This opinion was prepared by the late Justice Robert C. Finley. It is adopted by the undersigned Justices as the opinion of this Court.
[714]*714In this matter, the issue is whether it was error for the Superior Court for Stevens County to deny permanent custody to the mother of four minor children solely on the ground that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident father of the children.
We reverse the trial court and hold that it has in personam jurisdiction because (1) the record contains evidence indicating the commission in Washington of a tortious act, namely child nonsupport by the father, and (2) this tortious act permits the extension of jurisdiction under Washington’s long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185), without offending the minimal due process standards established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154,161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
The decision in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 97 L. Ed. 1221, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953), seems to have become something of a sacred cow in the law of domestic relations but, we think, with about as little rationality as attributable generally to the idolization of most sacred cows. In May v. Anderson, supra, the court seems to have overlooked, or perhaps closed its eyes to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950), with its potential for an accommodation of any due process difficulties in custody cases. Certainly the court ignored the practical, critical, and crucial problems with which courts, parents, and children frequently are faced in custody proceedings. Essentially, the court seems to have failed to recognize the inappropriateness of requiring in personam jurisdiction over both parents as an indispensable ingredient of a custody proceeding. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court’s timid approach to concepts of state court jurisdiction has been criticized vigorously.1 We believe that the [715]*715May v. Anderson decision has lost the vitality it may once have had and should be overruled. Fortunately, because of the availability of Washington’s long-arm statute,2 and because of the facts of the instant child custody case, May v. Anderson does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the reasonable and effective administration of justice in the instant case.
Petitioner, Josephine Moses, is the mother of four children, two boys and two girls, aged from 4 to 8 years. All are Washington domiciliaries and reside in Stevens County. The putative, but not duly married, father, Gilbert Miller, resides in Idaho and is domiciled there.
On December 26, 1974, the father brought the four children, ill-clad and in an unkempt condition, to the mother’s home where he delivered them to her. The record does not reflect where the parents lived prior to the time the children were turned over to the mother. On January 6, 1975, the mother filed a summons and petition in Stevens County Superior Court seeking a decree (1) awarding her permanent custody of the children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation, and (2) ordering the father to pay child support. A copy of the summons and petition was served personally on the father in Idaho on January 16, 1975, but he failed to respond. The mother later caused a notice of intent to take default to be mailed to the father at his Idaho address. The father again did not respond.
Also, on January 6, 1975, the mother filed a motion in the [716]*716case to enable her to proceed in forma pauperis. The accompanying affidavit fully discloses her impoverished financial status. Listing the sources of any income or other funds received from January 1, 1974, to January 3, 1975, the mother stated that during this period of time she received certain per capita payments, apparently to be used for necessities only for the boys, and that she worked for a short time at the Native American Center in Spokane. The affidavit also lists all of her expenses, debts, and assets. It is apparent that, if the mother had received any income for the support of the children from the father, this fact would have been reflected in the affidavit. Thus, the affidavit provides a convincing, if not inescapable, evidentiary inference that the father has not provided for the support of the children. Such an inference from the affidavit is consistent with the provision of the petition requesting the assistance of the court in obtaining child support from the father.
On March 28, 1975, the trial court held a hearing on the mother’s petition in the superior court at which she sought an order of default and an entry of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree awarding her custody of the children. The trial judge took the matter under advisement and on April 11, 1975, returned to the mother’s attorney the unsigned findings, conclusions, and decree with a letter explaining that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award custody to the mother without in personam jurisdiction over the father.
The mother then filed an application for a v/rit of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The writ was granted, and on August 22, 1975, we remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of an order disposing of the mother’s application for a child custody decree. Jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of review. On September 2, 1975, the trial judge signed an order denying the mother’s motion for the entry of findings, conclusions, and decree. The first writ of certiorari was amended with the consent of petitioner and the prosecuting attorney to show that the September 2, 1975, written order had been signed and filed as indicated.
[717]*717The application for the original writ of certiorari was premature. The trial court had not made a final determination which is necessary in order to make the application for the writ. RCW 7.16.030-.040; see State ex rel. Thomas v. Lawler, 23 Wn.2d 87, 159 P.2d 622 (1945). A writ of certiorari may be treated as a writ of mandamus, it being so in substance. See Tuschoff v. Westover, 60 Wn.2d 722, 375 P.2d 254 (1952); State ex rel. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Wn.2d 327, 155 P.2d 1005 (1945). A writ of mandamus is not premature because it was the duty of the trial judge to complete the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction by entering findings, conclusions, and judgment of dismissal to embody his view that the court lacked jurisdiction. That duty was not discharged even by the entry of the written order of September 2, 1975. A writ of mandamus lies to compel performance of that duty. See State ex rel. Pacific Coast Adjustment Co. v. Taggart, 159 Wash. 201, 204, 292 P. 741 (1930).
