Morgan, Deborah v. Beall Manufacturing, Inc.

2020 TN WC 124
CourtTennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
DecidedNovember 24, 2020
Docket2020-07-0266
StatusPublished

This text of 2020 TN WC 124 (Morgan, Deborah v. Beall Manufacturing, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morgan, Deborah v. Beall Manufacturing, Inc., 2020 TN WC 124 (Tenn. Super. Ct. 2020).

Opinion

FILED Nov 24, 2020 02:11 PM(CT) TENNESSEE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS AT JACKSON

DEBORAH MORGAN, ) Docket No. 2020-07-0266 Employee, ) v. ) BEALL MANUFACTURING, INC., ) State File No. 29562 2020 Employer, ) And ) TRAVELERS, ) Judge Amber E. Luttrell Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER

The Court held an Expedited Hearing on Ms. Morgan’s request for benefits for an alleged injury to her left hand/wrist. Beall Manufacturing, Inc., denied Ms. Morgan’s claim for benefits on two grounds.1 First, Beall, a Tennessee Drug Free Workplace, contended she refused to submit to a post-accident drug screen, which entitles it to a presumption that the proximate cause of her injury was the influence of drugs. Second, Beall argued Ms. Morgan did not prove she is likely to establish medical causation at trial. For the reasons below, the Court holds that Beall is not entitled to the presumption under the drug free workplace rules and Ms. Morgan did not show she is likely to prevail at trial in proving medical causation, so the Court denies her request for benefits.

History of Claim

Ms. Morgan alleged an injury to her left hand/wrist on May 5, 2020, while working on a press. She testified that while working with small parts that traveled down a chute into a bin, she noticed the parts were overflowing the bin. When she moved the parts to make room, she felt a “pop” in her left hand/wrist.2 She reported the injury to her supervisor.

1 At the hearing, the parties referred to Ms. Morgan’s employer as CSI, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Beall Manufacturing. For consistency with the pleadings, the Court refers to the employer as Beall throughout the Order. 2 Ms. Morgan experienced soreness in her hands the previous week while working with heavy blades and asked her supervisor to move her to a lighter job. 1 The next morning, Ms. Morgan called the safety manager, Keith Henneberger, and requested medical treatment. He gave her a verbal panel of physicians, and she selected McKenzie Medical Center. Upon arrival, the clinic required her to undergo a supervised post-accident drug screen.

Ms. Morgan’s undisputed testimony was that she produced two urine samples; however, the nurse disposed of the samples because there was “not enough.” Ms. Morgan stated she drank water between the two samples. She next saw the provider and after her exam, she again attempted to produce a sample but was unable. Ms. Morgan stated the nurse refused to test her again and did not offer any other type of drug screen. She was at the clinic for over three hours. The provider remarked on a lab note that Ms. Morgan had a “shy bladder.” The provider referred her to another physician for further evaluation of her hand/wrist, but Beall denied the claim, alleging she violated its drug free workplace policy by refusing to submit to a drug screen.

Later, Ms. Morgan spoke to Carol Holt, Beall’s human resources representative, and advised that she could not return to work until she had treatment for her injury. Ms. Morgan did not provide Beall an off-work slip, and Ms. Holt subsequently terminated her for violation of Beall’s attendance policy.

Ms. Holt testified regarding two random drug tests Ms. Morgan underwent one week before the injury date, which were administered by Jamie Moore, a third-party staffing specialist. According to Ms. Holt and the affidavit testimony of Ms. Moore, both samples were marked “no temp.” Ms. Morgan disputed the accuracy of the reports and stated the notations were added by “someone” after she signed the form. Although the test results were negative, Ms. Holt terminated Ms. Morgan on May 4 based on the temperature of the samples. Ms. Morgan appealed the decision and was returned to work on May 5, the injury date.3

Ms. Holt further testified that, at the time of Ms. Morgan’s injury, Beall was a member of the Tennessee Drug Free Workplace.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

At an expedited hearing, Ms. Morgan must provide sufficient evidence that she would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2019); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

3 Keith Henneberger, the Safety Manager, also testified on behalf of Beall. His testimony was duplicative of Ms. Morgan’s testimony regarding the job she performed on the injury date, the verbal panel he offered, and that she never gave him an off-work slip following the injury. 2 In its defense, Beall cited Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-110(c)(2), which states, “[I]f the injured worker refuses to submit to a drug test, it shall be presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, that the proximate cause of the injury was the influence of drugs, as defined in section 50-9-103.” It further cited the Tennessee Drug Free Workplace Program rules under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-12-.06(2), which also states the above presumption.

Beall argued that Ms. Morgan’s inability to produce a sufficient urine sample after three attempts on May 6, 2020, “is the same as refusing to submit to a post-accident drug test.” Because Beall is a member of the Drug-Free Workplace Program, it further contended it is entitled to the presumption that the proximate cause of Ms. Morgan’s hand/wrist injury was the influence of drugs. The Court is not persuaded by Beall’s argument.

The proof showed Ms. Morgan did, in fact, produce a supervised urine sample, on two of the three attempts. However, the nurse disposed of the first two samples because they were “not enough.” Ms. Morgan was then unable to provide a third sample. The provider’s report remarked Ms. Morgan had a “shy bladder.” Beall contended that because Ms. Morgan was at the clinic for over three hours and was provided water, she intentionally refused to produce a sufficient sample for the drug screen. Absent any supporting medical proof, the Court finds this argument speculative and unpersuasive. Further, the Court finds the previous random drug screen incident unusual, but it fails to prove Ms. Morgan refused to submit to the post-accident drug screen on May 6.

Moreover, under Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-12- .06(4), “if the employee is unable to provide a urine specimen when requested, the United States Department of Health and Human Services mandatory guidelines on fluid administration and for alternative oral specimen collection shall be followed.” Beall introduced no proof that these guidelines for alternative oral specimen collection were followed. For these reasons, the Court holds no statutory presumption applies regarding the proximate cause of Ms. Morgan’s injury, and there was no proof that Ms. Morgan’s hand/wrist injury was caused by intoxication or illegal drug use.

The Court next considers causation. Ms. Morgan must show that her alleged injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment. To do so, she must prove a work-related incident identifiable by time and place of occurrence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14)(A). Further, she must show, “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that [the incident] contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing the . . . disablement or need for medical treatment, considering all causes.” A “reasonable degree of medical certainty” means that, in the treating physician’s opinion, it is more likely than not considering all causes as opposed to speculation or possibility. See Tenn. Code Ann.

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Related

§ 50-6-102
Tennessee § 50-6-102(14)(A)
§ 50-6-239
Tennessee § 50-6-239(d)(1)

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Bluebook (online)
2020 TN WC 124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morgan-deborah-v-beall-manufacturing-inc-tennworkcompcl-2020.