Morrison v. Vincent
This text of 300 F. Supp. 541 (Morrison v. Vincent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The plaintiffs, parents of a dependent child and the dependent child herself, bring this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of themselves and as a class, action on behalf of all others similarly situated, Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. They seek a judgment declaring that certain provisions in the West Virginia Code,1 and the West Virginia Family Services Manual,2 which [543]*543require a one-year residence in the State before an applicant is eligible to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children, violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, their rights to equal protection and due process of law, and impede or chill the exercise of the right to travel freely among the various states. The plaintiffs further seek to enjoin the enforcement of these provisions.3
Plaintiffs moved to Wayne County, West Virginia, in August of 1967 from Columbus, Ohio, with hope that the father, Glendon Morrison, could obtain gainful employment. Having failed to secure such employment, on October 19, 1967 and again on January 6, 1968, the father made application to the Wayne County Department of Welfare for welfare assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Parent program, on behalf of his minor dependent child. Both of these applications were denied because of failure to meet the one-year residence requirement.4
After exhausting their administrative remedies the plaintiffs instituted this action on June 19, 1968, without prepayment of costs, at which time they moved for a temporary restraining order. This motion was heard and denied by the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia on June 27, 1968. Thereafter, this three judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 and the case came on for hearing on September 19, 1968. Final decision, however, was delayed by this court to await the outcome of litigation which was then pending before the United States Supreme Court involving statutory provisions similar to those here attacked.
On April 21, 1969, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional statutory provisions of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania which deny welfare assistance to residents of said States and the District of Columbia who have not resided within their respective jurisdictions for at least one year immediately preceding applications for assistance. Shapiro, Appellant v. Thompson; Washington, et al., Appellants v. Legrant, et al.; Reynolds et al., Appellants v. Smith, et al., 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).
Initially, the Court held that this residence requirement created two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than one year, in the jurisdiction; that based solely on this difference the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws.
It was further held in Shapiro etc., supra, that the statutory purpose of deterring the migration of indigents from one state to another state which offers greater welfare benefits is constitutionally impermissible because it has the effect of chilling the constitutional right to travel interstate. Neither is it a constitutionally permissible state objective to limit welfare benefits to only those who are regarded as having made some contribution to the community and to the economy of the state because the [544]*544reduction of welfare costs and benefits cannot be an independent ground for an invidiously discriminatory classification.
Next, the court held that this residence requirement is not shown to promote a compelling governmental interest merely because it facilitates the planning of the welfare budget, provides an objective test of residency, minimizes the opportunity for recipients fraudulently to receive payments from more than one jurisdiction, or encourages early entry of new residents into the labor force.
Finally, in disposing of the argument that the challenge to the constitutionality of the one-year waiting-period requirement must fail because Congress has expressly approved the imposition of such requirement by the States as part of the jointly funded AFDC program by enacting section 402(b) of the Social Security Act of 1935, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b), the Court held that even if the federal statute approved or prescribed such residence requirement Congress has no power to authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause, citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966).
Despite our inclination to uphold, if free to do so, the constitutionality of the West Virginia statutes and regulations here involved, we are compelled to follow and apply the determinations and pronouncements of the highest Court in the land. That Court has spoken. Therefore, upon the authority of Shapiro, etc., supra, we hold that those provisions of Chapter 9, Article 5, § 5(a) (4) and Chapter 9, Article 6, §§ 2 and 3 of the West Virginia Code, and all administrative regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, insofar as they prescribe a one-year residence requirement for eligibility to receive welfare assistance under the AFDC program, are unconstitutional and that the defendants, their officers, agents, servants and employees should be permanently enjoined and restrained by proper order of this court from enforcing and executing said provisions and regulations.
Although being of the opinion that the plaintiffs have standing to attack the constitutionality of the one-year residence requirement, since the sole reason assigned by the defendants for the denial of assistance was the failure of the plaintiffs to meet that requirement, we decline to consider an award to the plaintiffs of the requested damages in the nature of the benefits and assistance alleged to have been wrongfully withheld since, upon this record, we cannot determine that the withholding of relief was otherwise impermissible. Plaintiffs allege only that assistance was denied on the sole basis of the residence requirement but they neither allege nor carry the burden of showing that they were, in all other respects, eligible for relief.5
An order consistent with the views herein expressed will be entered.
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300 F. Supp. 541, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morrison-v-vincent-wvsd-1969.