Morse v. Houghton

136 N.W. 675, 158 Iowa 279
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedJune 10, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 136 N.W. 675 (Morse v. Houghton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morse v. Houghton, 136 N.W. 675, 158 Iowa 279 (iowa 1912).

Opinion

Ladd, J.

The defendant owns a two-story brick building at the northwest corner of Cottage Grove avenue and Nineteenth street, in Des Moines., Entrance to the upper story is by, a stairway from Cottage Grove avenue on the south, from the top of which a hallway extends to the north, with four rooms on each side. At the north end of this hallway was a door opening onto a covered landing, from which an outside stairway extended along the end of the building toward the east to the ground. On the outside of this stairway was a railing, about two and one-half feet high, with boards extending parallel therewith part of the way, fastened to the posts and spindles the rest of the way. A roof of boards and tar paper, with a board next to it, covered the stairs, except the last two steps; the space between the board and railing being open. The plaintiff oe[281]*281cupied a room in the second story as tenant, and the other rooms were also rented to different persons. These rooms were heated by stoves, and the tenants carried ashes and refuse out by way, of the back stairway, and necessary coal up from bins below. • On December 5, 1909, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, in going down the back stairway to empty some ashes, the plaintiff, in the manner hereinafter described, caught her heel when she reached the bottom step and fell, sustaining serious injuries. In this action she claims damages, alleging her own freedom from negligence, and that the covering of the stairway was negligently constructed, as well as the spouting, and, by way of an amendment, “that the spouting at the north end of the said building was permitted to get out of repair, so that the water ran therefrom upon the cover to said stairway, and the covering to said stairway was permitted to get out of repair, so that the water thrown thereon from the aforesaid spouting ran down between the covering to said stairway and the building upon the steps where plaintiff was injured; that the said downspout was permitted to get out of repair by defendant herein, so that the said water, which was concentrated at or near the steps where plaintiff was injured, gushed out of said downspout upon the said steps where plaintiff was injured and froze thereon; and the spout at the end of the cover to the stairway was also permitted by the defendant to get out of repair, and because thereof the water ran therefrom upon the steps of the said stairway where plaintiff was injured.” The answer was a general denial.

At the conclusion of the introduction of evidence in behalf of plaintiff, a motion to direct the jury to return a verdict for defendant was sustained. The grounds of this motion were (1) that no actionable negligence of defendant had been shown; (2) that the premises, in the respects complained of, were in the same condition as when plaintiff became a tenant; (3) that plaintiff “was injured by reason of [282]*282ice accumulating on the lower steps of the stairway and by slipping thereon, and that such had been the condition during the cold weather, and during all rainy times in cold weather, for more than two years previous to that, and that the plaintiff occupied the premises with the knowledge of that, and with knowledge of the means of egress and ingress to the premises”; (4) that defendant was not shown to have done anything which contributed to making the premises more dangerous than when plaintiff became a tenant; and (5) that plaintiff was a tenant at will from month to month, and could have surrendered the leased room at any time, and in staying elected to continue with conditions as they were. The court, in ruling on the motion, indicated as reasons for direoting a verdict that it did not appear (1) that ice on the steps was the cause of plaintiff’s fall; (2) nor that the accumulation of ice, if any, was caused by the leaking of a pipe or pipes; (3) nor that defendant had notice of the condition of the step prior to the injury.

It will be observed that assumption of risk was not pleaded as a defense, and that contributory negligence was not made a ground of the motion to direct a verdict. Neither of these was referred to in the court’s ruling, and, though argued by appellant, requires no attention.

Nothing is claimed because of the alleged negligent construction, and, of course, could not be, as conditions were in no wise concealed from nor misrepresented to the tenant in leasing the rooms. Boyer v. Commercial Bldg. Inv. Co., 110 Iowa, 491; 24 Cyc. 1047. But, as the stairway was made use of by the several tenants, this remained in the control of the defendant, and she was bound to keep the same in reasonable repair; if she negligently failed so to do, and as a consequence of such failure plaintiff was injured, liability therefor attached. Burner v. Higman & Skinner Co., 127 Iowa, 580; Peil v. Reinhart, 127 N. Y. 381, (27 N. E. 1077, 12 L. R. A. 843). Watkins v. Goodall, 138 Mass. 533; 24 Cyc. 1116; 18 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 220.

[283]*283That the law is as stated is not questioned, and was so regarded by the trial court in directing a verdict; and we have only to determine from an examination of the evidence whether defendant was delinquent in the matter of repairs, and the injury resulted therefrom as a natural consequence. The roof over the stairway was of boards and tar paper, leaving the two steps at the bottom uncovered. The evidence tended to show that a gutter and some pipes had become out of repair since plaintiff became a tenant in August, 1907.

She testified that:

At the east end of the roof there was a gutter, but it was not connected; and there was a pipe run from that to the downspout, . . . and coming down from that was a round tin pipe, which went over to the downspout at the corner of the building; that afterwards the downspout bursted, and defendant had it run under the sidewalk into an earthen pipe; that the pipe at the east end of the stairway had leaked for some time; and that the husband of defendant, who saw to making repairs, promised repeatedly to have same mended, and when he did the leak was not stopped, and the water came out on the steps just the same. . . . There was a little spouting at the east end of the porch (over the stairway); but it didn’t connect in some way, and let the water come down on the steps. When I first went there, there was a tiling in this downspout. That froze and broke. Mr. Houghton repaired that, or repaired at it, and took a piece of tin and fixed it, and had a wire around it— you could move it up and down — and the water used to spout out that way and over onto the steps, out between the tiling; it didn’t fit in. It was in that condition when I was hurt. It didn’t do that when I first went there. The water run down between the porch and the bidlding and onto the step. I don’t think it was in that condition when I went there. The spout at the east end of the top to the stairway was in a leaky condition; right up in there where it should have been fastened, it wasn’t fastened at all. That was not there to my knowledge when I went there. The water came down from the roof on the porch. It went in there and didn’t fit, and down at that place down by the steps — I mean the down[284]*284spout. He fixed that place, after being asked to, the spring before I was hurt, but left it in the same condition. It leaked just the same, and was never corrected.

On December 5, 1909, at 6 o’clock in the afternoon, she;

Was going down the back stairway to empty my ashes. I had them in the ash pan that belonged to the stove.

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Bluebook (online)
136 N.W. 675, 158 Iowa 279, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morse-v-houghton-iowa-1912.