Morrow v. Bisbee

Nevada Supreme Court

Morrow v. Bisbee

DecidedApril 17, 2015

Docket61954

StatusUnpublished

This text of Morrow v. Bisbee (Morrow v. Bisbee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Morrow v. Bisbee, (Neb. 2015).

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Opinion

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45, 262 P.3d 360, 364 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); NRS 34.160. "A district court's decision to grant or deny a writ petition is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Clark County, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000). Morrow claims that various statutes within NRS chapter 179A (Records of Criminal History and Information Relating to Public Safety) and chapter 239 (Public Records) support his request and mandate disclosure of his parole file. However, Morrow's reliance on these statutes is misplaced as NRS 213.1075 specifically controls the disclosure of information obtained by the Board in the discharge of its official duty and the more specific provision• controls. See Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999). NRS 213.1075 states: Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, all information obtained in the discharge of official duty by an employee of the Division or the Board is privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the Board, the judge, district attorney or others entitled to receive such information, unless otherwise ordered by the Board or judge or necessary to perform the duties of the Division. Morrow argues that the Board's information is merely privileged, not confidential, that the information can be released by the judge, and that he is an "other[ ] entitled to receive such information"

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 4WD because he is the subject of the parole file. Morrow fails to demonstrate that disclosure of his parole file was a duty required by law; therefore, he fails to demonstrate that he was entitled to extraordinary relief. Having reviewed the record on appeal, and for the reasons set forth above, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

( J.

Gibbons

J.

cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge Richard David Morrow Attorney General/Carson City Pershing County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." Williams v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 45, 262 P.3d 360, 364 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); NRS 34.160. "A district court's decision to grant or deny a writ petition is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Clark County, 116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000). Morrow claims that various statutes within NRS chapter 179A (Records of Criminal History and Information Relating to Public Safety) and chapter 239 (Public Records) support his request and mandate disclosure of his parole file. However, Morrow's reliance on these statutes is misplaced as NRS 213.1075 specifically controls the disclosure of information obtained by the Board in the discharge of its official duty and the more specific provision• controls. See Nevada Power Co. v. Haggerty, 115 Nev. 353, 364, 989 P.2d 870, 877 (1999). NRS 213.1075 states: Except as otherwise provided by specific statute, all information obtained in the discharge of official duty by an employee of the Division or the Board is privileged and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the Board, the judge, district attorney or others entitled to receive such information, unless otherwise ordered by the Board or judge or necessary to perform the duties of the Division. Morrow argues that the Board's information is merely privileged, not confidential, that the information can be released by the judge, and that he is an "other[ ] entitled to receive such information"

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A 4WD because he is the subject of the parole file. Morrow fails to demonstrate that disclosure of his parole file was a duty required by law; therefore, he fails to demonstrate that he was entitled to extraordinary relief. Having reviewed the record on appeal, and for the reasons set forth above, we ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

( J.

Gibbons

J.

cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge Richard David Morrow Attorney General/Carson City Pershing County Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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