Moroccans v. U.S. Department of Commerce

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 17, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-4177
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MOROCCANS, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-04177 (UNA) ) ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ) COMMERCE, et al., ) ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiffs’ pro se Complaint, ECF

No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF No. 2. For the

reasons explained below, the IFP Application is denied, and this matter is dismissed without

prejudice.

Plaintiffs Moroccans, Noble Drew Ali, and the Moorish Science Temple Of America “by

its Trustees, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,” sue the U.S. Department of

Commerce, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Census Bureau. See Compl. at 1–2. More

specifically, Plaintiffs, who attempt to bring this matter as a class action, see id. at 1, 3–4, contend

that Defendants “rely heavily . . . outdated ‘race classes’ when analyzing restricting plans under

section 2 of the VRA [Voting Rights Act], rather than focusing on specific, self-identified national

origins,” and that this overbroad race classification “results in systematic undercounting and

misrepresentation of specific communities,” in violation of several federal laws, see id. at 2–4.

They demand a declaratory judgment stating that Defendants’ current data collection methods are unlawful, and an injunction directing the Defendants to “develop and implement standards that

prioritize national origin data for all VRA-related analyses.” See id. at 4.

At the outset, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ IFP Application. The Application is executed by

a non-party to this action, Sheik Alfred Tard El, and furthermore, it vaguely states that the Plaintiffs

are purportedly exempt from court costs and fees due to a “compelling government interest.” See

IFP App. at 1. No authority is cited to support this broad contention, nor is the Court aware of any

applicable authority, and no information is provided regarding any of the Plaintiffs’ respective

financial circumstances; therefore, the Court cannot assess their ability––or inability––to pay the

filing fee for this matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); see also Form No. AO 240.

The Complaint fares no better. First, this matter cannot be brought as a class action. A

pro se litigant can represent only herself in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of

the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . .

”); Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (individual “not a member

of the bar of any court . . . may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as

counsel for others”) (citation and footnote omitted); U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec.

Co., 274 F. Supp. 2d 10, 16 (D.D.C. 2003), aff'd sub nom. Rockefeller ex rel. U.S. v. Washington

TRU Solutions LLC, No. 03–7120, 2004 WL 180264 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 2004) (“[A] class member

cannot represent the class without counsel, because a class action suit affects the rights of the other

members of the class”) (citing Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975)).

Although Plaintiffs state that their “legal team” will assist them in “fairly and adequately

represent[ing] the interests of the class,” see Compl. at 3, no attorney has entered an appearance.

Similarly, this matter cannot be brought on behalf of the Moorish Science Temple Of

America. A non-individual cannot proceed under the IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); the Supreme Court has interpreted that provision as applicable “only to individuals” or “natural

persons,” not “artificial entities,” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201–07 (1993),

nor can a pro se plaintiff proceed, IFP or otherwise, on behalf of an entity, if as here, that plaintiff

is not licensed counsel, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Greater Southeast Cmty. Hosp. Found., Inc. v.

Potter, 586 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Rowland, 506 U.S. at 201–02); see also Franklin v.

Vilsack, No. 11–0206 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2011) (denying IFP status to plaintiff in his capacity as an

officer of a non-profit corporation, because the non-profit, as an artificial entity, cannot proceed

IFP).

Second, even if this matter was brought solely individually, it is of no consequence,

because no individual plaintiff has established standing. Under Article III of the Constitution,

federal courts “may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies,” Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,

317 (1988), of which “the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part[.]”

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To satisfy the standing requirement, a

plaintiff must establish at a minimum (1) that he has “suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical[;]” (2) that “a causal connection” exists “between the injury and the

conduct complained of . . . and [is] not the result of the independent action of some third party not

before the court[;]” and (3) that the injury will “likely” be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.

at 560–61 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). As here, “a defect of

standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.

Cir. 1987).

Once again, the Complaint, akin to the IFP Application, is signed by Sheik Alfred Tard

El, who is not a party to this case, and none of the named parties have signed the Complaint. See Compl. at 4. That alone is a fatal defect, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), yet more, no Plaintiff has

alleged a redressable injury that is particularized to himself or herself. They generally allege that

they, as class, “reside in different states and are subject to the alleged misclassification and

misapplication of VRA data,” see Compl. at 2, but they do not describe any damages that anyone

personally suffered, raising textbook hypothetical damages.

Accordingly, for all of these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate

Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: April 17, 2026 ___________/s/____________ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge