OPINION
SPEARS, Justice.
This case is before us upon certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Pursuant to TEX. CONST, art. V § 3-c, we have jurisdiction to answer the following certified questions:
1. Does the “discovery rule” apply to the Texas Statute of Limitations, TEX. CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.003(b), in an action brought pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM CODE § 71.001 et seq. and § 71.021, respectively?
2. If the discovery rule does not apply to the Texas Statute of Limitations in wrongful death and survival actions, does that statute of limitations as applied to the plaintiffs herein, violate the open courts provision of the Constitution of the State of Texas, TEX. CONST, art. I § 13?
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we answer that the discovery rule does not apply to the wrongful death statute of limitations found in section 16.003(b), and, that section 16.003(b) as applied to the plaintiffs in this case does not violate article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution.
For clarity, we emphasize that these issues are before us on certified questions from the Fifth Circuit. This is a very limited procedural device; we answer only the questions certified and nothing more. See Tex.R.App.P. 114. Thus, the whole case is not before this court as it would be in an ordinary appeal.
The essential facts of this case have been certified to this court. On January 21, 1981, Alfred Moreno, Jr., the infant son of Alfred and Emma Moreno, died of Reye’s syndrome. On September 19, 1981, Shawna Rae Sloan, the infant daughter of James and Camilla Sloan, died of Reye’s syndrome. In the days preceding their deaths, [350]*350the infants had been administered doses of Bayer Children’s Aspirin, manufactured by Sterling Drug, Inc. Sometime after the deaths of the infants the parents were informed that in some instances the use of aspirin factored into Reye’s syndrome deaths. On October 22, 1985, the parents filed separate wrongful death suits against Sterling Drug in state district court. Sterling Drug removed the actions to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Following removal, Sterling Drug moved for summary judgment in both suits, claiming that the actions were barred by the Texas Wrongful Death Statute of Limitations, TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 16.003(b)(Vernon 1986). The federal district court dismissed the suits, citing the recent Fifth Circuit decision of Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 823 F.2d 68 (5th Cir.1987), wherein that court held the discovery rule does not apply to section 16.003(b). The cases were consolidated on appeal, and Moreno and Sloan (collectively “Moreno”) moved for certification of the legal questions to this court. A panel of the Fifth Circuit denied the motion to certify and affirmed in an unpublished opinion on the basis of Tennimon. On rehearing and after en banc reconsideration of the certification question, the Fifth Circuit granted the motion to certify.
The first question is whether the “discovery rule” applies to the statute of limitations for actions based on injuries resulting in death. The relevant limitations statute, section 16.003, TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN., provides as follows:
(a) A person must bring suit for ... personal injury ... not later than two years after the cause of action accrued.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.
The only courts to construe section 16.-003(b) have found it clear and unambiguous in prescribing an absolute two-year limitation period for bringing a wrongful death case. Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 823 F.2d 68, 73 (5th Cir.1987); Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 520 F.Supp. 865, 867 (S.D.Tex.1981). Those decisions, along with a literal reading of section 16.-003(b), would suggest that Moreno’s wrongful death action is barred because it was brought after the two-year limitations period had expired. Moreno, however, argues that the “discovery” rule should apply to section 16.003(b), because he neither knew nor could have known the cause of his injury within the two-year limitation period. Specifically, he asserts that his suit was timely brought because it was filed within two years of the discoveiy of the link between aspirin and Reye’s syndrome.
Moreno offers a number of arguments for why this court should disregard the plain language of section 16.003(b) and apply the discovery rule to the limitations period for wrongful death actions. First, he points out that this court has applied the discovery rule in determining the limitations period under the statutory predecessor to section 16.003(a), which governs actions for personal injury not resulting in death. Citing Ex parte Pruitt, 551 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex.1977) for the proposition that statutes should be read as a whole and construed to give purpose and meaning to every part, Moreno argues that the underlying purpose of section 16.003 is to authorize application of the discovery rule to subparts (a) and (b). Second, Moreno contends that the second sentence of section 16.003(b) only fixes the earliest time the cause of action may accrue and was intended to “save” the cause of action from being barred when more than two years elapse between injury and death. See DeHarn v. Mexican Nat’l Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 381 (1893). Moreno argues that this court should set the latest date of accrual beyond death (i.e. at discovery of cause of action) because the purpose of section 16.003(b) is to expand the time in which a wrongful death action can be brought. Finally, Moreno maintains that if subparts (a) and (b) are not interpreted consistently it will result in the absurdity of allowing a defendant to be exonerated for conduct which [351]*351kills but held liable for conduct which merely maims. See Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 694 P.2d 143, 147 (Alaska 1984). Moreno argues that this court should avoid this absurdity by construing subpart (b) to allow application of the discovery rule.
We begin our analysis by observing that the primary purpose of section 16.003, as with all limitation statutes, is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available. Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex.1988). Section 16.003 embodies a legislative determination of what a “reasonable time” is for bringing both an action for injuries not resulting in death (subpart a), and one for injuries resulting in death (subpart b). Under both subparts (a) and (b), an action must be brought within two years of the date the cause of action “accrues.” Only subpart (b), however, goes on to specify that a cause of action “accrues” at a certain time — the date of death. When the legislature employs the term “accrues” without an accompanying definition, the courts must determine when that cause of action accrues and thus when the statute of limitations commences to run. Indeed, on three previous occasions this court has adopted and relied upon the following language from Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 173 A.2d 277, 285 (1961):
[T]he question when a cause of action accrues is a judicial one, and to determine it in any particular case is to establish a general rule of law for a class of cases, which rule must be founded on reason and justice.... In the absence of legislative definition and specification, the ... courts have often been called upon to delineate the statute; they have consciously sought to apply it with due regard to the underlying statutory policy of repose, without, however, permitting unnecessary individual injustices.
Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 644; Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.1977); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580-81 (Tex.1967).
For purposes of the application of limitation statutes, a cause of action can generally be said to accrue when the wrongful act effects an injury, regardless of when the plaintiff learned of such injury. Robinson, 550 S.W.2d at 19. The discovery rule represents an exception to this general rule of accrual. Id. The discovery rule is a judicially constructed test which is used to determine when a plaintiffs cause of action accrued. Weaver v. Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.1977). When applied, the rule operates to toll the running of the period of limitations until the time that the plaintiff discovers, or through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence should discover, the nature of his injury. Id. at 793-94. This court has applied the discovery rule to medical malpractice cases in which the plaintiff did not, and could not, know of the injury at the time it occurred. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex.1967) (negligence action against physician for leaving sponge in patient’s body accrues when patient learns of, or in exercise of reasonable care and diligence, should have learned of presence of sponge); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex.1972) (action for negligent performance of vasectomy accrues when plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that he remains fertile). Similarly, this court has applied the discovery rule in a limited number of other cases when the injured party did not, and could not, know of his injury at the time it occurred. See e.g., Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., \671 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1984); Kelley v. Rinkle, 532 S.W.2d 947 (Tex.1976); Quinn v. Press, 135 Tex. 60, 140 S.W.2d 438 (1940). In each of these cases, this court applied the discovery rule to a statute of limitations which left the phrase “accrual” undefined. By contrast, section 16.003(b) specifically defines “accrual” as the date of death. The question here is whether the discovery rule should be applied to a limitations statute which has clearly and unequivocally prescribed that a cause of action accrues upon the occurrence of a specified event. For a number of reasons, we [352]*352hold that it should not.1
Plain Meaning of Section 16.003(b).
