Opinion of the Court by Justice SCOTT.
Appellant, Darryl W. Morgan, was convicted in the Ballard Circuit Court of first-degree burglary, second-degree stalking, two counts of kidnapping, first-degree sexual abuse, terroristic threatening, and first-degree criminal trespass. He was sentenced to a total of thirty-five years imprisonment and appeals to this Court as a matter of right. For the reasons hereafter set out, we affirm all of Appellants convictions, except the conviction for second degree stalking, which we hereby reverse and remand for entry of an amended judgment of conviction and resentencing order consistent herewith.
[103]*103FACTS
The bulk of the charges against appellant stem from Morgan’s actions on the night of October 2nd, and the early morning of October 3rd, 2002, wherein Morgan broke into the home of D.C. and essentially terrorized and victimized D.C. and her guest M.S.
Around 10:30 p.m. on October 2, 2002, Morgan went to the residence of D.C. in Barlow, Kentucky. Morgan, who admits to being a voyeur, watched through the bedroom window of D.C.’s trailer and observed her and her boyfriend, M.S., having sexual intercourse. After the couple went to sleep, Morgan lingered outside the trailer for several hours before cutting the telephone line and a window screen and going inside.1 He then awoke the couple, and ordered them onto their stomachs.
Morgan, then armed with her son’s shotgun and knife, repeatedly told the victims throughout the ordeal that if they did not do exactly as he told them, he would blow both of their heads off and bum the trailer down around them. When asked how he had gotten the gun, he replied he had been in her house numerous times and knew where everything was. He also boasted he had been in hundreds of houses in Ballard County.
Initially, Morgan ordered D.C. to get out from underneath the covers. When she cried and asked him not to make her, he put the gun up to M.S.’s head and said to do what he said or he would shoot M.S. D.C. eventually complied with Morgan’s demands.
Later, Morgan asked D.C. if she had any painkillers or any alcoholic beverages. All she had was some tea. He then allowed her to put on her robe and bring him some tea and Tylenol. However, he kept his gun on M.S. When she returned, and after tying M.S.’s hands behind his back, Morgan told her to take her robe off. When she cried, he again put the gun to M.S.’s head.
Morgan told the couple that he only wanted to see D.C. naked and that no one would get hurt if they listened to him. He then told D.C. to get her vibrator out of her dresser drawer. When she denied owning a vibrator, he boasted he had been in her house before and knew she owned one. When she cried and asked him not to make her, he again put the gun up to M.S.’s head and said to do what he said or he would shoot M.S. However, when D.C. went to her dresser to get the vibrator out of the drawer, she dialed 911 from a phone on the dresser. According to the 911-dispatch log, the call from the D.C.’s residence came in at 2:44 a.m. The 911 dispatcher immediately sent officers to the trailer.
Subsequently, Morgan forced D.C. to sexually touch herself with her vibrator, threatening to shoot M.S. if she did not cooperate. As D.C. complied, Morgan rubbed her foot and leg.
Several minutes into the ordeal, a car drove up to the trailer. Morgan told D.C. to answer the door and get rid of whoever it was. It was Barlow City Police Chief Tony Hall, who then pulled D.C. out the front door of the trailer after she whispered the intruder had a weapon. Appellant then fled the premises and was later arrested.
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Morgan’s first claim of error concerns the trial court’s refusal to remove Juror 19 for cause. Morgan alleges that this was prejudicial to him under Thomas [104]*104v. Commonwealth2 as he was required to use a peremptory strike to remove Juror 19.
During voir dire, Juror 19 disclosed that he was good friends with D.C.’s ex-husband, J.C., and that as a result, he had heard a great deal about the crimes from J.C., who in turn had heard the details directly from D.C. When asked whether he could find Morgan not guilty if the Commonwealth failed to prove its case, Juror 19 responded, “I would feel like I was betraying [J.C.] maybe,” and told defense counsel that he “probably wouldn’t be your best choice.” Several questions later, Juror 19 stated that based on what he had read and heard he thought the case was “open and shut.” When asked by the trial court whether he could render a fair verdict based solely upon the evidence presented, Juror 19 further replied, “Maybe I should not ... I would like to think I could, but I have formed a pretty strong opinion, but I don’t know him. I would like to hear his side of it actually.” Nonetheless, after repeated questions by the Commonwealth and trial court, Juror 19 finally said, ‘Well, I hope I can [make a decision strictly based on the evidence and the law]. I think I can, yeah.”
