Morrison v. State

845 S.W.2d 882, 1992 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 243, 1992 WL 367513

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 16, 1992
• Docket: 970-91
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION ON STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MALONEY, Judge.

Appellant was convicted of murder and punishment was assessed at confinement for fifty years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On appeal, appellant complained of the trial court’s practice of allowing jurors to question witnesses by means of submitting written questions to the court.¹ Appellant argued that this practice encourages jurors to become advocates. Appellant further contended that he was harmed because the juror’s question, although ruled inadmissible, “tipped off” the prosecutor, prompting the State to offer additional evidence on a material issue.² The Tenth Court of Appeals declined to ban the practice of juror questioning of witnesses, but held that the juror’s question in this case led to reversible error.³

We granted the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether “the court of appeals erred in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to recall a witness to produce evidence on a topic raised by a juror’s question.”⁴ The State claims that the trial court’s procedure for allowing juror questioning of witnesses “embodied virtually all safeguards” suggested by numerous other courts that have permitted the practice and argued that where procedural safeguards are adhered to, neither side gains an unfair advantage. The State further asserts that the practice does not lead jurors to become advocates, but aids in fully developing the evidence. Appellant essentially argues that the practice of allowing juror questioning distorts the jury’s neutral factfinding role, leading jurors to assume the role of advocates. Appellant claims that juror questions amount to a form a communication between jurors and the parties which calls into question the integrity of the adversary system. We agree with appellant. To allow our adversary system to travel, without prior authorization, unregulated by statute or rule, in the direction encouraged by the trial court’s practice is inconsistent with the principles underlying the system. Further, the dangers inherent in such a practice cannot be adequately circumvented by the imposition of procedural safeguards.

Resolution of the issue presented in this case turns upon our understanding of the adversary system.⁵ The practice of juror questioning reflects the currently popular movement to downplay long-standing adversarial principles in favor of an intensified focus on truth-finding.⁶ While we recognize that the search for truth is an integral part of the adversary process, other equally prominent features characterize our system. Addressing the multiple nature of our adversary system Justice Black wrote:

A criminal trial is in part a search for truth. But it is also a system designed to protect “freedom” by insuring that no one is criminally punished unless the State has first succeeded in the admittedly difficult task of convincing a jury that the defendant is guilty.

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 113-14, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1912, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). Due process and those individual rights that are fundamental to our quality of life co-exist with, and at times override, the truth-finding function.⁷ These values became intrinsic to the adversary process due largely to a general distrust of governmental power. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410, 92 S.Ct. 1628, 1632, 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1451, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). Evidentiary barriers to conviction exist, in part, to equalize the contest between the state and the defense by offsetting the abundant resources and power of the state.⁸

Establishment of the jury as a neutral and passive fact-finder in the adversary process paralleled the movement to safeguard individual rights against governmental oppression.⁹ Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156, 88 S.Ct. at 1451. The desire for the jury to stand as a body independent of governmental influence led to defined roles among participants in the system. The adversary theory as it has prevailed for the past 200 years maintains that the devotion of the participants, judge, juror and advocate, each to a single function, leads to the fairest and most efficient resolution of the dispute. Stephan Landsman, The Adversary System, a Description and Defense (1984). Party responsibility for the production of evidence insulates the jury, to the greatest extent possible, from the contest. Id.

The practice of juror questioning of witnesses is most disturbing in its potential for undermining these mainstays of the adversary process. As eloquently stated by 8th Circuit Chief Judge Lay, “[t]he fundamental problem with juror questions lies in the gross distortion of the adversary system and the misconception of the role of the jury as a neutral factfinder in the adversary process.” United States v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 707, 713 (8th Cir.1989) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).¹⁰ To allow active juror participation in the presentation of evidence encourages jurors to depart from their role as passive listeners and assume an active adversarial or inquisitorial stance. Such participation inevitably leads the inquirer to draw conclusions or settle on a given legal theory before the parties have completed their presentations, and before the court has instructed the jury on the law of the case.¹¹ Although it is impossible to guarantee that jurors will remain open-minded until the presentation of all of the evidence and instructions, passive detachment increases that probability. Johnson, 892 F.2d at 713.

