Moses v. Marin Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedAugust 10, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-03206
StatusUnknown

This text of Moses v. Marin Corporation (Moses v. Marin Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moses v. Marin Corporation, (N.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 DAVID JOHN MOSES, Case No. 22-cv-03206-JSC

8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND

10 MARIN CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. 11

12 INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, an inmate at Napa Valley State Hospital, who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against two 15 individuals and the “Marin Corporation.” Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is 16 granted in a separate order. For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed with 17 leave to amend. 18 STANDARD OF REVIEW 19 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 20 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 22 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 23 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 24 § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 25 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 26 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 27 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 1 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 2 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 3 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 4 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 5 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 7 claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. To state a claim that is plausible on its 8 face, a plaintiff must allege facts that "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 9 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 10 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 11 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 12 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 13 42, 48 (1988). 14 LEGAL CLAIMS 15 There are several problems with Plaintiff’s complaint. First, Plaintiff’s claims against 16 Defendant Paul Haakenson are not cognizable. He does not indicate where Haakenson works or 17 what position he holds, other than stating he is a “demonized clerk.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff 18 alleges that Haakenson committed “treason” and “acts of war and torture,” including denying him 19 bail, habeas corpus, due process, as well as California statutes and Supreme Court decisions. (Id.) 20 Such claims are conclusory, at best, as there are no allegations explaining how Haakenson 21 deprived Plaintiff of due process, bail, or habeas relief. This does not comply with the 22 requirement that Plaintiff allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See Bell Atlantic 23 Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. With respect to the statutes and case law, moreover, it is not clear whether 24 Haakenson allegedly deprived Plaintiff of access to them or deprived him of rights afforded by 25 them, and he does not explain how any such deprivation violated his rights under the United States 26 Constitution or other federal law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff may 27 attempt to correct these problems in an amended complaint. 1 conclusory allegation that Kim “condoned these facts.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) “A plaintiff must allege 2 facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 3 deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 4 Plaintiff does not explain who Kim is, whether he is s government official, what facts he 5 “condoned,” how he condoned them, or what actions he took that violated Plaintiff’s rights. As 6 such, he has not alleged sufficient facts that show Kim’s personal involvement in the deprivation 7 of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff may make such allegations in an amended complaint. 8 Third, Plaintiff names “Marin Corporation” as a Defendant, but it is not clear whether this 9 is a private company or a government entity. If there is a private corporation by this name that 10 Plaintiff wishes to sue, he has failed to allege any actions or omissions by this corporation that 11 violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, private entities are generally not liable under Section 12 1983, see, e.g., Heineke v. Santa Clara University, 965 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2020), and he 13 has not provided the location of this corporation, which is necessary for the United States Marshal 14 to serve it. If Plaintiff means to sue Marin County, he must say so, and to state a valid claim for 15 relief against a local government entity, such as Marin County, Plaintiff must allege “(1) that he 16 possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 17 policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; 18 and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt By and 19 Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has not alleged any 20 actions by the county or its employees: the unnamed police officer was a city, not a county, 21 employee, and Plaintiff does not allege that Haakenson or Kim worked for Marin County. In 22 addition, Plaintiff has not alleged any municipal policy or custom that was the moving force 23 behind the actions of these officials. Plaintiff is given leave to file an amended complaint in which 24 he must fix these problems. 25 Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that a San Rafael Police Officer used excessive force against him, 26 but he does not list this officer as a Defendant or identify the officer. If Plaintiff wishes to sue this 27 officer, his amended complaint must include him or her as a Defendant both in the caption of the 1 cannot yet identify the officer by name, he must list him using the name “John Doe” or “Jane 2 || Doe” until Plaintiff discovers the officer’s name. 3 CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons explained above, 5 1. The complaint is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff shall file an 6 amended complaint on or before September 10, 2022. The amended complaint must include the 7 caption and civil case number used in this order (No.

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Moses v. Marin Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moses-v-marin-corporation-cand-2022.