Morris v. Tondkar

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 11, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-01393
StatusUnknown

This text of Morris v. Tondkar (Morris v. Tondkar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morris v. Tondkar, (E.D. Wis. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

FREDRICK ANDREW MORRIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 21-CV-1393

DR. FARZANEH TONDKAR, JOHN KIND, LORI WACHHOLZ, VIRGINIA TRZOBIATOWSKI, and MICHELLE HAESE,

Defendants.

ORDER

Plaintiff Fredrick Andrew Morris, who is confined at Green Bay Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1.) Morris also filed two motions for temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions (ECF Nos. 5, 19), a motion for a scheduling conference (ECF No. 17), a motion to amend relief requested (ECF No. 20), a motion for mediation (ECF No. 26), and a motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee (ECF No. 2). This order addresses these outstanding motions and screens his complaint. The court has jurisdiction to screen the complaint in light of Morris’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a magistrate judge and the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s limited consent to the exercise of magistrate judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and this court. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because Morris was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On December 14, 2021, the court ordered Morris to pay $11.84 as an initial partial filing fee by January 3, 2022. (ECF No. 11.) The court granted Morris an

extension to pay the initial partial filing fee by February 3, 2022. (ECF No. 13.) Morris paid the fee on December 30, 2021. Thus, the court will grant Morris’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and allow him to pay the full filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. SCREENING OF THE COMPLAINT Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners

seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 2 which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the

same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the

United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

3 Morris’s Allegations Morris alleges that beginning on July 3, 2021, he went on a hunger strike. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The week of July 4, 2021, Defendants Dr. Farzaneh Tondkar, Lori

Wachholz, and Virginia Trzobiatowski were made aware that Morris was not eating and monitored him through his entire hunger strike, which lasted until August 13, 2021. (Id.) Morris lost 59 pounds and sustained kidney damage. (Id. at 2-3.) He still suffers from kidney issues to this day. (Id. at 3). Morris states Tondkar, Wachholz, and Trzobiatowski should have secured a court order to force treatment for the hunger strike once he refused to participate in any assessments or examinations.

(Id. at 2-3.) Analysis Morris’s complaint does not contain any allegations discussing defendants John Kind or Michelle Haese. Section 1983 “creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional violation.” Hildebrant v. Ill. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 347 F.3d 1014, 1039 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting

Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996)). Because §1983 makes public employees liable “for their own misdeeds but not for anyone else’s,” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 596 (7th Cir.2009), a plaintiff must specifically allege what each individual defendant did (or did not do) to violate his constitutional rights. Absent any allegations that they did anything to violate his constitutional rights, Kind and Haese are dismissed.

4 Morris claims that the remaining defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they ignored the effects of his hunger strike.

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Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
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555 F.3d 592 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
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Cesal v. Moats
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Morris v. Tondkar, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morris-v-tondkar-wied-2022.