A trial court’s decision as to whether to excuse a juror for cause is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Adkins v. Commonwealth3; Pendleton v. Commonwealth 4. “It is the probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause.” Pennington v. Commonwealth5. The Commonwealth contends that removal for cause was not warranted because, despite Juror 19’s pri- or comments, he eventually stated that he could decide the case based on the law and evidence presented. However, in Montgomery v. Commonwealth6, we noted:
One of the myths arising from the folklore surrounding jury selection is that a juror who has made answers which would otherwise disqualify him by reason of bias or prejudice may be rehabilitated by being asked whether he can put aside his personal knowledge, his views, or those sentiments and opinions he has already, and decide the case instead based solely on the evidence presented in court and the court’s instructions. Thus has come to be referred to in the vernacular as the “magic question.” But, as Chief Justice Hughes observed in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 146, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936), “[i]mpartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of mind.” A trial court’s decision whether a juror possessed “this mental attitude of appropriate indifference” must be reviewed in the totality of the circumstances. It is not limited to the juror’s response to a “magic question.”
Juror 19’s answers during voir dire established an inference of bias so pervasive that his eventual assertion that he could put aside his knowledge and preconceived opinions of the case simply did not rehabilitate him within the standard for a fair and impartial jury as guaranteed by the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. Con-cedingly, the trial court abused its discretion in not striking Juror 19 for cause.
However, Juror 19 never sat on the jury that convicted Morgan, because Morgan used one of his eight (8) peremptory challenges allotted to him for the very [105]*105purpose for which they were granted — to strike a juror he felt would not be sympathetic to his cause.7 To be clear, one should not believe this is a case where an obviously biased juror sat on the trial jury.
Morgan claims the use of his peremptory challenge in this circumstance resulted in a violation of a “substantial right” and thus requires reversal under Thomas.8
Under federal constitutional law, peremptory challenges are “auxiliary” and not of constitutional dimension.9 Rather, they are a means to achieve the constitutionally required end of an impartial jury.10 By Thomas, however, Kentucky elevated the peremptory challenge to that of a “substantial right” requiring the highest degree of protection, even though our history acknowledges we can freely add to them, subtract from them or take them away.11
Historically, the number of peremptory challenges has fluctuated for both the defense and the Commonwealth. In 1877, the defense was allowed twenty (20) peremptory challenges. The number was reduced to fifteen (15) in 1893; and to eight (8) in 1978. All during these periods, the Commonwealth was allowed only five (5) peremptory challenges.12 In 1994, RCr 9.40 was amended to allow both the defense and the Commonwealth an equal number, eight (8) peremptory challenges each.13 If the peremptory challenge was intended to be a substantial right afforded to the defendant, as Thomas holds, we suspect amendments as drastic as those made to RCr 9.40 would never have been allowed to stand.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a substantial right as one which is essential and that potentially affects the outcome of a lawsuit and is capable of legal enforcement and protection, as distinguished from a mere technical or procedural right.14 Conversely, a procedural right is derived from a legal or administrative procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of a substantial right.15 This case illustrates the quintessential exercise of the peremptory challenge. Morgan’s peremptory challenge allowed him to receive a fair and impartial jury; yet its use is now argued under Thomas as the basis for reversing the verdict of that fair and impartial jury.