Given the importance of maintaining juror impartiality as fundamental to adversarial integrity,¹² any redefining of the juror’s role in the process must be undertaken only when the benefits are exceedingly clear.¹³ The benefits of allowing jurors to participate in soliciting evidence are far from clear and fade to insignificance in light of the perils presented to adversarial principles.¹⁴

The State emphasizes the imposition of procedural safeguards, apparently presuming that judicial control will effectively eliminate any danger presented to adversary values.¹⁵ Although some of the pitfalls of the practice may be avoided pursuant to strict procedural safeguards, numerous other procedural and theoretical implications remain unanswered.¹⁶ For instance, what is the permissible scope of juror questions? Should jurors be told of the reasons for exclusion of a submitted question? Should a witness be recalled if a juror thinks of a question after that witness has been dismissed? If a juror’s questions indicate that the juror is becoming prematurely partial should the judge declare a mistrial? Should jurors be allowed to question a defendant who chooses to take the stand? Especially troublesome is the possibility that juror partiality may arise as the result of a single question or may arise in one juror as a result of another’s questions, however impartial those questions may appear.¹⁷

The questionable benefits of such a practice do not outweigh the far-reaching hazards presented to other values intrinsic in the system. Accord State v. Barrett, 297 S.E.2d 794, 796 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1045, 103 S.Ct. 1445, 75 L.Ed.2d 800 (1983). Absent a thorough legislative mandate in this area, courts should not experiment.¹⁸ A change in our system involving intrusion of one component into the function of another may only be established through the limited rule making authority of this court, subject to disapproval by the legislature or by the legislature in accordance with due process. We know of no authority establishing or authorizing jurors to ask questions of witnesses in the criminal jurisprudence of this state and therefore find the same to be error.

The State contends that the practice of juror questioning in the instant case was “of negligible value” and therefore error, if any, was harmless. Where the role of the jury as a neutral fact-finding body is significantly modified, the underpinnings of our system, designed to ensure trial by a fair and impartial jury are likewise compromised. A determination of harm in this context is virtually impossible. Accordingly, we hold that the practice of permitting jurors to become active participants in the solicitation of evidence by questioning witnesses is not subject to a harm analysis. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

MILLER, J., joins the judgment and opinion of the majority with the following note: The harm analysis question is not completely settled in my mind, but the issue concerning the practice of allowing juror questions needs resolution, thus I join the majority opinion. If the legislature, who has the responsibility of enacting criminal procedure for this state, wishes to allow the practice of juror questioning, they are certainly free to do so.

1 . The trial judge instructed the jury that following each witness jurors could submit questions to the court to be asked of that witness. The court would rule on the questions outside of the presence of the jury. If a question was ruled admissible, the judge would recall the jury and read the question to the witness. The parties were allowed to ask follow-up questions of the witness, limited to the subject matter of the juror's question. Appellant objected to "the process” on the grounds that it is "not authorized by law.” Appellant’s objection was overruled, but appellant obtained a running objection to “the whole process."

2 . We will briefly summarize the facts relevant to the juror’s question. The victim brought appellant to her house to facilitate a drug transaction. Appellant and the victim began fighting in a bedroom and hallway inside the victim’s house. Appellant eventually chased the victim from the house with a butcher knife. At trial, Detective Fickey, who investigated the crime scene, testified that he had found several drops of blood in a hallway in the victim’s house. Following his testimony, a juror submitted the following question: "Was any of the blood in the hall [appellant’s]?” Appellant's objection that the question called for a hearsay response was sustained and the question was never asked. However, the trial court allowed the State to recall Fickey, over objection, to question him about appellant’s “physical well being” the night of the murder. The State asked Fick-ey whether he had observed "wounds, scratches or injuries” on appellant the night of the murder, to which Fickey responded that he had not.

3 . The court of appeals determined that the trial court’s practice of permitting juror questions essentially amounted to communication between jurors and counsel during trial, undermining the integrity of the judicial process. Morrison v. State, 815 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex.App.—Waco 1991). Concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion by allowing the State to strengthen its case based upon the communication from the juror, the court of appeals held that error here was per se harmful, as "an appellate court cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that an unfair advantage which the state gained from a juror’s question did not contribute to either conviction or punishment.” Id. at 769.