Although there may not be sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that the father had delivered the children to the mother in Washington for the purpose of abandoning them, there is ample evidence to show that he has failed to support them.
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This opinion was prepared by the late Justice Robert C. Finley. It is adopted by the undersigned Justices as the opinion of this Court.
[714]*714In this matter, the issue is whether it was error for the Superior Court for Stevens County to deny permanent custody to the mother of four minor children solely on the ground that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident father of the children.
We reverse the trial court and hold that it has in personam jurisdiction because (1) the record contains evidence indicating the commission in Washington of a tortious act, namely child nonsupport by the father, and (2) this tortious act permits the extension of jurisdiction under Washington’s long-arm statute (RCW 4.28.185), without offending the minimal due process standards established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154,161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
The decision in May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 97 L. Ed. 1221, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1953), seems to have become something of a sacred cow in the law of domestic relations but, we think, with about as little rationality as attributable generally to the idolization of most sacred cows. In May v. Anderson, supra, the court seems to have overlooked, or perhaps closed its eyes to Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950), with its potential for an accommodation of any due process difficulties in custody cases. Certainly the court ignored the practical, critical, and crucial problems with which courts, parents, and children frequently are faced in custody proceedings. Essentially, the court seems to have failed to recognize the inappropriateness of requiring in personam jurisdiction over both parents as an indispensable ingredient of a custody proceeding. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court’s timid approach to concepts of state court jurisdiction has been criticized vigorously.1 We believe that the [715]*715May v. Anderson decision has lost the vitality it may once have had and should be overruled. Fortunately, because of the availability of Washington’s long-arm statute,2 and because of the facts of the instant child custody case, May v. Anderson does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the reasonable and effective administration of justice in the instant case.
Petitioner, Josephine Moses, is the mother of four children, two boys and two girls, aged from 4 to 8 years. All are Washington domiciliaries and reside in Stevens County. The putative, but not duly married, father, Gilbert Miller, resides in Idaho and is domiciled there.
On December 26, 1974, the father brought the four children, ill-clad and in an unkempt condition, to the mother’s home where he delivered them to her. The record does not reflect where the parents lived prior to the time the children were turned over to the mother. On January 6, 1975, the mother filed a summons and petition in Stevens County Superior Court seeking a decree (1) awarding her permanent custody of the children, subject to reasonable rights of visitation, and (2) ordering the father to pay child support. A copy of the summons and petition was served personally on the father in Idaho on January 16, 1975, but he failed to respond. The mother later caused a notice of intent to take default to be mailed to the father at his Idaho address. The father again did not respond.
Also, on January 6, 1975, the mother filed a motion in the [716]*716case to enable her to proceed in forma pauperis. The accompanying affidavit fully discloses her impoverished financial status. Listing the sources of any income or other funds received from January 1, 1974, to January 3, 1975, the mother stated that during this period of time she received certain per capita payments, apparently to be used for necessities only for the boys, and that she worked for a short time at the Native American Center in Spokane. The affidavit also lists all of her expenses, debts, and assets. It is apparent that, if the mother had received any income for the support of the children from the father, this fact would have been reflected in the affidavit. Thus, the affidavit provides a convincing, if not inescapable, evidentiary inference that the father has not provided for the support of the children. Such an inference from the affidavit is consistent with the provision of the petition requesting the assistance of the court in obtaining child support from the father.
On March 28, 1975, the trial court held a hearing on the mother’s petition in the superior court at which she sought an order of default and an entry of findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree awarding her custody of the children. The trial judge took the matter under advisement and on April 11, 1975, returned to the mother’s attorney the unsigned findings, conclusions, and decree with a letter explaining that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to award custody to the mother without in personam jurisdiction over the father.
The mother then filed an application for a v/rit of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The writ was granted, and on August 22, 1975, we remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of an order disposing of the mother’s application for a child custody decree. Jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of review. On September 2, 1975, the trial judge signed an order denying the mother’s motion for the entry of findings, conclusions, and decree. The first writ of certiorari was amended with the consent of petitioner and the prosecuting attorney to show that the September 2, 1975, written order had been signed and filed as indicated.
