Moscahlades Bros., Inc. v. United States

39 Cust. Ct. 127
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedSeptember 26, 1957
DocketC. D. 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 39 Cust. Ct. 127 (Moscahlades Bros., Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moscahlades Bros., Inc. v. United States, 39 Cust. Ct. 127 (cusc 1957).

Opinion

Donlon, Judge:

The issue before us is something of a conundrum. Are olives green, in the tariff sense, when they are immature; or, regardless of maturity, when they are green in color? Similarly, are olives ripe, in the tariff sense, when they are mature; or, regardless of maturity, when they have the dark, or black, color that is characteristic of maturity for some olives?

What olives are green and what olives are ripe has been a much litigated question. The issue is not new. What is new before us now, is that defendant has this time produced extensive testimony in an effort to prove a commercial designation, or meaning, of the words “green” and “ripe” that is different from the common meaning, as the common meaning of those words, as applied to olives, has been heretofore construed by our appeals court. The door was left open for such a test when that court, in Moscahlades Bros., Inc. v. United States, 42 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 78, C. A. D. 575, held that, in the absence of proof of commercial designation, the common meaning of “green” and “ripe” would be applied to olives for tariff purposes. The holding in that case was that immature olives are green olives and that mature olives are ripe olives.

[129]*129Two protests are before us. They have been consolidated for trial (R. 7).

The merchandise of protest 158256-K is slashed Kalamata olives in brine. It was classified in liquidation as olives, not specially provided for, under paragraph 744 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and charged with duty at the rate of 5 cents per pound. Plaintiff claims that slashed Kalamata olives in brine should be classified as olives in brine, green, also under paragraph 744 of the Tariff Act of 1930, but dutiable at 20 cents per gallon; or, alternatively, that classification should be as olives in brine, ripe, also under paragraph 744, but dutiable at 30 cents per gallon.

The merchandise of protest 158257-K is Greek Salona olives in brine. These olives were classified in liquidation as olives in brine, ripe, under paragraph 744 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and charged with duty at the rate of 30 cents per gallon. It is plaintiff’s contention that these olives should be classified as olives in brine, green, likewise under paragraph 744, but dutiable at 20 cents per gallon.

There are before us the records in three cases besides the current record. Considerable testimony has been adduced in the record of the two consolidated cases now tried. In addition, there has been incorporated in this record the record in Moscahlades Bros., Inc. v. United States, supra, and, in that case, there were incorporated the records in A. G. Skourtsis v. United States, 69 Treas. Dec. 522, T. D. 48218, and in United States v. Union Olive Oil Co., Inc., 38 C. C. P. A. (Customs) 73, C. A. D. 442.

It was stipulated that the olives of protest 158256-K, slashed Kalamata olives, are similar in all material respects to the olives of protest 172480-K, that is, the olives of the earlier Moscahlades case (R. 7). It was also stipulated that the olives of protest 158257-K, Salona olives, are in all material respects the same as the olives of the Union Olive Oil case (R. 13, 14). While counsel were not precise in their stipulation of similarity of the instant merchandise to the merchandise of the Moscahlades and Union Olive Oil Co., Inc., cases, it is assumed, from the record as a whole, that, in both protests before us, the olives, whether slashed or whole, were red to reddish brown to dark brown, or reddish or pinkish, in color; that they were picked before full maturity; and that the process of preparation includes, whether or not the olives were cut or slashed or left whole, placement “in vats of a brine solution for several weeks’ duration, after which they are placed in barrels, filled with brine, ready for shipment.” (Moscahlades record, incorporated here, p. 8.)

The objective of cutting or slashing the olives is alleged to be an acceleration of processing. There may be an issue which involves [130]*130the tariff consequences of cutting or slashing, but we defer its consideration until we have disposed of the principal issue.

The earlier Moscahlades decision, supra, is stare decisis of the issue here as to whether these olives are, for tariff purposes, green or ripe, unless there is proved a commercial designation that is different from the common meaning, as it was construed by our appeals court in that case. It was there held that no commercial designation of olives in brine, green, or olives in brine, ripe, had been shown in the record then before the court. As we have stated, that record included, by incorporation, the records in the Skourtsis and Union Olive Oil Co., Inc., cases, supra. Therefore, if commercial designation has now been shown, it is by evidence newly introduced here.

The burden of proof as to commercial designation is, in these cases, on the Government. The issue is before us because the Government has failed to follow the ruling of our appeals court in the Moscahlades case (C. A. D. 575), contending for a commercial designation different from the common meaning, as construed in that case.

Plaintiff rested, after incorporating the records above mentioned and identifying the merchandise here with the merchandise of the incorporated cases. Defendant then called 19 witnesses to testify as to the commercial designation asserted in liquidation. Plaintiff called three witnesses in rebuttal, on the issue of commercial designation. That is the testimony which is before us and which we now proceed to analyze and weigh.

Five of defendant’s witnesses were professors (two), a chemical engineer, a grower and student of olives, and an olive processor. They testified as expert technical witnesses. Their testimony is not relevant to the issue of commercial designation, as it relates rather to the picking and processing of olives than to their trade. It is not essentially different from like testimony that was before the. court in the Moscahlades case, supra, which evidence was held not to establish commercial designation. Defendant has not furthered its case by repetition of such evidence.

As to the testimony adduced in support of a commercial designation of olives by color, green or ripe, we weigh such evidence by the rule as to commercial designation that was long ago laid down by the Supreme Court. This rule has not since been stated more clearly than it then was.

* * * The object of the duty laws is to raise revenue, and for this purpose, to class substances according to the general usage and known denominations of trade. Whether a particular article were designated by one name or another, in the country of its origin, or whether it were a simple or mixed substance, was of no importance in the view of the legislature. It did not suppose our merchants to be naturalists, or geologists or botanists. It applied its attention to the description of articles, as they derived their appellations in our own markets. [131]*131in our domestic as well as our foreign traffic. And it would have been as dangerous as useless, to attempt any other classification, than that derived from the actual business of human life. Bohea tea, then, in the sense of all our revenue laws, means that article which, in the known usage of trade, has acquired that distinctive appellation.

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