Mortland v. Radhe Hospitality LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedMay 16, 2023
Docket1:22-cv-00366
StatusUnknown

This text of Mortland v. Radhe Hospitality LLC (Mortland v. Radhe Hospitality LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mortland v. Radhe Hospitality LLC, (N.D. Ind. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA FORT WAYNE DIVISION

DEREK MORTLAND ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Cause No. 1:22-CV-00366-HAB-SLC ) RADHE HOSPITALITY LLC. ) ) Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Plaintiff Derek Mortland (“Mortland”), a person with physical disabilities, stayed at a Comfort Suites hotel (the “Hotel”) in Auburn, Indiana and encountered architectural barriers that denied him full and equal access to the Hotel. He sued Defendant Radhe Hospitality LLC (“Radhe”), the owner/operator of the Hotel, alleging that he was denied access by a public accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12181 et seq. and the Indiana Civil Rights Law (“ICRL”), Ind. Code § 22-9-1 et seq., (ECF No. 1). After Radhe failed to appear or otherwise defend, Mortland applied for, and obtained, a clerk’s entry of default against it. Mortland then sought a default judgment. (ECF No. 6). On February 6, 2023, the undersigned referred the request for a default judgment to the Magistrate Judge to issue a Report and Recommendation (R & R). (ECF No. 7). On April 12, 2023, the Magistrate Judge entered her R & R (ECF No. 8), recommending that a default judgment be entered in favor of Mortland and against Radhe on Mortland’s ADA claims but DENIED relief as to his claims under the ICRL. As for damages, the R & R recommended awarding permanent injunctive relief and $4,571.68 in attorney fees, $1,160 in expert fees, and $480.40 in court costs, plus any additional time, costs, or expenses reasonably expended to enforce the Court’s order. By separate entry, Mortland was ordered to file a revised proposed form of permanent injunction detailing the necessary modifications and replacements identified

in the Site Accessibility Evaluation submitted by the Plaintiff, who served as his own expert in accessibility.1 The parties were advised of the 14-day objection period under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). That deadline has passed with no objections filed by the parties. DISCUSSION A district court may assign dispositive2 matters to a magistrate judge, in which case the magistrate judge may submit to the district judge only a report and recommended disposition, including any findings of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1). See also Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2009). The magistrate judge’s recommendation on a dispositive matter is not a final order, and the district judge makes the ultimate decision to “accept, reject, or modify” the findings and recommendations, and the

district court need not accept any portion as binding. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See also Schur, 577 F.3d at 760-61. After a magistrate judge makes a report and recommendation, either party may object within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the same. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). When a party raises specific objections to findings and recommendations made

1 Mortland is the President of Advanced Access, LLC, a consulting company specializing in accessibility and barrier removal.

2 Whether a matter is dispositive or non-dispositive is determined by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), which gives magistrate judges the power “to hear and determine any pretrial matter” with certain exceptions. See Adkins v. Mid-Am. Growers, Inc., 143 F.R.D. 171, 176 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“‘Dispositive’ is merely a term used to describe the motions listed in subsection 636(b)(1)(A) ....”). within the magistrate judge’s report, the district court must review those objections de novo, determining for itself whether the magistrate judge’s decisions on those issues are supported by substantial evidence or resulted from an error of law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). See also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). The court

may, however, defer to those conclusions to which timely objections have not been raised by a party. Schur, 577 F.3d at 760-61. “If no objection or only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Johnson, 170 F.3d at 739. As recounted above, the parties have not objected to the recommended disposition of the pending motions and, for good reason. The Magistrate Judge issued a detailed decision resolving Plaintiff’s request for default judgment and addressing all the issues attendant to that motion. The Magistrate Judge determined that the Complaint’s allegations and the other evidence submitted were sufficient to establish that Radhe is liable for violating the ADA. As to Mortland’s claim under the ICRL, however, the Magistrate Judge determined that default judgment cannot be entered because he is not legally entitled to relief under Indiana law.

For the award of injunctive relief, the Magistrate Judge first noted that plaintiffs suing under Title III of the ADA may obtain only injunctive relief, not damages. See Scherr v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir. 2013) (“damages are not available under Title III”). In fashioning the injunctive relief, the Magistrate Judge relied heavily on the Southern District of Indiana’s decision in Mortland v. Lights Out Devs., LLC, No. 1:19-CV-2557-JMS-DLP, 2020 WL 3577867, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 1, 2020). In that case, the court resolved a request for default judgment stating that “in cases involving a defendant’s failure to remove architectural or structural barriers under 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), ‘injunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities to the extent required by’ Title III.’” Lights Out Devs., 2020 WL 3577867, at *2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2)). The court then stated:

The overarching goal of an injunction in this case is to ensure that Lights Out takes the necessary steps to ensure that the Hotel complies with the ADA and provides all disabled patrons access to facilities to the extent required by law. To that end, Lights Out is ORDERED to modify and/or replace its facilities as necessary to conform with the requirements of the ADA, the accompanying regulations, and the Standards.

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Related

United States v. Swift & Co.
286 U.S. 106 (Supreme Court, 1932)
Winterland Concessions Company v. Edwin S. Trela, Jr.
735 F.2d 257 (Seventh Circuit, 1984)
Scherr v. Marriott International, Inc.
703 F.3d 1069 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc.
577 F.3d 752 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Johnathan Lacy v. Cook County, Illinois
897 F.3d 847 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Adkins v. Mid-American Growers, Inc.
143 F.R.D. 171 (N.D. Illinois, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
Mortland v. Radhe Hospitality LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mortland-v-radhe-hospitality-llc-innd-2023.