4 . The Corpus Christi and Houston courts of appeal have also been grappling with the issue of juror questioning. Velasquez v. State, 815 S.W.2d 842, 845-46 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991) (procedure permitted); Nichols v. State, 815 S.W.2d 306, 307-08 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. granted); Buchanan v. State, 807 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. granted); Allen v. State, 807 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet granted). Accordingly, this issue is ripe for our review. TEX.R.APP.PRO. 200(c)(2).

We note that the issue of juror questions was before this Court previously in Carr v. State, 475 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1099, 93 S.Ct. 919, 34 L.Ed,2d 682 (1973). Although we stated that we failed "to perceive how these questions permitted by the court without objection were improper or harmful", the point of error was multifarious and presented nothing for review.

5 . The State points to numerous state courts which have permitted the practice of juror questioning of witnesses in various forms. Review of these opinions reflects that, in arriving at their decisions, most of these state courts entertained virtually no discussion of adversarial principles or of the problems presented to the jury’s neutral role by the practice of juror questioning. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1974); People v. McAlister, 167 Cal.App.3d 633, 213 Cal.Rptr. 271, 276-78 (1985); Yeager v. Greene, 502 A.2d 980, 985-86 (D.C.1985); Ferrara v. State, 101 So.2d 797, 800-01 (Fla.1958); Story v. State, 157 Ga.App. 490, 278 S.E.2d 97, 98 (1981); Carter v. State, 250 Ind. 13, 234 N.E.2d 650, 651-52 (1968); Rudolph v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 550, 555-56 (Iowa 1980); People v. Heard, 388 Mich. 182, 200 N.W.2d 73, 75-76 (1972); Sparks v. Daniels, 343 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Mo.App.1961); State v. Rodriguez, 107 N.M. 611, 762 P.2d 898, 901-902 (Ct.App.1988) (state statute authorizes the practice); Byrge v. State, 575 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978).

6 . Judge Benavides’ dissent also indicates a willingness to join the current ranks of those whose intensified focus on truth-finding renders other adversary principles diminished importance.

7 .Certain adversary values may effectively impede the discovery of truth by operating as evidentiary barriers to conviction. For instance, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination eliminates a critical source of information that may shed light on the “truth". Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123-2 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1060, 1063-64 (1975). Rules of evidence also operate to keep information from the jury. Legal commentators suggest that we have implemented such evidentiary barriers because we are more appalled by the conviction of an innocent person than by the acquittal of a guilty individual. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123-2 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1031, 1037 (1975); H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge Frankel’s Idea, 123-2 U.Pa.L. 1067, 1078 (1975); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 — 1 U.Pa.L.Rev. 506, 508 (1973). Such barriers decrease the chance of conviction of an innocent person, but also increase the chance that a guilty person will escape conviction. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers, 121-1 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 507.

In comparing the adversary process with inquisitorial systems, one legal commentator discussed how the two systems differently "resolve the conflict between efficient pursuit of the truth and protection of values such as human dignity and privacy and the preservation of a general atmosphere of freedom”. Id. at 579. It is his contention that the system placing a high value on human dignity and privacy will remain committed to those values even at the expense of truth. A more truth-oriented system is less willing to establish evidentiary barriers that are independent of the truth-finding function. Further, the more committed a system to truth as its paramount purpose, the less tolerant it will be of acquitting the guilty in order to prevent conviction of the innocent. Id. at 579-80.

8 .In the words of Justice Black:

The Framers [of the Constitution] were well aware of the awesome investigative and prose-cutorial powers of government and it was in order to limit those powers [that] they spelled out in detail in the Constitution the procedure to be followed in criminal trials. A defendant, they said, is entitled to notice of the charges against him, trial by jury, the right to counsel for his defense, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to call witnesses in his own behalf, and the right not to be a witness against himself. All of these rights are designed to shield the defendant against state power. None are designed to make convictions easier and taken together they clearly indicate that in our system the entire burden of proving criminal activity rests on the State. The defendant, under our Constitution, need not do anything at all to defend himself, and certainly he cannot be required to help convict himself. Rather he has an absolute, unqualified right to compel the State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury though its own resources.

