Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc.

446 F. Supp. 628, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19328
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 28, 1978
Docket75 Civ. 5245
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 446 F. Supp. 628 (Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 628, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19328 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

Opinion

LASKER, District Judge.

Henry Morgan’s “amended and supplemental” complaint alleges violations of Sections 10(b) and 14(e) 1 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78n(e)) and Securities and Exchange *630 Commission Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.-10b-5). Several of the defendants 2 move to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that, as to them, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 3 Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted, and on our own motion, the complaint is dismissed.

In May, 1972, Morgan invested $30,000. in an oil and gas exploration fund and thereby became a limited partner in the Plaza One Development Fund, which was one of a number of programs collectively referred to as the 1972 Programs. 4 Participation in the 1972 Programs was offered to the public by Prudential Ventures Corporation (“Ventures”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Prudential Funds, Inc. (“Prudential”). 5 What Ventures was offering was claimed to be an attractive tax shelter opportunity; its features were described in a variety of “selling documents”: registration statements, prospectuses and other pieces of sales literature! Although the selling documents are not specifically identified, Morgan alleges that he bought his share on the strength of a prospectus entitled “Units of Limited Partnership Interests in Resource Ventures Development Fund.” This is the only publication that he alleges having seen in connection with his purchase.

The uniqueness of the 1972 Programs lay in their financial structure, two features of which assured tax treatment of a sort not to be found in competing tax shelter programs based on oil and gas ventures. First, the selling documents proclaimed that the actual drilling and explorations would be financed by non-recourse loans and that the loans would be secured by oil and gas reserves that had been proven and developed. Use of proven reserves as collateral (“back end leveraging”) permitted each investor to incorporate the loans into his or her cost basis. The stepped up cost basis would have been unavailable if the 1972 Programs had collateralized the loans with unproven, undeveloped oil and gas reserves (“front end leveraging”). Front end leveraging was mentioned and criticized in the Prudential selling documents. Second, the 1972 Programs were committed to use the borrowed funds to prepay “intangible drilling and development expenses.” The irrevocable allocation of borrowed funds to those specific expenses allowed investors to claim deductions in the year of prepayment, rather than in the year that the expenses actually materialized.

Phase I of the Fraud — The First Claim for Relief

After all the partnership interests had been sold, the mechanics of the 1972 Programs were set in motion. This occurred in the fall of 1972, after Morgan had purchased his interest. The first step in the actualization of the exploration/development program was the drafting of a model contract. The contract, which was to govern the relations between Prudential and whatever drilling companies were to be hired to perform the actual field work, contained, among other items, the terms of loan agreements and the details concerning use of borrowed funds. When, in October, 1972, it came time to draft the model contract, the Prudential Defendants had not established proven oil and gas reserves sufficient for the back end leveraging that had been described in the selling documents. The October developments were, according to the complaint, the first sign that the anticipated financial structure would be un *631 available. There is no allegation that at the time the selling documents were circulated, the Prudential Defendants knew or recklessly failed to discover that they would lack the reserves required for the promised form of financing. 6 The model contract that was drafted, with the assistance of defendants Bartling and Foreman & Dyess, contained provisions calling for front end leveraging, the very method that had been disparaged by the selling documents. In November, Prudential circulated the draft model contract to Caplin & Drysdale and Palmer, Series. These law firms advised Prudential that the scheme contemplated by the model contracts as drafted did not conform to what had been described in the selling documents. Prudential was warned that the Caplin & Drysdale tax opinion letters, which had been the basis of the tax information contained in the prospectus, did not cover the system laid out in the model contract. Prudential was further alerted that implementation of the draft contract might, in light of the representations made in the selling documents, create securities laws problems.

Reform was urged. In late November, responding to the criticism of the law firms, Prudential agreed to change the model contract and bring it into conformity with the selling documents. Prudential’s acquiescence was a sham, for at the time it agreed to make the changes in the model contract, it intended to employ front end leveraging, no matter what the terms of the revised contract might indicate. This is the first allegation of fraud (¶ 15, Complaint).

A revised contract appeared in early December. It called for a three phase drilling program, in which reserves developed in the first phase would be used to collateralize loans needed to finance the subsequent phases. The December contract had the potential of fulfilling the descriptions contained in the selling documents. However, by mid-December, “none of the prospects [explored in the first phase of drilling] had been developed sufficiently to provide collateral for loans to finance subsequent drilling phases.” With the year nearly over, the promise of back end leveraging disappeared. In the final days of December, 1972, the Prudential Defendants, “aided and abetted by defendants Bartling and Bartling & Associates,” concocted an elaborate scheme to conceal their failure to live up. to their earlier promises. There is no need for detailed description of the scheme. In short, a series of complicated loan transactions, involving Prudential, Bartling, the Operator defendants, and the Bank defendants, was consummated. The important feature of these transactions was that they deviated from what had been contemplated by the selling documents. The transactions were not

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
446 F. Supp. 628, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19328, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-v-prudential-funds-inc-nysd-1978.