Moreno’s argument that the discovery rule should be applied to section 16.003(b) as a matter of statutory construction ignores the plain language of the statute. Where language in a statute is unambiguous, this court must seek the intent of the legislature as found in the plain and common meaning of the words and terms used. RepublicBank Dallas, N.A. v. Interkal, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.1985); Cail v. Service Motors, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex.1983). Section 16.-003(b) specifically provides that in a wrongful death action “a person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues” and goes on to fix “accrual” at the injured person’s death. The express language of the statute, therefore, evidences the legislative intent to fix the only date of accrual, and not merely the earliest, as Moreno contends.2
Moreno’s reliance on our decision in De-Ham is also misguided. In DeHarn, this court interpreted the accrual language in TEX.REV.CIV.STAT. art. 3202 (1879), which was the statutory predecessor to section 16.003(b). The opinion describes the reason for Article 3202 as follows:
Since no action could be brought by the relatives of the injured person until death had ensued, and since a great deal of time might elapse between the injury and the death, it was reasonable that the time of death should be taken as the point from which limitation should begin to run.
DeHarn, 23 S.W. at 381-82. Moreno construes this single passage as evidencing a legislative purpose to extend the beginning of the running of the statute beyond the date of death. But Article 3202 was meant solely to prevent the potential anomaly of limitations running before death. Its purpose was not to extend the beginning of the running of the statute beyond the date of death. Nothing in the wording of Article 3202 or our discussion in DeHam indicates such a purpose. Moreover, to en-graft such a purpose on to section 16.003(b) would be to ignore our oft-repeated pronouncement that the “purpose” of all limitation statutes is to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend while witnesses are available. See e.g., Willis, 760 S.W.2d at 644; Robinson, 550 S.W.2d at 20; Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tex.1975); see also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 100 S.Ct. 352, 356, 62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1979) (“[sjtatutes of limitation ... afford plaintiffs what the legislature deems a reasonable time to present their claims [and] ... protect defendants and courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seri[353]*353ously impaired by loss of evidence, memory, or disappearance of witnesses.”).
The Discovery Rule.
Notwithstanding the plain language of section 16.003(b), Moreno argues that the discovery rule should be applied to the statute because our past decisions have applied the rule to section 16.003(a) involving injuries and, in the interest of consistency, section 16.003(b) should be similarly construed. This argument, however, misconceives both the function of the discovery rule and the power of this court to craft exceptions to legislative enactments.
As we have said, the discovery rule is a judicially conceived exception to statutes of limitation to be used by courts to determine when a cause of action accrues. This court has only applied the rule to “accrual” limitation statutes — i.e. statutes which have failed to define when a cause of action accrues. Because these statutes did not specify a time of “accrual,” this court did not violate a specific legislative directive when it interpreted them to allow for application of the discovery rule. Section 16.-003(b), however, prescribes an absolute limitations period by expressly specifying that “accrual” is the date of death. Since section 16.003(b) specifies death as the accrual date for wrongful death actions, there is no need for this court to employ the discovery rule — the legislature has completed the task.3 Furthermore, when faced with other absolute statutes of limitations in which the legislature has specifically defined the date or event which triggers accrual, this court has enforced the literal terms of the statute and refused to engraft a discovery rule. See e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Certainteed Corp., 710 S.W.2d 544, 546-48 (Tex.1986); Morrison v. Chan, 699 S.W.2d 205, 208 (Tex.1985).
Other Jurisdictions.
The overwhelming majority of states construing absolute statutes with similar or identical language to that found in section 16.003(b) have held that the discovery rule does not apply.4 These courts offer several rationales for refusing to apply the discovery rule, including: (1) that the rule applies only to accrual statutes but not absolute statutes, see, e.g., Presslaff, 403 A.2d at 940; White, 693 P.2d at 692; (2) that the fact of death itself is an event which should trigger any and all relevant inquiry, see, e.g., DeCosse, 319 N.W.2d at 51; (3) that there is a substantial state interest in promoting the prompt settlement of the affairs of the deceased, see, e.g., Cadieux, 593 F.2d at 145; Pastierik, 526 A.2d at 323; and (4) that the clear language of the statute cannot be judicially rewritten under the “guise of statutory construction,” see, e.g., Trimper, 501 A.2d at 449; Morano, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 95. In many of these decisions, the factors sug[354]*354gested by Moreno — “fairness of result” and “legislative purpose” — were, in fact, considered and weighed by the court.