Williams, 399 U.S. at 112, 90 S.Ct. at 1911-12 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

9 . Adversary method and philosophy as it is generally known today developed in England primarily during the 17th and 18th centuries. Development of the system was propelled by a variety of largely social influences, including the English reform movements of the 1760’s and 1770’s which used the legal system to address numerous social injustices of the day, scholarly writings on the adversarial nature of trials, scholastic reconceptualization of the rules of evidence, “the rise of dynamic individualism [and] the growth of a market economy”. Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 Cornell L.Rev. 497, 572-603 (1987).

Juries have been viewed as intrinsic to life in a “free” society:

... trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.

Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56 n. 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1451 n. 23 (quoting P. Devlin, Trial by Jury 164 (1956)). In continental systems, where a concern for human dignity and the preservation of individual rights is less prominent, the jury is notably absent.

10 . Although federal courts allow the practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses, they nevertheless recognize its inherent dangers. See, e.g., United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir.1990) (the court recognized "considerable merit" in appellant's argument that juror questioning was disruptive, invited speculation and “distorted the role of the jury in the adversarial process"); United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1123 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1005, 110 S.Ct. 1300, 108 L.Ed.2d 477 (1990) (risks of juror questioning of witnesses are "compounded in a criminal case"); DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir.1985). The Fourth Circuit has discussed at length the pitfalls of the practice, stating:

Notwithstanding our belief that juror questioning is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, we believe that the practice of juror questioning is fraught with dangers that can undermine the orderly progress of the trial to verdict. Our judicial system is founded upon the presence of a body constituted as a neutral factfinder to discern the truth from the positions presented by the adverse parties. The law of evidence has as its purpose the provision of a set of rules by which only relevant and admissible evidence is put before that neutral factfinder. Individuals not trained in the law cannot be expected to know and understand what is legally relevant, and perhaps more importantly, what is legally admissible. Since jurors generally are not trained in the law, the potential risk that a juror question will be improper or prejudicial is simply greater than a trial court should take, absent such compelling circumstances as will justify the exercise of that judicial discretion as set out above.

DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516-17.

Some federal courts have justified tolerance of juror questioning on the grounds that judicial interrogation of witnesses is generally permitted. While Federal Rule of Evidence 614 permits judicial interrogation of witnesses, federal appellate courts have cautioned district courts on the dangers inherent in the practice. See, e.g., United States v. Beaty, 722 F.2d 1090, 1095 (3rd Cir.1983) (judge must be "extremely careful" to minimize questioning); United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C.Cir.1969). As stated by the D.C. Circuit, judges should be constrained to hold questions to a minimum because “[ijnterrogation of witnesses tends to assimilate the court's role with the advocate's, and may tread over the line separating the provinces of judge and jury.” Barbour, 420 F.2d at 1321 (citations omitted). Citing opinions of other circuits, the court further asserted that "[tjhere is the risk that the questioning may bear 'the seeds of tilting the balance against the accused’ and place ‘the judge in the eyes of some jurors on the side of the prosecution’”. Id. (citations omitted).

While recognizing that Texas is “second to none” in its disapproval of the nonadversarial practice of trial judges’ examination of witnesses and that Texas is virtually alone in rejecting adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 614 which authorizes trial judges to call and interrogate witnesses, Judge Benavides in his dissent nevertheless asserts that juror questioning should be allowed because judicial questioning of witnesses has been tolerated. However, the cases cited by Judge Benavides in support of this proposition do not represent wholesale and unquestioned approval of judicial questioning nor do they justify extension of the practice to jurors.

