Morgan v. Balzhiser

568 P.2d 1354, 279 Or. 343, 1977 Ore. LEXIS 841
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 13, 1977
DocketNo. 75-4860, SC 25034
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 568 P.2d 1354 (Morgan v. Balzhiser) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan v. Balzhiser, 568 P.2d 1354, 279 Or. 343, 1977 Ore. LEXIS 841 (Or. 1977).

Opinion

HOLMAN, J.

This is an action by a withdrawing member of a partnership of architects against the remaining members for what is claimed to be the balance owing plaintiff for the value of his interest in the partnership. Defendants appeal from a judgment for plaintiff upon a stipulated set of facts.

Defendants, as partners, designed and supervised the building of a structure for the Eugene Swim and Tennis Club. Thereafter, on November 22,1968, plaintiff became a member of the firm. On January 22, 1969, the roof of the Eugene Swim and Tennis Club building collapsed. On February 24, 1970, an action for damages for negligence was filed against the members of the partnership at the time of the design and construction of the building. Plaintiff was not included as a defendant. On June 9, 1971, plaintiff gave notice to his partners of his intent to withdraw from the partnership in accordance with the partnership agreement. The withdrawal was accepted by the partnership on July 8, 1971. On August 5, 1971, the remaining partners of the firm notified plaintiff that they were exercising their option under the partnership agreement to purchase plaintiffs interest in the partnership. On September 20, 1971, the accountant for the partnership made a written declaration of the value of plaintiffs partnership interest which was required by the partnership agreement to be as of 60 days from the notice of withdrawal, or August 8,1971. It included no adjustment or reserve for any damages that might be paid to the Eugene Swim and Tennis Club. In May 1972 defendants settled the action of the Eugene Swim and Tennis Club for a sum which the plaintiff agrees was reasonable.

The sole issue in this dispute is whether defendants are entitled to a deduction from the value of plaintiffs interest for plaintiffs proportionate share of the loss resulting from the collapse of the roof of the building. [346]*346The trial court ruled the defendants were not so entitled to a deduction.

Defendants contend that pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, Section 17, which is ORS 68.290, plaintiff is responsible for a proportionate share of the losses of the partnership. The statute is, as follows:

"A person admitted as a partner into an existing partnership is liable for all the obligations of the partnership arising before his admission as though he had been a partner when such obligations were incurred, except that this liability shall be satisfied only out of partnership property.”

Similar provisions are also found in Section 41, subsections (1) and (7), of the Uniform Partnership Act, which is ORS 68.630, subsections (1) and (7). These provisions are:

"Liability of persons continuing the business in certain cases. (1) When any new partner is admitted into an existing partnership, * * * if the business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first or dissolved partnership áre also creditors of the partnership so continuing the business. * * * *
"(7) The liability of a third person becoming a partner in the partnership continuing the business!, under this section, to the creditors of the dissolved partnership shall be satisfied out of partnership property only.
ij: * * * ”

Section 17 of the Uniform Partnership Act is accompanied by the following official comment:

"The present section eliminates the difficulty which arises when a new partner is admitted without liquidation of firm debts. The present theory of the common law is that a new partnership is formed; all the property of the partnership which existed up to the moment of the entrance of the new partner being transferred to the new partnership. The result of this theory is that if the business fails, the creditors who have extended credit after the admission of the new partner have a prior claim on the assets in the business. The inequitable character [347]*347of this result has led the courts, where no notice of the change of membership is had by the creditors, to be diligent in finding an assumption of liability on the part of the new partnership of the debts of the old partnership.
* * * *
"The section should be read in connection with section 41, infra. Both sections are based on the principle that where there has been one continuous business the fact that A has been admitted to the business, or C ceased to be connected with it, should not be allowed to cause, as at present, endless confusion as to the claims of the creditors on the property employed in the business; but that all creditors of the business, irrespective of the times when they became creditors and the exact combinations of persons then owning the business, should have equal rights in such property. The recognition of this principle solves one of the most perplexing problems of present partnership law.”

Section 41(1) of the Uniform Partnership Act has this official comment:

"The section as a whole deals primarily with the rights of creditors when a new partner is admitted or a partner retires, is expelled or dies, and the business is continued without liquidation of the debts of the partnership dissolved by the change in personnel.
* * * * »

It is apparent that these statutes are not concerned with rights among partners but are concerned with the protection of the rights of creditors. It is, therefore, plaintiff’s contention that the statutes are irrelevant to our inquiry.

We agree that these statutes, without more, do not dictate a result in this case. Section 17 is found in the chapter concerned with creditors’ rights. Section 41 is found in the chapter on dissolution and winding up of the partnership. Therefore, the latter section would be expected to concern itself with, among other things, the relations among the partners; however, it is couched entirely in the language of creditors’ rights, and it is that language which is in question here. Even [348]*348though the statute says, "* * * if the business is continued without liquidation of the partnership affairs, creditors of the first or dissolved partnership are also creditors of the partnership so continuing the business,” the language does not require that the creditors of the first partnership be considered creditors of the second partnership for the purpose of resolving rights between the withdrawing partner and the continuing partnership; the values which are important in an equitable determination of this question have nothing to do with the protection of creditors, which was the purpose of the statutes.

Defendants also contend that Section 18(a) of the Uniform Partnership Act, which is ORS 68.310(1), is applicable. The statute reads:

"Rules determining rights and duties of partnérs. The rights and duties of the partners in relation to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them, by the following rules:
"(1) Each partner shall

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
568 P.2d 1354, 279 Or. 343, 1977 Ore. LEXIS 841, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-v-balzhiser-or-1977.