NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW MORROW, No. 24-3711 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00642-MTL v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN, BADE, and KOH, Circuit Judges. Partial concurrence and partial dissent by Judge KOH.
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Morrow appeals a district court order upholding
the denial of Social Security disability benefits by an administrative law judge
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“ALJ”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the
district court’s order de novo and will not overturn the ALJ’s decision “unless it is
either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Woods
v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Luther v. Berryhill, 891
F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018)). We affirm.
1. Morrow claims that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of his
primary care physician, Jospeh Alia, D.O. In support of Morrow’s application, Dr.
Alia submitted two two-page form assessments opining that Morrow cannot sit and
stand for the duration of an eight-hour workday and that he must take frequent rest
breaks—resting for about 10 to 15 minutes every 45 minutes.
To reject a medical opinion, an ALJ must provide “an explanation supported
by substantial evidence” that “‘articulate[s] . . . how persuasive’ [he] finds ‘all of
the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source” and that “‘explain[s] how
[he] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching [his]
findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b); and
then quoting id. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). Here, the ALJ did so.
First, the ALJ addressed supportability, finding that Dr. Alia’s opinions
regarding Morrow’s physical limitations are not supported by his own examination
findings because his examination findings “do not demonstrate [discomfort] with
sitting for prolonged periods, gait instability, or reduced strength of the bilateral
2 24-3711 lower extremities.” To this end, the ALJ cited medical records by Dr. Alia that do
not include any abnormal examination findings regarding Morrow’s ability to sit,
his gait, or his lower extremities and that also include normal examination findings
regarding Morrow’s range of motion and strength in his lower extremities. Given
the severity of the limitations assessed by Dr. Alia, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Alia’s opinions are not supported by his treatment
records.
Second, the ALJ addressed consistency, including by reviewing the opinions
of the other medical professionals—none of whom reached the same conclusion as
Dr. Alia that Morrow is “limited to significantly less than sedentary work.” In
particular, the ALJ found the opinions of Robert Gordon, D.O.—that Morrow can
sit for four hours and stand or walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday—to be
better supported, because those opinions were consistent with Dr. Gordon’s
examinations and with “the majority of treatment examinations, which generally
demonstrate normal physical functioning, but which also note some limitations in
range of motion in the claimant’s spine.” Substantial evidence also supports this
finding.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Alia’s opinions. See
Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding substantial
evidence supported ALJ’s rejection of medical opinion as “unsupported by
3 24-3711 objective findings” and “inconsistent with the opinions of [other doctors]” where
the source of the medical opinion had filled out a form without “referenc[ing] any
specific objective findings to support the extreme . . . limitations he assessed”).
2. Morrow also claims that the ALJ erroneously rejected his symptom
testimony. Morrow testified that he has difficulty sitting and standing for
prolonged periods and that he needs to take frequent breaks to lay down flat and
rest for 15 minutes to two hours at a time and for a total of two to six hours a day.
Where, as here, “a claimant presents objective medical evidence establishing
an impairment ‘that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which [he]
complains, an adverse credibility finding must be based on clear and convincing
reasons.’” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008)).
This standard “requires an ALJ to show his work” by identifying a “rationale” for
rejecting the claimant’s testimony that “is clear enough that it has the power to
convince.” Id. at 499. The ALJ did so in this case.
In his decision, the ALJ first observed that Morrow had alleged limitations
affecting his ability to sit, stand, and walk, and then found that Morrow’s
allegations of “disabling pain and limitations” were inconsistent with the record.1
1 Although the ALJ’s decision cites “a function report and an exertional activities questionnaire” that Morrow had submitted in support of his application
4 24-3711 In support of this finding, the ALJ chronologically reviewed the medical records,
identifying examination findings inconsistent with the extent of Morrow’s alleged
sitting, standing, and walking limitations. Specifically, the ALJ cited examination
findings that Morrow has normal or only somewhat reduced range of motion and
strength in his lower extremities, including as reflected in primary care records,
physical therapy records, and emergency room records.