Judge Benavides cites ten cases in his dissent in which this court under limited circumstances allowed questioning of witnesses by judges. A primary concern in allowing active participation by judges is the danger that the judge will somehow convey his opinion of the case to the jury and ultimately influence their decision. See Article 38.05 V.A.C.C.P.. In most of the ten cases cited, the questioning did not occur during the course of a trial in the presence of the jury. Therefore, the danger that any apparent bias would influence the jury was not present. In two of the cases cited, the questions propounded by the judge were done so at probation revocation hearings where defendants are not entitled to a jury and where no objection had been made to the questioning. Brewer v. State, 572 S.W.2d 719 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Munoz v. State, 485 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). In two other cases cited, the defendant was before the trial court on a plea of guilty. Cleveland v. State, 588 S.W.2d 942 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Navarro v. State, 477 S.W.2d 291 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). Another of the cases cited was a bench trial. Marshall v. State, 164 Tex.Crim. 167, 297 S.W.2d 135 (1957) (holding that since the trial was before the court without a jury, the questions did not result in harm to the appellant). Two of the cases clearly involved questions to which the judge would need answers in order to make a ruling. Milo v. State, 152 Tex.Crim. 405, 214 S.W.2d 618 (1948) (although recognizing that the court should normally refrain from asking questions, it was permissible here to aid the court in its determination of admissibility of evidence); Rodrigues v. State, 110 Tex.Crim. 267, 8 S.W.2d 149 (1928) (although recognizing that the judge should refrain from asking questions of the witnesses, such questions were permissible here to aid court in determination of venue issue). In another of the cases cited, the trial judge asked the witness a question because he did not hear what the witness had just stated. Ash v. State, 420 S.W.2d 703 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). In another of the cases cited, the objections were directed at the court’s explanations to veniremen of questions being asked them during voir dire. Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). Only one of the ten cases cited by the majority involved judicial questioning in an effort to elicit facts unrelated to an issue of law in the normal course of a jury trial. Stewart v. State, 438 S.W.2d 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1969).

In five of the seven court of appeals cases cited by Judge Benavides, the judicial comments were either made outside the presence of the jury during a jury trial or the comments were made during the course of a bench trial. Burks v. State, 693 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.App.—1985); Silva v. State, 635 S.W.2d 775 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982); Bautista v. State, 632 S.W.2d 846 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982); Richardson v. State, 632 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982); Voelkel v. State, 629 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1982). In another of the seven cases cited, no objection had been made to the questioning. Ross v. State, 800 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990). In another of the seven cases cited, the trial judge did not ask questions of any witnesses, but merely made comments to counsel in an effort to preserve orderly proceedings. Betancourt v. State, 657 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983).

11 . Fellow jurors who are likely to give greater weight to questions asked by another jury member than by the lawyers responsible for presenting the evidence may also be inclined to draw premature conclusions. DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516-17.

12 . In addition to the real distortion of adversarial principles resulting from the practice of allowing jurors to participate in the presentation of evidence, the jurors’ assumption of any role other than that of an impartial and indifferent listener calls into question the integrity of the system by giving the appearance that the jury may not be maintaining its impartiality. Although judge and juror each operate within distinct and clearly defined roles, they share the common goal of striving to maintain impartiality in order to preserve the integrity of the system. As stated by Justice Frankfurter in referring to a judge who appeared biased against one of the parties during a trial, “[t]hese are subtle matters, for they concern the ingredients of what constitutes justice. Therefore, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954) (emphasis added).

13 . A change of this nature may best be facilitated legislatively. The Code of Criminal Procedure sets forth numerous rules of procedure applicable to juries with considerable detail. For instance, the Code provides that juries are to be the exclusive finders of fact, Articles 36.13, 38.04 V.A.C.C.P., prohibits anyone from conversing with the jury during deliberations, Article 36.22 V.A.C.C.P., describes what the jury may take with them into the jury room, Articles 36.18, 36.25 V.A.C.C.P., provides a method by which juries may communicate with the court after they receive the case, Article 36.27 V.A.C.C.P., and allows jurors during deliberations to have trial testimony read from the notes of the court reporter or a witness re-examined if a reading is not possible, Article 36.28 V.A.C.C.P. Significant attention is given to the formation of the jury. Article 35.01 et. seq. V.A.C.C.P. Many of the Code’s provisions applicable to juries are clearly designed to foster impartiality.

14 .Studies on the practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses have shown that the alleged benefits of the practice are marginal at best, and the detrimental effects are elusive of measurement. Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors be Allowed to Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 Vand.L.Rev. 117, 140-42 (1991). In one of the most extensive studies conducted on the matter, the theoretical advantages of permitting juror questions were stated as the following:

(1) it would ensure that the jury had all the relevant information to reach a just verdict; (2) it may uncover evidence left out by the attorneys; (3) it increases juror participation; and (4) it would alert attorneys to areas which need to be developed or clarified.

