Moreno-Barasa v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 21, 2026
• Docket: 24-4816
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 21 2026

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

HECTOR DANIEL MORENO-BARASA, No. 24-4816 Petitioner, Agency No. A098-949-622 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted March 31, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: NGUYEN, MILLER, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Hector Daniel Moreno-Barasa, a citizen of El Salvador, petitions for review

of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming an order of

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for withholding of removal.1

We have jurisdiction under § 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252. We review de novo the agency’s legal conclusions, including whether a

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 1 Moreno-Barasa does not challenge the agency’s denial of his application for relief under the Convention Against Torture. The issue is therefore forfeited. See Corro-Barragan v. Holder, 718 F.3d 1174, 1177 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013). particular social group is cognizable. See Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099, 1101

(9th Cir. 2020). We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence.

See Davila v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020). Under the latter standard,

“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We

deny the petition.

To be eligible for withholding of removal, an applicant must show that he

would likely suffer persecution because of his “race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). Before the IJ, Moreno-Barasa asserted that he faced persecution

based on his asserted membership in the particular social groups of “Salvador[]ans

who have opposed or resisted the different gangs,” and “Male Salvador[]ans

known to have lived in rival gang territory.”

To be cognizable, a particular social group must be “(1) composed of

members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with

particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Aleman-

Belloso v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1031, 1042 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Here,

the agency properly concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to show that

either of Moreno-Barasa’s proposed particular social groups meets the particularity

requirement. See Nguyen, 983 F.3d at 1103.

2 As to Moreno-Barasa’s first proposed social group (“Salvadorans who have

opposed or resisted the different gangs”), we agree with the agency that inclusion

of terms like “opposed” and “resisted” renders the first proposed particular social

group “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective,” because it could encompass

individuals who directly oppose or resist gang activity as well as individuals who

engage in more indirect or general conduct, such as using social media to condemn

gang violence. Nguyen, 983 F.3d at 1103; see also Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542

F.3d 738, 745–46 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “young men in El Salvador

resisting gang violence[] is too loosely defined to meet the requirement for

particularity”), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707

F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

The agency also properly concluded that Moreno-Barasa had failed to show

that his second proposed particular social group (“Male Salvadorans known to

have lived in rival gang territory”) satisfied the particularity requirement. The fact

that this proposed group’s definition draws on two immutable characteristics—

namely, Moreno-Barasa’s sex and his past residences—does not change the fact

that the overall definition still fails to “provide a clear benchmark for determining

who falls within the group.” Andrade v. Garland, 94 F.4th 904, 911 (9th Cir.

2024) (citation omitted); see also Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir.

2016) (explaining that the BIA has observed that “not every immutable

3 characteristic is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group” (citation

omitted)). On this record, the agency properly concluded that Moreno-Barasa had

failed to establish clear parameters for ascertaining who is “known” to have “lived’

in “gang territory” of a rival gang. As the BIA noted, the proposed group is not

limited in age and would sweep in “broad swaths of society” as “susceptible to

victimization” without any clear limits. See Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070,

1078 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Because Moreno-Barasa’s failure to

establish a cognizable particular social group is dispositive of his eligibility for

withholding of removal, we conclude that the agency properly denied his request

for such relief. See Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2019).

Moreno-Barasa’s motion to stay removal (Dkt. No. 2) is denied.

PETITION DENIED.