Morse v. Anderson

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: August 2, 2016
• Docket: YORcv-15-121
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT YORK, SS. Civil Action Docket No. CV-15-121

ANGELA M. MORSE,

Plaintiff, DECISION and ORDER v. GRANTING CITY OF SANFORD'S MOTION FOR MELISSA A. ANDERSON and SUMMARY JUDGMENT CITY OF SANFORD,

Defendants.

Plaintiff Angela Morse seeks damages for injuries arising out of a motor vehicle

collision that occurred in the City of Sanford i.n October 2013. The complaint, filed in

June 2015, alleges that defendant Melissa Anderson was negligent in the operation of

her vehicle when it proceeded into an intersection and struck plaintiff's vehicle. By

way of an amended complaint filed in October 2015, two years after the accident,

plaintiff added the City of Sanford as a party defendant, alleging that the City was also

negligent because a road sign controlling traffic at the intersection in question

apparently had been removed and the missing sign may have been a contributing cause

of the collision. The City has moved for summary judgment. There are no disputes

as to the facts. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.

The Maine Tort Claims Act requires that a person who intends to file a

negligence claim against a municipality must first provide written notice of the claim to

the municipality within 180 days of the date the cause of action accrues. 14 M.R.S. §

8107(1); see also Cottle Enters. v. Town of Farmington, 1997 ME 78,

(notice of claim must be filed with government entity "within 180 days of the wrongful

act alleged to produce a judicially cognizable injury"); Peters v. City of Westbrook, 2001

1 ME 179, 9[ 5, 787 A.2d 141 ("Plaintiffs who seek to hold a governmental unit and

employee liable must first meet a procedural requirement of notifying the unit of the

intention to bring a claim"). The notice must identify the claimant, the details of the

claim, the name(s) and address(es) of government employees involved, the nature of

the injury, and the damages sought. See id. "Failure to comply [with the notice

requirement] bars the suit." Porter v. Philbrick-Gates, 2000 ME 35, 'l[ 4, 745 A.2d 996.

The date the cause of action accrued in this case was the date of the collision,

October 31, 2013. Thus, absent "good cause" for not doing so, see 14 M.R.S. § 8107(5),

plaintiff was required to have notified the City of Sanford before May 2014 in writing as

a condition for bringing suit.

Ms. Morse admits she did not provide the City with written notice within the

statutorily required 180-day period, but maintains she did not know until much later

that Ms. Anderson was claiming that the absence of a traffic control sign caused or

contributed to her failure to yield. Therefore, plaintiff contends there is "good cause"

within the meaning of 14 M.R.S. § 8107(5) for not complying with the 180-day notice

requirement.

The Law Court has consistently held that a party's lack of awareness of a

potential claim does not constitute "good cause," whether the basis for potential claim

was readily apparent or difficult to ascertain. Peters v. City of Westbrook, 2001 ME 179,

'l[ 8, 787 A.2d 141 ("The difficulty in learning the facts underlying a claim is not enough

for a plaintiff to meet its burden of showing good cause.") (quoting Beaucage v. City of

Rockland, 2000 ME 184, 9[ 6, 760 A.2d 1054).

It is also argued that if only defendant Anderson would implead the City, the

180-day notice requirement would not apply and plaintiff could maintain a direct claim

against the City. See 14 M.R.S. § 8107(5) (180-day notice requirement "shall not apply

2 to such claims as may be asserted under the Rules of Civil Procedure by a 3rd party

complaint, crossclaim or counterclaim.") The difficulty with plaintiff's argument is

self-evident-there is no pending 3.. party complaint, crossclaim or counterclaim against

the City. Anderson may, but is not obligated to, implead the City. Nor can the court

compel her to do so. The additional exception in Section 8107(5) is, thus, not available.

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff is barred from bringing this action

against the City of Sanford, and the motion for summary judgment must be granted.

The clerk will make the following entry, by reference, on the docket pursuant to

Rule 79(a): "The motion for summary judgment is granted and judgment is hereby

entered for the City of Sanford on the amended complaint."

DATE: August 2, 2016