Notably, the ALJ recognized that Morrow does have limitations in his ability
to stand, walk, and sit, which the ALJ incorporated into his residual functional
capacity finding that Morrow can sit for six hours a day and stand and walk for
three hours a day. But the ALJ ultimately determined that Morrow’s allegations of
even greater limitations were inconsistent with the foregoing examination findings
in Morrow’s medical records. That rationale is “clear enough that it has the power
to convince,” id., and the ALJ therefore did not err in rejecting Morrow’s symptom
testimony.2
AFFIRMED.
rather than the transcript from the hearing, Morrow’s allegations in those documents are consistent with his hearing testimony. 2 Unlike Lambert v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MATTHEW MORROW, No. 24-3711 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-00642-MTL v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2025** San Francisco, California
Before: CALLAHAN, BADE, and KOH, Circuit Judges. Partial concurrence and partial dissent by Judge KOH.
Plaintiff-Appellant Matthew Morrow appeals a district court order upholding
the denial of Social Security disability benefits by an administrative law judge
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). (“ALJ”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the
district court’s order de novo and will not overturn the ALJ’s decision “unless it is
either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.” Woods
v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Luther v. Berryhill, 891
F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018)). We affirm.
1. Morrow claims that the ALJ erroneously rejected the opinions of his
primary care physician, Jospeh Alia, D.O. In support of Morrow’s application, Dr.
Alia submitted two two-page form assessments opining that Morrow cannot sit and
stand for the duration of an eight-hour workday and that he must take frequent rest
breaks—resting for about 10 to 15 minutes every 45 minutes.
To reject a medical opinion, an ALJ must provide “an explanation supported
by substantial evidence” that “‘articulate[s] . . . how persuasive’ [he] finds ‘all of
the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source” and that “‘explain[s] how
[he] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching [his]
findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b); and
then quoting id. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). Here, the ALJ did so.
First, the ALJ addressed supportability, finding that Dr. Alia’s opinions
regarding Morrow’s physical limitations are not supported by his own examination
findings because his examination findings “do not demonstrate [discomfort] with
sitting for prolonged periods, gait instability, or reduced strength of the bilateral
2 24-3711 lower extremities.” To this end, the ALJ cited medical records by Dr. Alia that do
not include any abnormal examination findings regarding Morrow’s ability to sit,
his gait, or his lower extremities and that also include normal examination findings
regarding Morrow’s range of motion and strength in his lower extremities. Given
the severity of the limitations assessed by Dr. Alia, substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Alia’s opinions are not supported by his treatment
records.
Second, the ALJ addressed consistency, including by reviewing the opinions
of the other medical professionals—none of whom reached the same conclusion as
Dr. Alia that Morrow is “limited to significantly less than sedentary work.” In
particular, the ALJ found the opinions of Robert Gordon, D.O.—that Morrow can
sit for four hours and stand or walk for four hours in an eight-hour workday—to be
better supported, because those opinions were consistent with Dr. Gordon’s
examinations and with “the majority of treatment examinations, which generally
demonstrate normal physical functioning, but which also note some limitations in
range of motion in the claimant’s spine.” Substantial evidence also supports this
finding.
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Alia’s opinions. See
Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1106-08 (9th Cir. 2024) (holding substantial
evidence supported ALJ’s rejection of medical opinion as “unsupported by
3 24-3711 objective findings” and “inconsistent with the opinions of [other doctors]” where
the source of the medical opinion had filled out a form without “referenc[ing] any
specific objective findings to support the extreme . . . limitations he assessed”).
2. Morrow also claims that the ALJ erroneously rejected his symptom
testimony. Morrow testified that he has difficulty sitting and standing for
prolonged periods and that he needs to take frequent breaks to lay down flat and
rest for 15 minutes to two hours at a time and for a total of two to six hours a day.
Where, as here, “a claimant presents objective medical evidence establishing
an impairment ‘that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which [he]
complains, an adverse credibility finding must be based on clear and convincing
reasons.’” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 497 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting
Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008)).
This standard “requires an ALJ to show his work” by identifying a “rationale” for
rejecting the claimant’s testimony that “is clear enough that it has the power to
convince.” Id. at 499. The ALJ did so in this case.
