Morris v. Jody

288 S.W. 332, 216 Ky. 593, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 977
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedNovember 16, 1926
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 288 S.W. 332 (Morris v. Jody) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morris v. Jody, 288 S.W. 332, 216 Ky. 593, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 977 (Ky. 1926).

Opinion

*594 Opinion op the Court by

Commissioner Sandidge—

Reversing.

This is an action to quiet title. The tract of land in dispute contains less than 2 acres. Defendant below was successful and plaintiff' has appealed.

On February 14,1900, "Wiley Carpenter sold and conveyed a tract of land to'appellee, Thomas Jody. On November 20, 1906, appellee and his wife sold and conveyed a part of the Carpenter tract to appellant, J. K. Morris. Before the conveyance was made a surveyor was employed to establish the boundary to be conveyed, and the deed described it according’ to the survey so made. Since the execution and delivery of that deed appellant, Morris, has resided upon the land so conveyed to him, and appellee has resided upon the portion he had left after the conveyance was made. So far as it affects the controversy herein only the third and fourth lines of the tract so conveyed as they were described in the deed are material and need be quoted. Starting on a black oak corner, the third line is described to run, “thence north 29 west 48 poles to a stone and white oak,” and the fourth line, “thence north 55% east 98 poles to a black oak bush.” The survey was made by Andy Simpson, and the two lines above described were new lines, laid off then for the first time. The testimony herein establishes without contradiction that as he ran those lines on the ground they included all the land in controversy within the boundary conveyed to appellee. Some time after the survey was made and appellee had taken possession under his deed appellant discovered that the surveyor’s chain used by Simpson in measuring the boundary conveyed to appellee was 34 feet and 4 inches long instead of 33 feet, the length of a standard chain. That started the controversy which has led to this action. Appellee thereafter claimed and insists herein that since the third line of the boundary of the tract of land conveyed to appellant runs from the 'black oak “north 29 west 48 poles to a stone and white oak;” and the fourth, “thence north 55% east 98 poles to a black oak bush,” to ascertain the true boundary line between them the distance of the third line from the black oak must be measured by a standard chain and that it must end where the distance 48 poles so measured ends. Appellant contends that regardless of the fact that the chain used in measuring his tract of land when he purchased it was more than 33 feet long that the line actually *595 projected on the ground by the surveyor is controlling and that the distance 48 poles given in the third line of his deeded boundary must be lengthened to reach the point actually established as the corner at the end of that line by the survey which was made. The controversy between the parties that arose in the manner suggested ■seems to have lived in full vigor from its inception until this action was instituted by appellant to settle it by the orderly processes of the law.

The evidence even from appellee himself establishes •that the lines of this survey as projected on the ground by the surveyor wlm established the boundary which was conveyed to appellant, though measured by a chain which made the distance only 48 poles, was actually 50 poles long and included all of the disputed land within appellant’s boundary. The black oak comer from which the third line ran was then and yet is standing and marked. 'The evidence is not satisfactory to establish that a stone ■and white oak to which that line, according to the description in the deed, was said to run were then located at the end of the line as run by the surveyor. It will be observed, however, that the fourth line running from the stone and white oak runs north 55% east 99 poles to a black oak bush. The evidence herein for appellant clearly establishes that a black oak bush stood at the end ■of that -line as it was projected on the ground by the surveyor, and that it was then marked to denote it as the corner tree to which that line ran. The evidence for appellant further clearly establishes that the black oak bush then so marked is still standing. No evidence for appellee controverting that fact is found in the record. On the other hand, the evidence of the surveyor, who testified for appellee and who established the corner at the end of the third line by running that line from its beginning corner 48 poles, and who then ran the fourth line the given course from the end of the 48 poles, discloses that where he made the corner at,the end of the 98 pole line he did not find a marked black oak bush. He stated though that his attention was called to the black oak bush; that it was marked as a corner tree; and that it stood at a point where if he had extended the 48 pole line two poles and run the fourth line from that point it would have •ended at the marked black oak bush. These further facts appear herein to support appellant’s contention. The tract of land which he purchased and which appellee con *596 veyed to him had been contracted by the latter to another before he purchased it. The survey was made pursuant to the contract between appellee and the other. The person who had so contracted to purchase the land took possession of it and after the survey was made and pursuant to the contract between appellee and the previous purchaser, appellee erected a fence on the line dividing the two tracts of land just as it was run by the surveyor. The previous purchaser was unable to meet the payments and then the trade was made by which appellant succeded to his rights and the-deed of conveyance was made to him. At that time and when the deed was made the fence which appellee himself had erected stood on the line as the surveyor located it on the ground, leaving all the land in controversy on appellant’s side of that fence. Tillable land lies on either side of the fence, and the evidence without contradiction establishes that from the time appellant went into possession under his deed he has cultivated all the land on his side up to that fence; and that appellee has cultivated all of the land on his side only up to that fence. The fence stood from the time it was so constructed until a short time before this action was instituted..

All of the rules of law that have been adopted for guidance in locating disputed boundary lines have been to the end that in so doing the steps of the surveyor' who .originally projected the lines on the ground may be retraced as nearly as possible. No rule that has been adopted to accomplish that end is more firmly established than that courses and distances are controlled by marked corners and fixed monuments. Here all the evidence establishes that the lines of the survey in dispute were actually projected on the ground by the surveyor who established the boundary lines which are in dispute just as appellant contends they should be located. The evidence without contradiction establishes that the black oak corner from which the third dine runs north 29 west and that the black oak bush to which the fourth line runs north 55% east are both now standing and marked. That being true, the location of the lost corner, that marking the end of the third and beginning of the fourth line, presents one of the simplest of the problems of surveying. Eun the third line from its known beginning corner 'and reverse the fourth line from its known ending corner until they intersect and the point of intersection fixes the loca *597

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415 S.W.2d 363 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1967)
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246 S.W.2d 460 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1952)
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25 S.W.2d 1009 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
288 S.W. 332, 216 Ky. 593, 1926 Ky. LEXIS 977, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morris-v-jody-kyctapphigh-1926.