Moser v. Anderson
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Opinion
Moser v. Anderson CV-93-634-B 04/09/98
UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Pamela L. Moser, et al.
v. C-93-634-B
Carole A. Anderson, et a l .
O R D E R
Pamela Moser, Nathan Strout, and Sharon Wieprecht have
brought this class action complaint against the Merrimack,
Strafford, and Carroll County houses of correction, claiming that
they were illegally strip searched. The named plaintiffs
represent a class of "all persons who were held in the
defendants' jails in protective custody or for an offense no
greater than a misdemeanor or a violation, which did not include
the possession of weapons or contraband as an element of the
offense, and who were subject to a strip search pursuant to the
defendants' custom, practice, or policy after December 3, 1990 in
Merrimack County House of Correction and after February 15, 1992
in Strafford and Carroll County [h]ouses of [c]orrection."
Plaintiffs have filed a motion for partial summary judgment
seeking a declaration that the defendants each had in place an
unconstitutional strip-search policy during the class period. Defendants concede that each defendant had a strip-search
policy in place during the class period that required jail
officials to strip search all detainees upon admission. Further,
as I previously held in denying Strafford County's motion for
summary judgment, in most cases, the Constitution bars jail
officials from strip searching an inmate detained in protective
custody or for a minor violation unless the person conducting the
search has a reasonable suspicion that the inmate is concealing
weapons or contraband. See Order dated November 25, 1996.
Because the authority for this conclusion is overwhelming, I
stand by my earlier ruling. See, e.g., Wachtler v. County of
Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 1994); Chapman v. Nichols, 989
F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir. 1993); Act Up!/Portland v. Bagiev, 988
F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993); Watt v. City of Richardson
Police Dep't, 849 F.2d 195, 197 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Wood v.
Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 929 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying same standard
to stip searches of prison visitors); United States v.
Uricoechea-Casalias, 946 F.2d 162, 166 (1st Cir. 1991) (applying
same standard to border searches).
Defendants have produced evidence suggesting that some of
the plaintiff class members eventually were transferred from
protective custody into the general inmate population. A few
- 2 - courts in other jurisdictions have suggested that an inmate who
faces an imminent transfer to the general population may be strip
searched irrespective of whether jail officials have a reasonable
suspicion that the inmate is concealing weapons or contraband.
See, e.g., Dobrowolskvi v. Jefferson County, Kv., 823 F.2d 955,
958-59 (6th Cir. 1987); Cottrell v. Kavsville City, Utah, 994
F.2d 730, 735 (10th Cir. 1993) (dictum); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry,
950 F.2d 1437, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991) (dictum). Relying on this
authority, defendants contend that their strip-search policies
were constitutional.
I am unpersuaded by defendants' argument. Defendants'
strip-search policies reguired all detainees to be searched
without regard to whether they were to be held in the general
population. Even if I assume, as defendants claim, that strip
searches of inmates who are about to be moved into the general
inmate population can be justified by defendants' heightened need
to prevent detainees from passing weapons and contraband to other
inmates, that concern could be addressed by strip searching
inmates only if and when they are to be transferred. Defendants'
concern could not possibly justify their more troubling practice
of strip searching all inmates without regard to whether they
would, in fact, be transferred into the general population.
- 3 - Accordingly, I reject defendants' argument.
Plaintiffs' Phase I Motion for Summary Judgment (document
no. 120) is granted.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro Chief Judge
April 9, 1998
cc: James P. Loring, Esg. Dort S. Bigg, Esg. Joseph L. Hamilton, Esg. William G. Scott, Esg. Donald E. Gardner, Esg. Malcolm McNeill, Jr., Esg.
- 4 -
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