[717]*717The application for the original writ of certiorari was premature. The trial court had not made a final determination which is necessary in order to make the application for the writ. RCW 7.16.030-.040; see State ex rel. Thomas v. Lawler, 23 Wn.2d 87, 159 P.2d 622 (1945). A writ of certiorari may be treated as a writ of mandamus, it being so in substance. See Tuschoff v. Westover, 60 Wn.2d 722, 375 P.2d 254 (1952); State ex rel. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Wn.2d 327, 155 P.2d 1005 (1945). A writ of mandamus is not premature because it was the duty of the trial judge to complete the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction by entering findings, conclusions, and judgment of dismissal to embody his view that the court lacked jurisdiction. That duty was not discharged even by the entry of the written order of September 2, 1975. A writ of mandamus lies to compel performance of that duty. See State ex rel. Pacific Coast Adjustment Co. v. Taggart, 159 Wash. 201, 204, 292 P. 741 (1930).
Although there may not be sufficient evidence in the record to indicate that the father had delivered the children to the mother in Washington for the purpose of abandoning them, there is ample evidence to show that he has failed to support them. The distinction between abandonment and nonsupport is crucial. They are not synonymous; nonsupport in and of itself does not constitute abandonment. Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 P.2d 853 (1947). The term “abandonment” means the voluntary failure or neglect to care for as well as the failure to support, i.e., furnish necessary food, clothing, and shelter, a child. See In re Adoption of Lybbert, 75 Wn.2d 671, 674, 453 P.2d 650 (1969); In re Adoption of Webb, 14 Wn. App. 651, 544 P.2d 130 (1975); In re Paden, 181 Misc. 1025, 43 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1943). The duty to “care for” includes the parental obligation to train, supervise, and guide a child’s growth and development. In re Estate of Musczak, 196 Misc. 364, 92 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (1949). Nonsupport, on the other hand, connotes a failure to contribute to the maintenance and material well-being of a child. In re Estate of Musczak, [718]*718supra at 100; see RCW 26.20.030(1) (b) (failure to “furnish necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical attendance.”)
The distinction between abandonment and nonsupport is reflected further by the statutory scheme providing for criminal nonsupport prosecution under RCW 26.20.030.3 Under that statute, abandonment is distinguished from nonsupport. Huffman v. Smith, 34 Wn.2d 914, 918, 210 P.2d 805 (1949); see State v. Russell, 68 Wn.2d 748, 755, 415 P.2d 503 (1966); State v. Brown, 52 Wn.2d 92, 94, 323 P.2d 239 (1958).
The failure of a parent to support his or her children constitutes a tort. In State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140, 143 (1974), a filiation proceeding, the court stated:
The doing of an act prohibited by law or the neglect to perform a duty imposed by law, resulting in damages to another, creates a legal liability, . . . and may be denominated a tort within the scope of the long-arm statute.
(Citation omitted.) Accord, Gentry v. Davis, 512 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tenn. 1974) (a filiation proceeding in which the long-arm statute was applied). In Nelson, the court concluded that the father’s failure to perform his statutory duty to support his child caused foreseeable damages to the complainant and provided a sufficient basis upon which to exercise in personam jurisdiction under the long-arm statute. See Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795,839 (1964).
[719]*719In Washington, a parent has both a statutory and a common-law duty to support his or her children. For example, a putative father’s duty to support his children can be enforced judicially on behalf of the children by a filiation proceeding (RCW 26.24), or under the common-law right of illegitimate children to support by their natural father. Kaur v. Chawla, 11 Wn. App. 362, 522 P.2d 1198 (1974). The record demonstrates that the father has failed to support his children since December 1974. Nonsupport constitutes a tortious act.
The merits of the jurisdictional question may now be addressed. In Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wn.2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245 (1963), the court set forth an oft-repeated jurisdictional formula:
[T]here are three basic factors which must coincide if jurisdiction is to be entertained. Such would appear to be: (1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
(Footnotes omitted.) All of these elements must be satisfied in order to exercise in personam jurisdiction under Washington’s long-arm statute.
The first requirement is met because the father purposefully has failed to support his children since he delivered them to their mother in December 1974. The failure of a nonresident to perform his duty or obligation as imposed by law to support his natural children, whether they be domiciled or merely resident in this state, constitutes a tortious act as that term is contemplated by RCW 4.28.185(1) (b).
The next issue, one of general fairness, concerns the [720]*720second element of the Tyee jurisdictional formula. It requires that the cause of action arise from or be connected with the tortious act. The custody proceeding is an integral part of, grows out of, and is connected with the father’s purposeful failure or omission to support his offspring. It was reasonably foreseeable to the respondent that, as a direct result of his nonsupport, the petitioning mother upon whom the children depend for their material well-being would seek the legal custody of the children. The second prerequisite to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is complied with because the custody matter is connected directly with the respondent’s other actions or activities in the state. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445-46, 96 L. Ed. 485, 72 S. Ct. 413 (1952); Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wn.2d 719, 725, 504 P.2d 782 (1972); Deutsch v. West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wn.2d 707, 713, 497 P.2d 1311 (1972); Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and The In personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 569, 601 (1958).
In determining whether the respondent is accorded the “fair play and substantial justice” requirement of the Tyee jurisdictional formula, this must be considered in context with and cannot be divorced from the nature of the underlying controversy which evoked this litigation. One also must keep in mind that the welfare of the children is the paramount concern, coupled with the secondary interests of the parents and the state in the resolution of this issue.
Traditionally, custody has been treated as a matter of “status” and has been analogized to other status concepts, e.g., marriage, legitimacy, and adoption. Although the purpose of other status concepts primarily may involve the creation or recognition of legal relationships, custody differs somewhat in that it is concerned with determining conflicting claims to the care and control of the children. It recognizes and imposes new personal obligations on parents [721]*721(and occasionally third parties) with respect to the subject matter of the custody proceeding, i.e., children.
It should be noted that, in addition to the requirement of in personam jurisdiction4 over both parents,5 Washington persistently has followed the rule that the child must be domiciled in the state.6 Even this rule is too harsh because [722]*722the technical subtleties of the concept7 are irrelevant to a custody proceeding.
Washington adheres to the view taken by the old Restatement,8 which treats the child’s status as though it were a “res.”9 The theory is that the “res” is subject to the control or power of the state in which the child is domiciled because the domiciliary state has the most substantial interest in the welfare of its citizens. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 79, comment a at 237 (1971); Stumberg, The Status of Children in the Conflict of Laws, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 42, 55 (1940).
In the instant case, the parents and the alternative forums, i.e., Washington or Idaho, have a substantial interest in providing a final resolution of this custody matter, and the paramount concern of all parties should be the welfare of the children. Idaho, under its law, cannot enter a binding decree awarding permanent custody to a parent in the absence of at least the temporary physical presence of the children in that forum. Schmitt v. Schmitt, 83 Idaho 300, 306, 362 P.2d 884, 887 (1961). Even if the mother were to consent to the jurisdiction of the Idaho courts to entertain this matter, the physical presence of the children apparently would be required. This would require a change in [723]*723their environment, if not their actual physical custody, which would be disruptive to the children’s well-being and contrary to the policy of this jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Saucido, 85 Wn.2d 653, 662, 538 P.2d 1219 (1975) (Finley, J., concurring); Anderson v. Anderson, 14 Wn. App. 366, 368, 541 P.2d 996 (1975); RCW 26.09.260(c). These circumstances, coupled with strong considerations of social policy which require that at least one of the alternative state forums should have the juridical power to render a final adjudication as to both parents’ rights to the custody of their children,10 strongly militate against a conclusion that Idaho is a convenient forum to hear and decide the merits of this case.
Although there may be some evidence in Idaho pertaining to the children, Washington can best determine the most suitable custodial parent because it has access to the maximum amount of information regarding the mother’s background, the children’s adjustment to their home, school, and community,11 and access to witnesses. Ratner, Child Custody in a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 808-09 (1964); Comment, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 124 (1953); see Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 614, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1008, 78 S. Ct. 963 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89, 117; Comment, Developments in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 979 (1960). Another element of litigational convenience that makes this jurisdiction the more suitable forum to entertain the custody proceeding is the fact that the mother would incur the [724]*724greatest expense and inconvenience in traveling to a foreign jurisdiction to present her case with her four children as opposed to the minimal cost and inconvenience incurred by the father in traveling to this state.
Finally, and most importantly, the father purposely brought the children to this forum and could fully anticipate that a custody proceeding would be initiated here. The relationship of the parties to the underlying controversy, to this jurisdiction, and Washington’s interest in the custody action makes this the most convenient forum to address and resolve the issues at hand. See Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., supra at 725; Orland & Fischnaller, Jurisdiction Salad: Washington Style, 9 Gonzaga L. Rev. 1, 37 (1973); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1167 (1966). The exercise of jurisdiction by this forum does not offend due process requirements because the elements of “fair play and substantial justice” weigh heavily in favor of entertaining the action in this jurisdiction.
In conclusion, we are convinced that the record provides ample evidence to provide a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction and that the use of Washington’s long-arm statute does not offend the due process standards established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
The judgment of the superior court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to grant permanent custody to the mother and to provide for reasonable support and visitation rights as to the father.
Rosellini, Hunter, Hamilton, Wright, and Brachtenbach, JJ.