Morton v. Clark County Detention Center

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedJanuary 28, 2025
Docket2:23-cv-00818
StatusUnknown

This text of Morton v. Clark County Detention Center (Morton v. Clark County Detention Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morton v. Clark County Detention Center, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Paris Morton, Case No. 2:23-cv-00818-JAD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 dba Pigeonly; Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 9 Department,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Paris Morton’s motion for appointment of counsel 13 (ECF No. 16), Plaintiff’s notice informing the Court that she would like to attempt service on 14 Defendant dba Pigeonly at a different address (ECF No. 19), and Defendant Las Vegas 15 Metropolitan Police Department’s (“LVMPD”) motion to extend discovery deadlines (ECF No. 16 21). The Court addresses each in turn. 17 I. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel. 18 Plaintiff moves the Court to appoint counsel for her. (ECF No. 19). She explains that she 19 is unable to afford counsel, that the issues in the case are complex, and that she has limited access 20 to the law library, which access she has to pay for. (Id.). LVMPD opposes the motion. (ECF 21 No. 20). 22 A litigant does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 23 civil rights claims. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). Under 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford 25 counsel.” However, the court will appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants only in “exceptional 26 circumstances.” Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 action). “When 27 determining whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ exist, a court must consider ‘the likelihood of 1 of the complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Id. “Neither of these considerations is 2 dispositive and instead must be viewed together.” Id. 3 The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion because it does not find that she has demonstrated 4 exceptional circumstances at this stage of the litigation. While Plaintiff has experienced difficulty 5 accessing legal materials, she has not asserted that she has no ability to access these materials. 6 Additionally, nearly all inmates have to contend with limited access to legal research given the 7 nature of incarceration. Regarding the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, it is not clear to the Court 8 whether Plaintiff’s case will ultimately succeed because it is in its early stages. Plaintiff has also 9 demonstrated an ability to articulate her claims pro se as demonstrated by the instant motion and 10 her other filings. The Court thus denies Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel without 11 prejudice. 12 II. Plaintiff’s notice regarding service. 13 In compliance with the Court’s screening order (ECF No. 3), Plaintiff has requested that 14 the Untied States Marshals Service (“USMS”) attempt service on Pigeonly again, using a 15 different address. (ECF No. 19). The Court will thus send Plaintiff another form USM-285 and 16 enter an order regarding service. The Court will also extend the deadline for service because 17 Plaintiff has pointed out that she has limited access to legal resources and is incarcerated, which 18 the Court finds constitutes good cause to extend the deadline for service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 4(m). 20 III. LVMPD’s motion to extend discovery deadlines. 21 LVMPD moves to extend discovery deadlines for ninety days. (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff 22 did not respond to the motion, constituting her consent to the Court granting it under Local Rule 23 7-2(d). The Court finds that LVMPD has demonstrated good cause to extend discovery under 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) and Local Rule 26-3. However, because the Court 25 modifies certain of the LVMPD’s proposed deadlines, it grants the motion in part. 26 /// 27 /// 1 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel 2 (ECF No. 16) is denied without prejudice. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send the 4 following to the USMS for service: (1) a copy of this order; (2) a copy of the complaint filed at 5 ECF No. 4; and (3) the summons issued to Pigeonly filed at ECF No. 5. 6 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send Plaintiff 7 a copy of this order and a blank copy of the Form USM-285. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until February 18, 2025, to send 9 the USMS the completed Form USM-285. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one days after receiving a copy of the 11 Form USM-285 back from the USMS showing whether service has been accomplished, Plaintiff 12 must file a notice with the Court identifying whether the defendant was served. If Plaintiff wishes 13 to have service again attempted on an unserved defendant, the Plaintiff must file a motion with 14 the Court identifying the unserved defendant and specifying a more detailed name and/or address 15 for said defendant or whether some other manner of service should be attempted. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until April 28, 2025, to 17 accomplish service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 /// 27 /// 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that LVMPD’s motion to extend discovery (ECF No. 21) 2 is granted in part and denied in part. It is denied in part only to the extent that the Court 3 modifies the below deadlines. The below deadlines shall govern: 4 5 Amend pleadings/add parties: April 7, 2025 6 Expert disclosures:1 April 7, 2025 7 Rebuttal expert disclosures: May 6, 2025 8 Discovery cutoff: June 5, 2025 9 Discovery motions: June 20, 2025 10 Dispositive motions: July 7, 2025 11 Joint pretrial order: August 6, 20252 12 13 DATED: January 28, 2025 14 15 DANIEL J. ALBREGTS 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 1 The Court’s initial scheduling order did not include deadlines for expert and rebuttal expert 24 disclosures, but LVMPD’s motion does. Because Plaintiff does not oppose, and the Court sees no 25 issue with setting these deadlines, it includes them here. But it modifies the discovery deadline to account for them. Additionally, LVMPD’s motion does not include the deadline for discovery 26 motions. So, the Court includes that here. 27 2 Under Local Rule 26-1(b)(5), if dispositive motions are filed, the deadline for filing the joint pretrial order will be suspended until thirty days after decision on the dispositive motions or

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Related

Larry A. Storseth, 623435 v. John D. Spellman
654 F.2d 1349 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Palmer v. Valdez
560 F.3d 965 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Morton v. Clark County Detention Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morton-v-clark-county-detention-center-nvd-2025.