As Justice Keller charged in his dissenting opinion in Stopher v. Commonwealth, “bestowing a substantial right upon the exercise of a peremptory challenge serves one function and one function only-it manufactures reversible error in cases where the case has been decided by a fair and impartial jury.”16
Morgan is now finding error where no error should exist. And again, Thomas upsets a verdict rendered by a fair and impartial jury only because the Fifth and Sixth Amendment safeguards worked. RCr 9.40 is something we created and we [106]*106allow to exist. It is not and never-has been of constitutional status, except for our decision in Thomas.' ■
Ours is an adversarial system where all parties work together to insure a fair and impartial jury. When that is done and a fair and impartial jury is seated, we should not disturb the verdict for that reason. As Justice Wintesheimer, in his dissent in Thomas, pointed out, “The mere fact that the defendant exercised all his peremptory challenges does not provide a sound basis for asserting that the process relating to challenges for cause automatically deprived him of a proper number of peremptory' challenges.”17
Morgan used his peremptory challenges to make sure that a fair and impartial jury decided his case, as was in his best interest to do. To suggest otherwise is an acknowledgment that one party has the right to a jury that favors his or her side. Many have said change Thomas or change RCr 9.40. One or the other is not working. We now join the chorus — it is time to overrule Thomas. And we do.
Having departed from Thomas, we admit the reversal therein was proper. We would again be compelled to join in such a reasonable opinion under those facts, but only for the proper grounds as were pointed out in Justice Leibson’s concurring opinion thereto. There, Justice Leibson noted, the “death ... was front-page news in the local newspaper, the ‘Troublesome Creek Times, ... Prior to trial, Thomas moved for a change of venue, attaching seven news articles from the newspaper. The motion was denied, renewed after voir dire and denied again.
Voir dire in Thomas revealed that 65 of 67 prospective jurors who were questioned on the record were knowledgeable about the case. “Of the 67 prospective jurors, the trial court struck 24 for cause when they admitted they could not be fair, or expressed an opinion based on pre-trial publicity. Defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to strike ten more jurors for cause on grounds that they admitted they had read the details of this case in the paper.”18 There was, indeed, an abuse of discretion by the trial court in Thomas ..., but the abuse was the failure to grant a change of venue. And, to the extent inconsistent with this opinion, Thomas is hereby overruled.
Justice Cooper, in his dissent hereto, conjures up a scene where a less than scrupulous judge intentionally allows a jury to be “stacked” in favor of one party over the other and goes on to suggest that our decision sets the stage for such activities. On the contrary, this majority relies on the credibility of trial judges, as the backbone of our judicial system, to operate according to the law and the facts of the particular case, with which they are dealing. We give great deference to the decisions of trial judges because we rely on their adherence to the law and to the oath of office administered to them according to the Constitution of this Commonwealth. See Harris v. Commonwealth;19 Commonwealth v. Deloney;20 Commonwealth Transportation Cabinet Dept. of Highways v. Taub;21 Commonwealth v. Walker.22
In any scenario such as the one suggested by Justice Cooper, there are means for [107]*107dealing with such conduct. This case deals with the facts before us and involves one juror and one peremptory strike. There is no evidence in this case to suggest any favoritism for the Commonwealth’s position over Morgan’s and no one has suggested otherwise. And were it otherwise, we would rule appropriately. It is simply not appropriate for our ruling today to be based upon facts not before us.
In Thomas, the Commonwealth relied on Turpin v. Commonwealth23 and Dunbar v. Commonwealth,24 to dispute the contention of a constitutional violation with respect to the use of peremptory challenges. Dunbar held:
A defendant’s right to be tried by an impartial jury is infringed only if an unqualified juror participates in the decision. Rigsby v. Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 795 (Ky.1973); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 253 (Ky.1986); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.1988). As long as the jury that actually hears and decides the case is impartial, there is no constitutional violation. Even if a juror should have been removed for cause, such error does not violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury if the person did not actually sit on the jury. Cf. Turpin v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 619 (Ky.1989); Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988).
Dunbar at 854-55. The decision in Thomas abrogated the holdings in Turpin and Dunbar. This is a case where the evidence of the Defendant’s guilt and abhorrent conduct are overwhelming. To retry this case under the sole dictates of Thomas would be absurd.
Thus we find no error in Morgan’s trial in this regard. The error of the court in failing to strike Juror 19 for cause was harmless since he did not play a part in Morgan’s conviction.
BATSON CHALLENGE
Morgan next alleges the Commonwealth violated Batson v. Kentucky,25 and J.E.B. v. Alabama,26 when it exercised all of its peremptory challenges on male prospective jurors. We have reviewed the Commonwealth’s grounds for striking each juror and conclude that it proffered sufficient gender-neutral explanations for the challenges. No error occurred.
