Morr's Appeal

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Morr's Appeal

80 Pa. 427, 1876 Pa. LEXIS 70

DecidedFebruary 17, 1876

StatusPublished

This text of 80 Pa. 427 (Morr's Appeal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Morr's Appeal, 80 Pa. 427, 1876 Pa. LEXIS 70 (Pa. 1876).

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Opinion

Judgment was entered in the Supreme Court,

.Per, Curiam.

It does not appear that the notes given by Mrs. Catharine Summers, with Jacob J. Morr, her father, as surety, were at all binding on her, she being under the disability of coverture. Nor does it appear that her father became surety and paid the notes as an advancement to her. His mistake as to the capacity to bind herself, cannot change the intention existing when the notes were given.

In order to create an advancement, out of what was only intended as a debt, to be paid by her to the holder of the notes, there would have to take place a mere legal transmutation of one thing into another. This might be equitable, but we know of no decision which has changed an intended debt into an advancement, though, if binding, it may be deducted from the children’s share. Mrs. Summers then not being bound as a debtor, and not being advanced as a daughter, was not liable to be charged with the notes as an advancement, and her share is not subject to it in the hands of her children.

Decree affirmed with costs, and appeal dismissed.

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Judgment was entered in the Supreme Court,

.Per, Curiam.

It does not appear that the notes given by Mrs. Catharine Summers, with Jacob J. Morr, her father, as surety, were at all binding on her, she being under the disability of coverture. Nor does it appear that her father became surety and paid the notes as an advancement to her. His mistake as to the capacity to bind herself, cannot change the intention existing when the notes were given.

In order to create an advancement, out of what was only intended as a debt, to be paid by her to the holder of the notes, there would have to take place a mere legal transmutation of one thing into another. This might be equitable, but we know of no decision which has changed an intended debt into an advancement, though, if binding, it may be deducted from the children’s share. Mrs. Summers then not being bound as a debtor, and not being advanced as a daughter, was not liable to be charged with the notes as an advancement, and her share is not subject to it in the hands of her children.

Decree affirmed with costs, and appeal dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

80 Pa. 427, 1876 Pa. LEXIS 70, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morrs-appeal-pa-1876.