In his decision, the ALJ first observed that Morrow had alleged limitations
affecting his ability to sit, stand, and walk, and then found that Morrow’s
allegations of “disabling pain and limitations” were inconsistent with the record.1
1 Although the ALJ’s decision cites “a function report and an exertional activities questionnaire” that Morrow had submitted in support of his application
4 24-3711 In support of this finding, the ALJ chronologically reviewed the medical records,
identifying examination findings inconsistent with the extent of Morrow’s alleged
sitting, standing, and walking limitations. Specifically, the ALJ cited examination
findings that Morrow has normal or only somewhat reduced range of motion and
strength in his lower extremities, including as reflected in primary care records,
physical therapy records, and emergency room records.
Notably, the ALJ recognized that Morrow does have limitations in his ability
to stand, walk, and sit, which the ALJ incorporated into his residual functional
capacity finding that Morrow can sit for six hours a day and stand and walk for
three hours a day. But the ALJ ultimately determined that Morrow’s allegations of
even greater limitations were inconsistent with the foregoing examination findings
in Morrow’s medical records. That rationale is “clear enough that it has the power
to convince,” id., and the ALJ therefore did not err in rejecting Morrow’s symptom
testimony.2
AFFIRMED.
rather than the transcript from the hearing, Morrow’s allegations in those documents are consistent with his hearing testimony. 2 Unlike Lambert v. Saul, the ALJ here did not simply “provide a relatively detailed overview of [the claimant’s] medical history.” 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020). The ALJ went further and specifically identified examination findings inconsistent with Morrow’s allegations of extreme limitations on his ability to sit, stand, and walk.
5 24-3711 FILED JUL 14 2025 Morrow v. Bisignano, No. 24-3711 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK KOH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
I respectfully dissent in part.1 “To satisfy the substantial evidence standard,
the [Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)] must provide specific, clear, and
convincing reasons which explain why the medical evidence is inconsistent with
the claimant’s subjective symptom testimony.” Ferguson v. O'Malley, 95 F.4th
1194, 1200 (9th Cir. 2024). I would hold that the ALJ legally erred because the
ALJ failed “to articulate sufficient reasons for refusing to credit [Morrow’s]
testimony about the severity of his medical condition.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d
1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 2020).
The ALJ made generic statements that Morrow’s allegations “concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [his] symptoms are not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record” and that
Morrow’s “allegations of disabling pain and limitations are out of proportion with
the record.” The ALJ then provided a summary of Morrow’s medical records
without any analysis of the medical records. As Judge Bress explained in Lambert,
even if similar “boilerplate statements” are combined with “a relatively detailed
overview of [the claimant’s] medical history,” that is insufficient to reject a
1 I concur that the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Alia’s opinions.
1 claimant’s testimony, because “providing a summary of medical evidence . . . is not
the same as providing clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant’s
symptom testimony not credible.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277, 1278 (cleaned up).
The majority states that the ALJ “specifically identified examination
findings inconsistent with Morrow’s allegations of extreme limitations on his
ability to sit, stand, and walk.” Respectfully, I see no such reasoning in the ALJ’s
opinion. Several of the ALJ’s statements support Morrow’s allegations because the
ALJ noted abnormal physical examination findings alongside normal examination
findings without explaining why the normal examination findings are inconsistent
with Morrow’s allegations. Moreover, the ALJ never “expressly and specifically
stated” which of Morrow’s alleged symptoms was “inconsistent with any particular
record evidence, as it was required to do.” Ferguson, F.4th at 1200-01 (9th Cir.
2024) (holding that the ALJ erred where it referenced normal examination findings
but failed to specify how those findings were inconsistent with the symptom
testimony).
“Our cases do not require ALJs to perform a line-by-line exegesis of the
claimant’s testimony, nor do they require ALJs to draft dissertations when denying
benefits.” Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1277. “But our precedents plainly required the ALJ
to do more than was done here[.]” Id. I would therefore vacate the district court’s
2 judgment and remand with instructions to return this case to the ALJ for further
proceedings. See id. at 1278 (remanding under similar circumstances).