Jeffery Reynolds Sylvester, Your Honor, May I Ask a Question? The Inherent Dangers of Allowing Jurors to Question Witnesses, 7 Cooley L.Rev. 213, 223 (1990) (discussing study conducted by Larry Huer of the Dispute Resolution Center at Northwestern University and Steven Penrod of the University of Wisconsin-Madison). The theoretical disadvantages were set forth as the following:

(1) jurors could lose their objectivity and become overinvolved; and (2) jurors might ask improper questions.

Id. The study was based on real trials in which jurors were allowed to submit written questions to the judge who screened the questions. Note, Breaking the Silence, 44 Vand.L.Rev. at 140-41. Although the study found that jurors believed their questions elicited additional information, results indicated that the jurors’ questions did not elicit previously undisclosed evidence and were only moderately helpful. Jeffery Reynolds Sylvester, Your Honor, May l Ask a Question?, 7 Cooley L.Rev. at 223; see abo Note, Breaking the Silence, 44 Vand.L.Rev. at 141 (Huer, Penrod study revealed that the "belief that jury questions uncover pertinent and helpful information has been exaggerated. Benefits in this areas were modest at best”). Significantly, the study found that the subjective nature of the potential disadvantages rendered it impossible to measure those propositions at all. Jeffery Reynolds Sylvester, Your Honor, May I Ask a Question?, 7 Cooley L.Rev. at 223-24.

15 . Judge Benavides, in his dissent, also concludes that when juror questioning is subject to conscientious judicial control, “the fundamental values of our adversary system are not compromised” and premature commitment by jurors can be avoided. Judge Benavides' belief that premature impartiality can somehow be circumvented by screening the number or manner of questions submitted assumes that such impartiality will be so obvious as to be clearly reflected in the questions asked. We think it more likely that juror impartiality is generally elusive of detection or measurement and for this reason any practice which may impart impartiality should not be condoned.

16 . Courts and legal scholars addressing this issue agree that the procedural difficulties arising from juror questioning of witnesses include: (1) placement of attorneys in the awkward position of deciding whether to object to an inappropriate question at the risk of offending or alienating the juror and arousing suspicion, or to not object and risk admission of irrelevant or damaging evidence, foregoing the preservation of the error; (2) determination of the scope of the juror's question — should questions be limited to issues already raised by the evidence presented or may questions raise new issues; (3) the asking of inappropriate, prejudicial or irrelevant questions due to the juror’s lack of legal training; and (4) further slowing of the already sluggish and cumbersome trial process. See, e.g., DeBenedetto, 754 F.2d at 516; State v. Zima, 237 Neb. 952, 468 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1991); see abo Jeffery S. Berkowitz, Note, Breaking the Silence: Should Jurors be Allowed to Question Witnesses During Trial?, 44 Vand.L.Rev. 117, 120-21 (1991); Michael J. Wulser, Comment, Should Jurors be Allowed to Ask Witnesses Questions in Criminal Triab?, 58 UMKC L.Rev. 445, 451-59 (1990). The procedures employed by the trial court in this case eliminated the attorney’s dilemma of deciding whether or not to object to the question in the presence of the jury.

17 . As noted by Judge Lay, the practice of juror questioning leads to unfairness of a "subtle and psychological nature that is difficult to identify with particularity.” Johnson, 892 F.2d at 711 n. 1.

18 . We note that Texas’ staunch loyalty to adversarial principles has been demonstrated in its stated disapproval of the nonadversarial practice of trial judges’ examination of witnesses and in its rejection of Federal Rule of Evidence 614 which authorizes judges to call and interrogate witnesses. As recognized by Judge Bena-vides in his dissenting opinion, every state which has enacted a state version of the federal rules of evidence has adopted some version of Rule 614 with the exception of Oregon and Texas. Neither has Texas chosen to enact a rule authorizing the interrogation of witnesses by jury members. This absence indicates that the rule making authorities did not intend to endorse or authorize questioning of witnesses by judges or jurors.