Morton v. Fulwood

District of Columbia

Morton v. Fulwood

18 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22086, 2014 WL 658072

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia

DecidedJanuary 30, 2014

DocketCivil Action No. 2014-0193

StatusPublished

This text of 18 F. Supp. 3d 1 (Morton v. Fulwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Morton v. Fulwood, 18 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22086, 2014 WL 658072 (D.D.C. 2014).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Reggie Walton, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and his pro se complaint. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the complaint.

The plaintiff has requested, and the defendants have denied, a reduction of his minimum sentence under 28 C.F.R. § 2.76. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Chair of the United States Parole Commission and two Commission staff members, demanding not only a court order directing the United States Parole Commission to grant him an early parole hearing but also an award of $120,000 as compensation for earnings he must forgo if he were to remain incarcerated. Insofar as the plaintiff seeks to advance his release date, his claim sounds in habeas. See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing *2 Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 666 (D.C.Cir.2013) (“[W]e hold that a federal prisoner need bring his claim in habeas only if success on the merits will “necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration.’ ’’(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005)).

A habeas action is subject to jurisdictional and statutory limitations. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). The plaintiff currently is incarcerated at a federal penitentiary in Coleman, Florida. The proper respondent in a habeas corpus action is the petitioner’s warden, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C.Cir.1988)), who has not been named a defendant to this action. Moreover, this “district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C.Cir.2004). Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff alleges a viable constitutional claim, this district is not the appropriate forum for its resolution. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Reggie Walton, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis and his pro se complaint. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the complaint.

The plaintiff has requested, and the defendants have denied, a reduction of his minimum sentence under 28 C.F.R. § 2.76. He brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Chair of the United States Parole Commission and two Commission staff members, demanding not only a court order directing the United States Parole Commission to grant him an early parole hearing but also an award of $120,000 as compensation for earnings he must forgo if he were to remain incarcerated. Insofar as the plaintiff seeks to advance his release date, his claim sounds in habeas. See Davis v. U.S. Sentencing *2 Comm’n, 716 F.3d 660, 666 (D.C.Cir.2013) (“[W]e hold that a federal prisoner need bring his claim in habeas only if success on the merits will “necessarily imply the invalidity of confinement or shorten its duration.’ ’’(quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005)).

A habeas action is subject to jurisdictional and statutory limitations. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). The plaintiff currently is incarcerated at a federal penitentiary in Coleman, Florida. The proper respondent in a habeas corpus action is the petitioner’s warden, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-35, 124 S.Ct. 2711, 159 L.Ed.2d 513 (2004); Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1039 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 810 (D.C.Cir.1988)), who has not been named a defendant to this action. Moreover, this “district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C.Cir.2004). Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff alleges a viable constitutional claim, this district is not the appropriate forum for its resolution. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the complaint. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

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18 F. Supp. 3d 1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22086, 2014 WL 658072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morton-v-fulwood-dcd-2014.

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