The only case cited by Moreno that directly supports his position is Hanebuth v. Bell Helicopter International, 694 P.2d 143 (Alaska 1984). In Hanebuth, the majority applied the discovery rule to an absolute limitations statute on the basis that failure to do so would result in injustice and would make it more profitable for a tortfeasor to kill rather than scratch a plaintiff. Id. at 146-47. However, as the dissent in Hanebuth points out, the majority reached its decision only after it ignored its own recent and controlling precedent, the plain language of the statute, and the vast majority of decisions to the contrary from other jurisdictions. Id. at 147 (Moore, J., dissenting). We decline to follow Hane-buth for these reasons, and because the decision both relies on distinguishable cases5 and fails to recognize the distinction between personal injury and death actions.6 Summary.
The language used in section 16.003(b) reflects a clear legislative intent to adopt an absolute two-year limitations period for wrongful death actions. The legislature could have either left “accrual” undefined in section 16.003(b) or could have stated that the cause of action accrues “on the death of the injured person or upon discovery of the cause of death’’-, either route would have allowed the discovery rule to be applied to section 16.003(b). Instead, the statute unambiguously specifies one event — death—and only that one event as the date upon which the action accrues. By specifying that date, the legislature has foreclosed judicial application of the discovery rule. If we concluded otherwise, we would be disregarding the plain meaning of section 16.003(b), distorting the clear function of the discovery rule, frustrating [355]*355the legitimate purposes of limitation statutes, and ignoring the well-reasoned opinions of most other jurisdictions.
“Open Courts”.
Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, and his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.
This provision, known as the “open courts” provision, is premised upon the rationale that the legislature has no power to make a remedy by due course of law contingent upon an impossible condition. Morrison, 699 S.W.2d at 207; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex.1984). In order to establish an “open courts” violation, a litigant must satisfy a two-part test: first, he must show that he has a well-recognized common-law cause of action that is being restricted; and second, he must show that the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose and basis of the statute. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.1988); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex.1983).
Moreno contends that if section 16.003(b) does not provide for application of the discovery rule, it is unconstitutional because he neither discovered, nor could have discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, his cause of action within the two-year limitations period. In other words, Moreno contends that section 16.-003(b) is unconstitutional because it makes his remedy contingent on an impossible condition, namely, the discovery of the connection between aspirin and Reye’s syndrome within two years after his child’s death. Moreno argues that the “open courts” provision applies because Texas recognizes a common-law right to assert a wrongful death action. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). Alternatively, Moreno argues that wrongful death should be accorded common-law status for purposes of review under the “open courts” provision because a death action incorporates common-law elements and because there is no fundamental distinction between a common-law action for non-fatal personal injuries and a statutory action for wrongful death. See Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomy Maats Holland, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421, 423 (1961). Finally, Moreno contends that section 16.003(b) is unreasonable and arbitrary because it denies him a remedy that would have been available to him had his child lived instead of died.
Common-law Requirement.
We first consider the question of whether Moreno is asserting a common-law cause of action. See Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.1977); Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951, 954-55 (1955); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 121 Tex. 202, 48 S.W.2d 944 (1932). In Hanks, this court applied the “open courts” provision to a municipal ordinance which required notice to a municipality of a defective condition prior to the filing of suit. Essential to this court’s holding in that case — that the ordinance violated the “open courts” provision — was a determination that the cause of action at issue, municipal liability, was common law rather than statutory. Implicit in the opinion was a recognition of the distinction between a court’s power to apply “open courts” protection to common-law causes of action on the one hand, and statutorily created actions on the other. A common-law cause of action exists without a legislative enactment. As such, article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution mandates that the courts be open to pursuing such claims. The legislature is not entitled to restrict or abrogate a common-law cause of action without a reasonable basis and without providing an adequate substitute. If, however, a cause of action was not recognized at common law, but was itself created by the legislature, any legislative abrogation of the cause of action would not be a true abrogation of a constitutional right. Rather, the legislature would simply not have granted as extensive a right as it might have. See Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water Dist. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (“Open Courts” provision does not apply to wrong[356]*356ful death action, which is a statutory cause of action “that expands the rights of an individual beyond those granted by the common law”); see also Stout v. Grand Prairie Indep. School Dist., 733 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ refd n.r.e.); Tarrant County Hosp. Dist. v. Ray, 712 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.).