SHERIFF COOPER’S TESTIMONY
Morgan argues he was prejudiced by Sheriff Todd Cooper’s reference to the camouflage bag and its contents as a “rape kit.” We disagree. The “bag and its contents” were admitted into evidence without objection. Thus its contents were subject to fair comment.
No evidence of rape was presented to the jury as this was not, in fact, a rape case. The jury knew this within the context of the evidence it heard. No one ever suggested Morgan raped anyone.
Moreover, Sheriff Cooper was thoroughly cross-examined in the presence of the jury by Morgan’s counsel regarding the contents of the bag, as well as other possible explanations for a bag containing these items. Testimony as to the bag, as well as the contents, was appropriate and the jury was allowed to conduct its duties as pre[108]*108scribed to it — to weigh the evidence presented and reach a verdict. We find no error in this mischaracterization of the contents of the bag. If anything, the use of “rape kit” was harmless error as we find there is no reasonable possibility that this mischaracterization might have contributed to Morgan’s conviction.27
DC’S TESTIMONY
On direct examination, D.C. testified that during her ordeal with Morgan, he told her he had been in “hundreds of houses in Ballard County” but he did not take things from these houses, rather he looked to see what they had. Following this unsolicited reference to Morgan’s statements to her, Morgan’s counsel made a motion for a mistrial based on the alleged erroneous introduction of KRE 404(b) evidence. At that time the trial court overruled the motion based on its opinion that the prejudicial impact of the statement did not rise to a level necessary to warrant a mistrial. However, the court offered to give an admonition to the jury if desired. Defense counsel, rather, rejected the offered .admonition on the belief it would compound the impact of the testimony.
Later in the direct examination, D.C. started to refer to the “hundreds of houses” statement again, but was cut-off by the Commonwealth before the statement could be completed. Defense counsel again waited, until the end of D.C.’s direct examination, to object and move for mistrial. The trial court, again; overruled the motion.
Later, during cross examination, Morgan’s counsel initiated a line of questioning to D.C! regarding whether she was aware Morgan had been in her house, taken anything or moved anything. She then replied she had not known Morgan had been in her home, and explained that Morgan told her; during the course of her ordeal, he did not take anything from the houses he had been in; he only looked around to see what they had. D.C.’s response in this regard was somewhat more relevant to the question posed by defense counsel than that of the Commonwealth.
. From all of this, Morgan now complains the jury heard evidence of “prior bad acts” even, though the Commonwealth had agreed not to introduce any KRE 404(b) evidence. He claims that D.C.’s multiple references to his being in “hundreds of houses in Ballard County” not only violated the pretrial KRE 404(b) agreement, but “unduly prejudiced” his case before the jury enough to warrant a mistrial.
First, it is a well-settled presumption that a jury will follow a curative admonition when a potentially prejudicial statement has been made.28 Therefore, a timely and appropriate admonition provided by the trial court to the jury following such a statement is generally sufficient to cure an error.29 Obviously, the trial court did not believe declaring a mistrial was the appropriate cure for D.C.’s statements but, rather, believed that an admonition' was sufficient. Yet the offer of the court of an admonition was refused.
A mistrial is warranted only where the record reveals “a manifest ne[109]*109cessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity.”30 The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial, and its decision should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.31 The trial court was the tier of fact of the impact of the statement and, upon evaluating the evidence before it, determined that the situation did not create an urgent or real necessity to declare a mistrial.
A mistrial was not, in fact, warranted in this instance, but an admonition would have been appropriate.32 Morgan’s counsel, however, waived his right to the admonition. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling the motion for mistrial.33
In addressing Morgan’s KRE 404(b) argument, we refer to Kentucky’s kidnapping statute. KRS 509.010 defines the restraint element of kidnapping as being one that can be accomplished by “physical force, intimidation, or deception, or by any means ...” Moreover, KRS 509.040(1)(c) establishes an intent “[t]o terrorize the victim or another, ...” as an alternative element of kidnapping. Thus, Morgan’s statement to D.C. is distinguishable from KRE 404(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, in that the statement was intended as one of his several tools of domination (or mental restraint). Why else would he have made the statement except to intentionally intimidate (or terrorize) D.C. while she was under his control and as a means of maintaining that control? It was as much a weapon used by Morgan to further restrict and confine her mentally and emotionally, as were the shotgun and the knife. Morgan wanted D.C. to know that he could do whatever he wanted and she was helpless. In fact, she was compelled to do as he wanted — as embarrassing and frightful as it was.
This is no different than Johnny Gilbert’s use of alcohol, marijuana and pornographic movies to control, force or induce his stepdaughters into adult sexual activity; wherein we stated, “[i]t was necessary that the jury see the entire picture ..., evidence that provides necessary perspective is competent. Juries do not have to perform their function of fact-finding in a vacuum.”34 D.C. could not have given a truthful account of the ordeal without testifying as to Morgan’s use of fear and intimidation, as well as the shotgun and knife, as the weapons to effectuate her kidnapping and control.
KRE 403 provides “[Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, .... ” In adjudging whether or not the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice, this Court has consistently indicated a willingness to protect “probative evidence.”
In Springer v. Commonwealth,35 we upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant was romantically involved with [110]*110another person on the basis of its relevancy to establish a motive for the defendant to loll her spouse; we also upheld the admission of witness testimony of “three person sexual acts” involving the same defendant and her spouse. We have also held, in Hall v. Transit Authority, that evidence of a sexual harassment Plaintiffs previous extramarital affair was relevant over a KRE 408 “undue prejudice objection.” 36 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Turpin v. Kassulke, upheld the admission of a letter written by a murder defendant as evidence of motive (which expressed envy of the wealth a friend received following the death of her husband) as well as a diary entry by the defendant which displayed the longing for wealth.37
In Turpin, the Sixth Circuit discussed the standard of review for evidence admitted or excluded under KRE 403, “A trial judge enjoys ‘various substantial discretion’ in ‘balancing’ probative value on one hand and ‘unfair prejudice’ on the other. Indeed, in reviewing the trial judge’s balancing under KRE 403, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value.”38 Thus the probative value of D.C.’s statements outweighed any prejudicial effect on Morgan’s case. There was no abuse of discretion.
With respect to the notice requirement of KRE 404(c), a prosecutor must first intend on introducing the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or act's before notice of intent is required.39 In this instance, it was not the intent of the Commonwealth to introduce the statement as evidence; it originated from a non-responsive answer in the Commonwealth’s direct and a later response to a series of questions from the defense on cross-examination. Thus we find no error occurred in this regard.
REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS MORGAN’S STATEMENT
During an interview immediately after his arrest, Morgan admitted to Deputy Gaia that he had a problem with voyeurism and had broken into D.C.’s home because he wished to see her naked. A few minutes into the interview, Morgan indicated that he no longer wished to speak with the deputy. Deputy Gaia immediately ceased the questioning. Later the same day, Morgan was approached by another deputy, Carey Batts, who again advised him of his Miranda rights. Morgan thereafter agreed to discuss the matter and gave an extensive statement to Deputy Batts.
Morgan now claims that because Deputy Batts did not specifically ask him whether he understood his rights after being Mir-andized for the second time, his willingness to discuss the case cannot be considered a knowing and voluntary waiver of his rights. The trial court found otherwise, and we uphold that finding.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is deemed conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.40 The record of the suppression hearing indicates there was absolutely no evidence indicating that Morgan did not understand his rights or that he did not knowingly and [111]*111voluntarily agree to the- interview with Deputy Batts. No error occurred.
SECOND DEGREE STALKING
Morgan takes issue with the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on the definition of “course of conduct” as it pertained to the second-degree stalking charge. The record indicates that while defense counsel orally requested such instruction, he did not tender a written definition. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled that it would not give a written definition, but that defense counsel was free to argue it to the jury. Accordingly, during closing argument, defense counsel explained that second-degree stalking requires proof of an intentional course of conduct, which is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of two (2) or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.”41 However, in the Commonwealth’s closing argument that followed, the prosecutor made the following statements:
You get to decide what he did that day, that’s what these instructions talk about. Let’s look at this. The third one is definitions and I’m going to come back, you’ll only need these words if they are used in an instruction and you don’t understand them. Mr. Preston told you some things that are not in here. He said some things. I didn’t object. It’s his closing argument. He told you some of what he said was the law. The judge tells you what the law is .... [Y]ou said you would follow the law the judge gave you in the form of instructions. If it’s not written in here, it’s not the law.
As noted in 1 Cooper, Kentucky Instructions to Juries (Criminal) § 3.10, p. 91 (4th ed.1999), the definition of “course of conduct” must accompany the definition of “stalk.” Without it, the jury has no way of knowing that the pattern of conduct necessary to prove stalking must include at least two intentional acts. Here, the jury was provided the written definition of “stalk,” but not the definition of “course of conduct.” And while the trial court ruled that defense counsel could argue the definition to the jury, the prosecutor’s comments eviscerated any explanation that was given. Morgan was entitled to an instruction as to all of the elements of the offense of stalking. The definition of “course of conduct” must accompany the definition of stalk. We must conclude that the failure to properly instruct the jury on all of the elements of stalking was reversible error.
DIRECTED VERDICT
Morgan further asserts, with respect to the second-degree stalking charge, that he was entitled to a directed verdict because the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of the offense as set forth in KRS 508.150, which provides:
(1) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when he intentionally:
(a) Stalks another person; and
(b) Makes an explicit or implicit threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of:
1. Sexual contact as defined in KRS 510.010;
2. Physical injury; or
3. Death.
“Stalking” is defined in KRS 508.130(1) as follows:
(a) To “stalk” means to engage in an intentional course of conduct:
1. Directed at a specific person or persons;
[112]*1122. Which seriously alarms, annoys, intimidates, or harasses the person or person; and
3. Which serves no legitimate purpose.
(b) The course of conduct shall be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial mental distress.
Finally, as previously noted, “ ‘course of conduct’ means a pattern of conduct composed of two (2) or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose.”42 Thus, to be guilty of second-degree stalking, Morgan had to engage in an intentional course of conduct, comprised of two or more acts directed at D.C. which seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated or harassed her, and which served no legitimate purpose.
The Commonwealth argues that the course of conduct was established by (1) Morgan’s alleged entry into D.C.’s trailer sometime during the summer of 2002, and (2) the October 3, 2002 incident. Without question, the events which took place on the evening of October 3 were directed at D.C., and would have seriously alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed any reasonable person. However, while Morgan’s prior alleged entry into D.C.’s trailer was directed at her, she had absolutely no knowledge of it until the evening of October 3, 2002.
In Kentucky Criminal Law, § 9 — 7(b), p. 402 (1998), Professors Lawson and Fortune note that with respect to the crime of stalking, the requirement that the victim be alarmed, annoyed, intimidated, or harassed, “requires that the conduct of a defendant actually cause serious mental distress to the victim.” Here, it cannot reasonably be argued that D.C. suffered serious mental distress as a result of Morgan’s first entry into her trailer because she was never aware that it had occurred. Moreover, D.C. herself testified that although she knew who Morgan was, she had only seen him a couple of times over the years and had no personal contact with him at all. D.C. never claimed that Morgan engaged in any acts which caused her serious mental distress prior to the night of October 3.
We conclude that the Commonwealth did not introduce sufficient evidence that Morgan engaged in a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Accordingly, as the Commonwealth failed to prove that Morgan intentionally “stalked” D.C., as that term is defined in KRS 508.130, he was entitled to a directed verdict on this charge
VOYEURISM INSTRUCTION
Morgan argues that he was entitled to a voyeurism instruction as a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. He contends that the jury could have reasonably believed that he entered D.C.’s trailer with only the intent to see her naked, not to commit another crime. The trial court denied the instruction on the grounds that voyeurism is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree burglary. We agree.
A lesser-included offense “is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged.” KRS 505.020(2)(a). In other words, “if the lesser offense requires proof of a fact not required to prove the greater offense, then the lesser offense is not included in the greater offense, but is simply a separate, uncharged offense.”43
[113]*113First-degree burglary is committed when a person, with the intent to commit a crime, knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building and, when effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime.44 In comparison, KRS 531.090(1) provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of voyeurism when:
(a) He or she intentionally:
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(3) Enters or remains unlawfully in or upon the premises of another for the purpose of observing or viewing the sexual conduct, genitals, or nipple of the female breast of another person without the person’s consent; and
(b) The other person is in a place where a reasonable person would believe that his or her sexual conduct, genitals, or nipple of the female breast will not be observed, viewed, photographed, filmed, or videotaped without his or her knowledge.
Voyeurism requires proof that the' defendant entered or remained unlawfully for the purpose of viewing another individual’s body or sexual conduct. Proof of that fact is not required to convict a person of burglary and, as such, voyeurism is not a lesser-included offense. Under Morgan’s theory, i.e., that he entered D.C.’s trailer only to look at her and not to commit a crime (although he fails to recognize that voyeurism is a crime), he was entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass, which he was, in fact, given.
Moreover, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Morgan unlawfully entered D.C.’s trailer “with the intention of committing a crime therein” and “was armed with a deadly weapon.” Under the facts presented, the jury could not possibly have believed that Morgan entered without the intent to commit a crime and thus, even had he been entitled to a voyeurism instruction, any failure to give such would have been harmless.45
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
Morgan’s next claim is that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. While Morgan did tender a requested instruction, he presented no evidence to support such.
Voluntary intoxication is a defense to a criminal charge if it “[negatives the existence of an element of the offense!.]”46 The defense is justified only where there is evidence reasonably sufficient to prove that the defendant was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing.47 Evidence of mere drunkenness is not sufficient to warrant an instruction.48 Although Morgan claimed he had consumed as many as eleven Jack Daniels and cokes on the night in question, he also [114]*114stated that he was “cool as a cucumber” during the incident. There was no evidence presented that Morgan was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing when he entered D.C.’s trailer. Accordingly, he was not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction.
IMPROPER CLOSING ARGUMENT
Finally, Morgan claims the Commonwealth made several prejudicial statements to the jury during the penalty phase closing arguments. Counsel for Morgan objected to, and thus preserved for review, the Commonwealth’s reference to his courtroom behavior subsequent to the guilt phase, specifically that he pulled off his tie and popped the top on a Sprite. The claim of error for the Commonwealth’s statement that the jury should give the defendant a “strong, clear message” was not preserved for review at trial, therefore any review must be for palpable error.
RCr 10.26 states:
A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered by the court on motion for new trial or by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error.
It is well settled and recognized that broad latitude must be allowed counsel in presenting a case to the jury.49 It has long been this Court’s opinion that the closing arguments should always be considered “as a whole” and that wide latitude be allowed parties during closing arguments.50 Opening and closing arguments are not evidence and counsel is allowed great latitude in both.51
The statements made did not rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct. As we have held in Stopher v. Commonwealth,52 “In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Here, the Commonwealth asked the jury to “give him a clear, strong message. One, that this won’t be tolerated in Ballard County. That we are going to be safe. [D.C.] can be safe, as long as he is locked away. And, two, that it’s because of his actions_” In evaluating the overall fairness of this trial, we cannot conclude that the conduct of the Commonwealth was so serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. The statements made by the Commonwealth in its closing argument were within the wide latitude allowed them, and the closing argument was neither unfair nor improper.
However, even if, for the sake of argument, we were to find error in the Commonwealth’s statements, the error would be harmless as it did not, in any way, contribute to his conviction.53 On the evidence, Morgan’s conviction was both just and right and does not warrant reversal on this issue. We find no error in the statements made by the Commonwealth.
[115]*115CONCLUSION
We therefore affirm the convictions for first-degree burglary charge, two (2) counts of kidnapping, terroristic threatening, first-degree sexual abuse, and first-degree criminal trespass.54 We hereby reverse and dismiss the second-degree stalking conviction. Further, we remand to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment of conviction and sentencing order consistent herewith.
GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
ROACH, J., concurs in result only and concurs by separate opinion in which GRAVES, J., joins.
GRAVES, J., also concurs by separate opinion.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J.; and JOHNSTONE, J., join.
JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion in which LAMBERT, C.J., and COOPER, J., join.