Morton v. Critterden

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedApril 10, 2023
Docket2:23-cv-00210
StatusUnknown

This text of Morton v. Critterden (Morton v. Critterden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morton v. Critterden, (D. Nev. 2023).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 PARIS MORTON, Case No. 2:23-cv-00210-GMN-EJY

4 Plaintiff, ORDER and 5 v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 6 JAMES E. CRITTERDEN,

7 Defendant. 8

9 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint and application to proceed in 10 forma pauperis. ECF Nos. 1-2, 4. The Court has also reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment 11 of Counsel. ECF No. 1-3. 12 I. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION 13 On February 9, 2023, Plaintiff, an inmate, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. 14 ECF No. 1. The application was incomplete and denied without prejudice. ECF No. 3. On March 15 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complete in forma pauperis application (ECF No. 4), which is granted. 16 II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 17 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, a court must screen the complaint 18 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a federal court must dismiss 19 a prisoner’s claim if the action “is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may 20 be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 21 However, pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 22 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 23 The standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can 24 be granted is established by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court applies the same 25 standard under § 1915 when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or an amended complaint. When 26 a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915(e), the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the 27 complaint with directions to cure its deficiencies unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that 1 the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 2 1995). 3 Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. Chappel v. Lab. 4 Corp. of America, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). In making this determination, the court treats 5 all material factual allegations as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the 6 non-moving party. Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1996). While the standard 7 under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must plead more than 8 mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic 9 recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. 10 Finally, all or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed sua sponte if the 11 prisoner’s claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal 12 conclusions that are untenable as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (e.g., fantastic 13 or delusional scenarios). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); see also McKeever v. 14 Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 III. DISCUSSION 16 A. Background. 17 Plaintiff contends in her Complaint that she is engaged in the commercial publishing industry 18 and reproduces, distributes, and sells copyrighted literary compositions and published works. ECF 19 No. 1-2 at 2. Plaintiff asserts that sometime in June 2022 Defendant stole a manuscript written by 20 Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) and (3) to reproduce and distribute 21 the manuscript. Id. Plaintiff argues that Defendant has committed direct and contributory 22 infringement of Plaintiff’s work and is liable for damages under the theory of vicarious liability. Id. 23 Plaintiff contends that she and Defendant had an understanding that required Defendant to 24 retain possession of Plaintiff’s life memoir, titled “The World of Paris,” but Defendant would return 25 the manuscript to Plaintiff when it was ready for publication. Id. at 3. Plaintiff says that during the 26 summer of 2022, she repeatedly attempted to communicate with Defendant to secure the return of 27 her manuscript to no avail. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff contends her life has been the subject of much media 1 This chance for profit, according to Plaintiff, is the reason Defendant refuses to return the 2 manuscript. Id. 3 Instead of helping Plaintiff publish the memoir, as he promised to do, Plaintiff accuses 4 Defendant of sharing excerpts of the manuscript over social media and allowing third parties to 5 publish details of the contents. Id. at 5. Plaintiff avers that these actions constitute direct 6 infringement, as Defendant and the parties were able to profit financially from the disclosure of 7 Plaintiff’s proprietary information. Id. Plaintiff contends she has obtained verification through 8 conversations with these third parties that Defendant intended all along to profit from the 9 unauthorized publication of Plaintiff’s memoir. Id. at 5-7. 10 Because Defendant stole a manuscript that was owned by Plaintiff, ownership Defendant 11 allegedly acknowledged in an email to counsel for Plaintiff, and has prevented Plaintiff from 12 reproducing and distributing her manuscript, Plaintiff contends Defendant is liable for damages 13 under 17 U.S.C. § 501. Id. at 8-9. Plaintiff further accuses Defendant of not engaging in the fair use 14 of her copyrighted work, reiterating her allegations that he illegally stole, and disseminated details 15 of her memoir. Id. at 11-12. Plaintiff argues that the four factors under 17 U.S.C. § 107 used to 16 analyze whether Defendant’s dissemination of Plaintiff’s work constitutes fair use weigh in favor of 17 a finding that Defendant did not engage in a fair use of Plaintiff’s memoir.1 Id. at 12-20. 18 Plaintiff argues that because Defendant knowingly encouraged and assisted third parties in 19 infringing upon the rights of Plaintiff regarding her memoir, Defendant should be held liable under 20 a theory of contributory infringement. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff also avers that Defendant is vicariously 21 liable for the copyright infringement of Plaintiff’s memoir that was committed by the third parties 22 because he stood to gain financially each time disclosures were made and because Defendant was 23 able to supervise his social media account and its content and chose not to do so. Id. at 23-25. 24 As a result of this alleged copyright infringement, Plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing 25 Defendant from any further infringement of Plaintiff’s work, monetary damages of not more than 26 $150,000, and criminal charges against Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 2319.

27 1 Plaintiff cites the four factors as the purpose and character of the use of the memoir, the nature of the memoir, 1 B.

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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
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Edward McKeever Jr. v. Sherman Block
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Morton v. Critterden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morton-v-critterden-nvd-2023.