This court has repeatedly said there was no recognized common-law cause of action for wrongful death. See Witty, 727 S.W.2d at 505-06; Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 n. 2 (Tex.1980); Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex.1968); Elliott v. City of Brownwood, 106 Tex. 292, 166 S.W. 1129 (1914); Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio R.R. Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189, 199 (1879). Wrongful death causes of action owe their existence to statutes changing this common-law rule. TEX.CIY.PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002; Duhart, 610 S.W.2d at 742 n. 2; Marmon, 430 S.W.2d at 182.7 Moreno relies on Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) to support his argument that the common law recognized an action for wrongful death. In Moragne, however, while the majority recognized a common-law action for wrongful death in maritime law, it readily acknowledged that no such action existed at common law. 398 U.S. at 382, 384, 90 S.Ct. at 1778, 1779. Similarly, Moreno’s argument that a wrongful death action is really a common-law action because it incorporates common-law elements ignores the fact that it is the Wrongful Death Act itself which incorporates and sets forth the “elements” of the cause of action. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.002(b)(1986). The fact that common-law elements are required is the result of an express statutory provision and does not change the fact that the underlying right to bring the action is statutory.8
Summary.
Our most recent open courts decisions have consistently required that the cause [357]*357of action restricted be one that is well defined in the common law. Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Tex.1988); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 922 (Tex.1984). Moreno’s constitutional attack on section 16.003(b) is not premised upon restriction of a common-law cause of action, and, therefore, necessarily fails the first prong of the open courts test. See Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water Dist. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 636 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ) (wrongful death action did not exist at common law, and it is only by virtue of statutory authority that such suits can be maintained; therefore, “open courts” provision simply does not apply).
Finally, and notwithstanding the dissent’s argument to the contrary, we believe today’s decision is entirely reconcilable with our decision in Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 918. First, Nelson involved limitations on a malpractice action — a well-established common law cause of action. See, e.g., Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664-666; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Morin, 66 Tex. 225, 18 S.W. 503 (1886). Second, because the injury complained of in Nelson did not manifest itself until after limitations had run, the Nelsons had no reason to know of their injury, and thus their ability to bring suit, until after limitations had expired. In the instant case, the injury — i.e. death — was immediately known. Even in those Texas cases which have applied the discovery rule the courts have held that limitations begin to run when the fact of injury is known. See, e.g., Rascoe v. Anabtawi, 730 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1987, no writ) (injury evident and limitations commenced on day plaintiff died); Love v. Zales Corp., 689 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (discovery rule does not apply in wrongful death cases to toll running of limitations until plaintiff discovers that he has a cause of action); cf. Coody v. A.H. Robins Co., 696 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) ("The discovery rule speaks only of discovery of the injury [and] does not operate to toll the running of the limitations period until such time as plaintiff discovers all of the elements of a cause of action.”); Otis v. Scientific Atlanta, Inc., 612 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (limitations run from date injury is discovered, not from date of discovery of responsible party).9
For the reasons stated, our answer to the first certified question is that the discovery rule does not apply to TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.003(b). In response to the second certified question, we answer that § 16.003(b), as interpreted, is not inconsistent with and violative of Article I, section 13 of the Texas Constitution.10
DOGGETT, J., joined by RAY and MAUZY, JJ., dissenting.