Morgan v. Morgan

81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2434
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedApril 7, 1975
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 81 Misc. 2d 616 (Morgan v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan v. Morgan, 81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2434 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1975).

Opinion

ISSUE

Bentley Kassal, J.

Having determined the wife is entitled to a divorce, the basic issue now is:

Shall a young mother, presently a full-time premedical student with exceptional grades, be given an equal opportunity for development and fulfillment by completing her medical school training although capable of being self-supporting as a secretary?

After a noncontested hearing, I adjudged that plaintiff was entitled to a divorce on grounds of abandonment and custody of the parties’ seven-year-old son. Thereafter, the parties did, at great length, contest the question of whether the wife is entitled to receive alimony, albeit for a short period, which would enable her to complete her premedical (IV2 years) and medical school education.

facts

The parties were married on January 27, 1967 when the husband was in his third year prelaw course at the University of North Carolina and the wife, a sophomore, studying biology, at the Florida State University. Recognizing that both could not simultaneously continue their education and be self-supporting, they agreed it would be preferable for him to [618]*618finish his undergraduate and law school education while she worked. She commenced working full time, earning a monthly salary of $328 until the day before she gave birth to a son, on August 9, 1967. She resumed working a few months later, in January, 1968, on a part-time basis, took care of her own and other children, on an exchange basis, and did typing at home for students, as well as her husband’s theses. This continued until she and her husband separated in October, 1972.

In the interim, Mrs. Morgan has become very proficient at shorthand and typing and also worked as a data analyst. I am satisfied that she is very skilled and, as an executive secretary or technician, could probably command an annual salary of at least $10,000 in normal economy and, very possibly, even in the present employment market.

In February 1973, she returned to the campus to pursue a full time educational career by undertaking a premedical course at Hunter College and her grades have been exceptional — a 3.83 general average (out of a 4.0 maximum) and an A score in the organic chemistry course, ranking 5th in a class of 70.

For his part, the husband has progressed well in his profession, having graduated from Columbia Law School after being selected for its Law Journal. His career started, as planned, with a one-year stint as a law clerk to a Federal Circuit Judge and he immediately thereafter became an associate at a prominent Wall Street law firm. His starting salary, in August, 1972 was $18,000 per annum with $500 increases on November 1, 1972, March 1, 1973, April 1, 1973, a $3,500 increase on November 1, 1973, a $1,500 increase on May 1, 1974 with the most recent increase of $3,000 on November 1, 1974, to a present salary level of $27,500. In all, he has done well and his future appears very promising.

Both parties have become encumbered with personal obligations resulting from loans, taken while they lived together and thereafter, for living and educational expenses, in addition to "loans” due their respective parents.

Extensive memoranda have been submitted delineating in great detail the financial needs of each party, as well as critiques as to the other’s budget. Neither budget appears to be significantly exaggerated but the total, when compared to the available income of the husband, illustrates the impossibility of relying on needs alone.

[619]*619LAW

Defendant cites the case of "Bosner” v "Bosner” (202 Mise 293), for the principle that the husband has no obligation to provide the funds the wife requires to attain a professional status. While the case did involve a wife who, as here, was a college student and wanted to become a doctor, the husband’s gross income was only $4,400. As the court stated (p 297): "On his earnings it would not be possible for him, were he so inclined, to meet the expenditures involved in her studies and the achievement of her ambitions.”

I have found one other case with a similar, though distinguishable, fact pattern. In Levi v Levi (10 Misc 2d 288), the husband was a college teacher and the wife a student in a doctoral (Ph. D.) program. She discontinued daytime work (in which she had earned $2,800 a year) so that she could take daytime courses to qualify for her degree in four years, rather than the eight years it would take if she attended only evening courses. After finding the husband’s total earnings to be about $10,000 and net income of $7,000, the court stated that the husband could not be expected to bear the cost of the wife’s education. The court did award as alimony and support for one child $3,900 a year. Under such facts, I would agree with the court’s statement that the wife’s education (and private school for the child) "are not burdens which can be placed upon defendant unless his means are clearly sufficient to permit.” (Id., p 289.)

There is a further consideration which bears upon my determination and that is the total cost to both parties of hewing to the traditional approach of compelling the wife to spend her life working at a level far below her capabilities, both in terms of intellectual attainment, as well as from a monetary point of view.

At a time when some call for treating the marriage contract as any other contract, it is particularly appropriate to speak of the wife’s duty to mitigate the damages to the husband upon breach. I agree that "when she can, she should also be required to mitigate the husband’s burden either by her own financial means or earning potential or both.” (Doyle v Doyle, 5 Misc 2d 4, 7.) But it is a corollary to the rule of mitigation that the injured party may also recover for the expenses reasonably incurred in an effort to avoid or reduce the damages. (Den Norske- Ameriekalinje Actiesselskabet v Sun Print. 6 Pub. Assn., 226 NY 1, 8.) In this case, any possible short-[620]*620term economic benefit which would result from the wife’s returning to a position similar to the one she held over two years ago, is far outweighed by the potential benefit, economic, emotional and otherwise, of her pursuing her education.

CONCLUSION

In coming to the conclusion I do, I am seeking to effect a balancing of many factors — the parties’ financial status, their obligations, age, station in life and opportunities for development and self-fulfillment. As noted in Phillips v Phillips (1 AD2d 393, 395, affd 2 NY2d 742), times have changed, owing not alone to the coequal status which a married woman shares with her husband, but also to the increase in the number of married women working in gainful occupations. (See, also, Doyle v Doyle, 5 Misc 2d 4, 6, supra.)

Further, I would like to cite a study by the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, entitled Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation: a Preliminary Analysis, which, in setting forth some of the factors to be considered in determining whether alimony is indicated and the quantum thereof, lists the following, among others: "(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find suitable employment.” (Emphasis added.)

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Bluebook (online)
81 Misc. 2d 616, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977, 1975 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-v-morgan-nysupct-1975.