1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 TOM MOSGROVE, Case No. 24-cv-00808-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE A 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND SUA SPONTE GRANTING 11 Defendants. EXTENTION OF TIME BY 10 DAYS
12 [Re: ECF No. 76]
13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff Tom Mosgrove’s (“Plaintiff”) administrative motion to extend 15 his deadline to file a second amended complaint. ECF 76. Defendants City of Morgan Hill, Scott Martin, Matthew Donatoni, Katrina Olson (collectively, “City Defendants”) and the County of Santa 16 Clara (“County”) filed two oppositions. ECF 77, 78. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES 17 Plaintiff’s administrative motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this action against City Defendants, County, and the Police Chiefs’ 20 Association of Santa Clara County (“PCA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on February 9, 2024. ECF 21 1. Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) as of right on April 25, 2024. ECF 31. While 22 District Attorney Jeffrey F. Rosen (“D.A. Rosen”) was not named as a defendant in the initial 23 complaint, he was added as a defendant in the FAC. See ECF 1, 31. City Defendants answered the 24 FAC. ECF 38. County, D.A. Rosen and PCA moved to dismiss the FAC under Federal Rules of 25 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 41, 49. The Court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss on 26 September 12, 2024. ECF 68. At the hearing, the Court stated that it would give Plaintiff “ample 27 1 the Court that 60 days would be sufficient. ECF 71, Motion to Dismiss Tr. at 39:25-40:5. On October 2 8, 2024, the Court issued the Order granting the motions to dismiss with leave to amend as to County 3 and PCA and without leave to amend as to D.A. Rosen. See ECF 74 at 7-8. The Court set the deadline 4 for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to be December 7, 2024, which is 60 days after the Court 5 issued its Order. See id. at 8. On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Administrative Motion, 6 requesting the deadline to be extended to January 21, 2025, or a date thereafter. ECF 76 at 5. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Courts have broad discretion to grant extensions of time. Jenkins v. Commonwealth Land 9 Title Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1), 10 when an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time if 11 the request for an extension is made before the original time or its extension expires. See Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). The rule is “to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing 13 that cases are tried on the merits.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (9th 14 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, a court should normally grant requests for extensions of time 15 made before the applicable deadline has passed “in absence of bad faith on the part of the party 16 seeking relief or prejudice to the adverse party.” Id., 624 F.3d at 1259. 17 “‘Good cause’ is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural 18 and statutory contexts.” Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1259. Sister courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied 19 the “good cause” standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16(b), which permits a party to 20 modify a scheduling order “for good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), to that in Rule 6(b)(1)(A). 21 See, e.g., Liu v. Mandalay Bay, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01435-CDS-VCF, 2024 WL 95522, at *2 (D. 22 Nev. Jan. 8, 2024); Saxena v. Matinez-Hernandez, 2024 WL 728657, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 21, 2024); 23 Galvan v. Duffie, 2018 WL 10436581, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018). When evaluating whether 24 the “good cause” standard has been met, the court primarily considers the diligence of the party 25 seeking the extension. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) 26 (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 27 amendment”). A deadline may be extended “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of III. DISCUSSION 1 Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to extend the deadline. ECF 76 at 3-5. Specifically, 2 Plaintiff states that he has worked diligently on discovery since its commencement in September. 3 Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, after reviewing the discovery responses from City Defendants, he 4 served City Defendants a Notice of Taking Deposition of Officer Martin on November 21, 2024, 5 but City Defendants indicated that Officer Martin would not be available for a deposition until 6 January 2025. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that he will “suffer substantial harm” if he could not depose 7 Officer Martin before filing his amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff further argues that an extension of 8 the deadline will not prejudice Defendants because “discovery is ongoing.” Id. 9 In their opposition, City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request is not supported by good 10 cause because he delayed until November 21, 2024, to unilaterally notice Officer Martin’s 11 deposition via 11 days’ notice. ECF 77 at 4. City Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to 12 explain why Officer Martin’s deposition is needed to amend his claims against the County and PCA, 13 and Plaintiff’s attempt to collect information on the dismissed Defendants for his amended 14 complaint is “inappropriate.” Id. City Defendants further argue that they will be prejudiced since 15 the extension will cause unnecessary delays in light of other discovery deadlines. ECF 77 at 5. 16 In its opposition, County contends that there is no basis for extending the deadline to amend 17 Plaintiff’s complaint for Officer Martin’s deposition because Plaintiff must satisfy the pleading 18 requirements before the discovery stage. ECF 78 at 2 (citing Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 19 593 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted)). County further contends that Plaintiff has failed to 20 act diligently because he did not serve his deposition notice until sixteen days before the amended 21 complaint was due. ECF 78 at 2. Additionally, County argues that it will be prejudiced by the 22 requested extension in light of other discovery deadlines. ECF 78 at 3. 23 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for the requested extension of 24 time to file an amended complaint. As advised by Plaintiff, the Court provided him 60 days after 25 issuance of its Order granting the motions to dismiss for him to amend his complaint, but Plaintiff 26 delayed almost two months in noticing Officer Martin’s deposition. See ECF 77-1, Declaration of 27 Sheila D. Crawford (“Crawford Decl.”), at ¶¶ 5, 8; ECF 77-1, Ex. A. Plaintiff has known of the 1 Court’s order with respect to the sufficiency of his complaint since the hearing on September 12, 2 2024, and no later than October 8, 2024, when the Court issued its order granting the motions to 3 dismiss. See ECF 67, 74.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 SAN JOSE DIVISION 6 7 TOM MOSGROVE, Case No. 24-cv-00808-BLF
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 9 v. ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO EXTEND DEADLINE TO FILE A 10 COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al., SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND SUA SPONTE GRANTING 11 Defendants. EXTENTION OF TIME BY 10 DAYS
12 [Re: ECF No. 76]
13 14 Before the Court is Plaintiff Tom Mosgrove’s (“Plaintiff”) administrative motion to extend 15 his deadline to file a second amended complaint. ECF 76. Defendants City of Morgan Hill, Scott Martin, Matthew Donatoni, Katrina Olson (collectively, “City Defendants”) and the County of Santa 16 Clara (“County”) filed two oppositions. ECF 77, 78. For the reasons below, the Court DENIES 17 Plaintiff’s administrative motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff filed this action against City Defendants, County, and the Police Chiefs’ 20 Association of Santa Clara County (“PCA”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on February 9, 2024. ECF 21 1. Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint (“FAC”) as of right on April 25, 2024. ECF 31. While 22 District Attorney Jeffrey F. Rosen (“D.A. Rosen”) was not named as a defendant in the initial 23 complaint, he was added as a defendant in the FAC. See ECF 1, 31. City Defendants answered the 24 FAC. ECF 38. County, D.A. Rosen and PCA moved to dismiss the FAC under Federal Rules of 25 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 41, 49. The Court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss on 26 September 12, 2024. ECF 68. At the hearing, the Court stated that it would give Plaintiff “ample 27 1 the Court that 60 days would be sufficient. ECF 71, Motion to Dismiss Tr. at 39:25-40:5. On October 2 8, 2024, the Court issued the Order granting the motions to dismiss with leave to amend as to County 3 and PCA and without leave to amend as to D.A. Rosen. See ECF 74 at 7-8. The Court set the deadline 4 for Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to be December 7, 2024, which is 60 days after the Court 5 issued its Order. See id. at 8. On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant Administrative Motion, 6 requesting the deadline to be extended to January 21, 2025, or a date thereafter. ECF 76 at 5. 7 II. LEGAL STANDARD 8 Courts have broad discretion to grant extensions of time. Jenkins v. Commonwealth Land 9 Title Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1), 10 when an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time if 11 the request for an extension is made before the original time or its extension expires. See Fed. R. 12 Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A). The rule is “to be liberally construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing 13 that cases are tried on the merits.” Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1258–59 (9th 14 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, a court should normally grant requests for extensions of time 15 made before the applicable deadline has passed “in absence of bad faith on the part of the party 16 seeking relief or prejudice to the adverse party.” Id., 624 F.3d at 1259. 17 “‘Good cause’ is a non-rigorous standard that has been construed broadly across procedural 18 and statutory contexts.” Ahanchian, 624 F.3d at 1259. Sister courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied 19 the “good cause” standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16(b), which permits a party to 20 modify a scheduling order “for good cause,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4), to that in Rule 6(b)(1)(A). 21 See, e.g., Liu v. Mandalay Bay, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01435-CDS-VCF, 2024 WL 95522, at *2 (D. 22 Nev. Jan. 8, 2024); Saxena v. Matinez-Hernandez, 2024 WL 728657, at *1 (D. Nev. Feb. 21, 2024); 23 Galvan v. Duffie, 2018 WL 10436581, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2018). When evaluating whether 24 the “good cause” standard has been met, the court primarily considers the diligence of the party 25 seeking the extension. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992) 26 (“Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 27 amendment”). A deadline may be extended “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of III. DISCUSSION 1 Plaintiff argues that good cause exists to extend the deadline. ECF 76 at 3-5. Specifically, 2 Plaintiff states that he has worked diligently on discovery since its commencement in September. 3 Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, after reviewing the discovery responses from City Defendants, he 4 served City Defendants a Notice of Taking Deposition of Officer Martin on November 21, 2024, 5 but City Defendants indicated that Officer Martin would not be available for a deposition until 6 January 2025. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends that he will “suffer substantial harm” if he could not depose 7 Officer Martin before filing his amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff further argues that an extension of 8 the deadline will not prejudice Defendants because “discovery is ongoing.” Id. 9 In their opposition, City Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request is not supported by good 10 cause because he delayed until November 21, 2024, to unilaterally notice Officer Martin’s 11 deposition via 11 days’ notice. ECF 77 at 4. City Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to 12 explain why Officer Martin’s deposition is needed to amend his claims against the County and PCA, 13 and Plaintiff’s attempt to collect information on the dismissed Defendants for his amended 14 complaint is “inappropriate.” Id. City Defendants further argue that they will be prejudiced since 15 the extension will cause unnecessary delays in light of other discovery deadlines. ECF 77 at 5. 16 In its opposition, County contends that there is no basis for extending the deadline to amend 17 Plaintiff’s complaint for Officer Martin’s deposition because Plaintiff must satisfy the pleading 18 requirements before the discovery stage. ECF 78 at 2 (citing Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 19 593 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted)). County further contends that Plaintiff has failed to 20 act diligently because he did not serve his deposition notice until sixteen days before the amended 21 complaint was due. ECF 78 at 2. Additionally, County argues that it will be prejudiced by the 22 requested extension in light of other discovery deadlines. ECF 78 at 3. 23 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to show good cause for the requested extension of 24 time to file an amended complaint. As advised by Plaintiff, the Court provided him 60 days after 25 issuance of its Order granting the motions to dismiss for him to amend his complaint, but Plaintiff 26 delayed almost two months in noticing Officer Martin’s deposition. See ECF 77-1, Declaration of 27 Sheila D. Crawford (“Crawford Decl.”), at ¶¶ 5, 8; ECF 77-1, Ex. A. Plaintiff has known of the 1 Court’s order with respect to the sufficiency of his complaint since the hearing on September 12, 2 2024, and no later than October 8, 2024, when the Court issued its order granting the motions to 3 dismiss. See ECF 67, 74. Without any good reason, Plaintiff’s delay of more than a month to 4 unilaterally notice Officer Martin’s deposition shortly before the deadline to amend his complaint 5 does not show reasonable diligence. See Tindall v. First Solar Inc., 892 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 6 2018) (affirming district court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to extend the deadline for filing their 7 amended complaint because plaintiffs had not shown good cause). 8 Moreover, Plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to develop his pleading. “Plaintiffs must 9 satisfy the pleading requirements [] before the discovery stage, not after it.” Mujica, 771 F.3d at 593 10 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)) (emphasis in original). Thus, 11 Plaintiff’s requested extension is not justified to the extent he seeks to amend his complaint based 12 on Officer Martin’s deposition. 13 Lastly, the Court finds Defendants will be prejudiced if an extension to file an amended 14 complaint is granted. Under the current scheduling order, the fact discovery cutoff is August 29, 15 2025, and the expert disclosure deadline is September 5, 2025. ECF 73. In view of the current 16 discovery schedule and other existing deadlines, an extension to file an amended complaint to 17 January 21, 2025, will lead to undue delay and the Defendants will not have sufficient time to 18 complete their discovery. 19 However, recognizing the short time remaining before the due date for the amended 20 complaint, the Court will grant an additional ten (10) days for Plaintiff to file the amended complaint 21 in consideration of counsel’s workload. 22 IV. ORDER 23 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 24 Plaintiff’s administrative motion to extend its deadline to file a second amended complaint 25 is DENIED but the Court sua sponte extends the deadline by ten (10) days. Plaintiff SHALL file an 26 amended complaint on or before the December 17, 2024, deadline. 27 // 1 Dated: December 6, 2024
4ern LABSON FREEMAN 3 United States District Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 e 12
13 14
15 16
Zz 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28