (Washington Supreme Court, 1892)
Chandler v. United States
70 Ct. Cl. 690 (Court of Claims, 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
141 Ct. Cl. 666, 1958 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 99, 1958 WL 7361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mosgrove-v-united-states-cc-1958.