2025 IL App (1st) 242373-U No. 1-24-2373 Order filed December 17, 2025 Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ DANIEL MORECI, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 21 CH 463 ) RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE COUNTY ) EMPLOYEES’ AND OFFICERS’ ANNUITY AND ) BENEFIT FUND OF COOK COUNTY, ) Honorable ) Michael T. Mullen, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Rochford and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Equitable tolling did not apply to toll the statutory deadline for a retiring government employee to purchase additional service credit because the employee failed to exercise diligence in completing the fund transfer request form and the COVID-19 pandemic did not prevent the timely processing of the employee’s fund transfer request.
¶2 Defendant Retirement Board (the Board) of the County Employees’ and Officers’ Annuity
and Benefit Fund of Cook County (the Fund) denied plaintiff Daniel Moreci’s request to purchase No. 1-24-2373
additional service credit because the Fund did not receive Moreci’s required payment by the
statutory deadline. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed the Board’s decision.
¶3 On appeal, Moreci argues that the Board’s denial was clearly erroneous and the court
should apply equitable tolling to toll the deadline based on the substantial business disruptions
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
¶4 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, which affirmed the
Board’s decision. 1
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 Moreci had worked as a deputy sheriff for the Cook County Sheriff’s Department since
1991 and retired effective April 30, 2020. Based on his 29.33 years of creditable service, he was
entitled to a monthly annuity of $4,693.64. However, he had accumulated 1400 hours of sick time,
which he could purchase and apply toward his total years of creditable service. This purchase
would increase his monthly annuity to $7,805.40. The Fund advised Moreci on April 30, 2020,
that, pursuant to statute, if he wanted to purchase additional service credit consisting of his accrued
unused sick time, the Fund must receive the requisite payment no later than 30 days from the date
of his withdrawal from service. Specifically, the Fund notified Moreci that he would need to pay
the Fund $7,576.14 to purchase the additional service credit and the Fund must receive that
payment no later than May 30, 2020.
¶7 Moreci chose to pay for his unused sick time by using his deferred compensation account
held at Nationwide Retirement Solutions (Nationwide). The Fund gave Moreci the Fund’s direct
1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
-2- No. 1-24-2373
transfer for purchase of permissive service credits form to send to Nationwide to transfer the funds
to purchase permissive service credits. In bold print, the form stated: “This request should be
submitted to your Deferred Compensation Plan Administrator prior to the 15th of the month for
payments due on the first of the following month.” The Fund had completed Section 2 of the form,
which stated, inter alia:
“Please consider this as confirmation of the balance of $7,576.14 if paid by May
30, 2020. ***.
***. This amount will be credited to the account of the above named member for
the payment of Permissive Service Credits.”
The Fund had signed Section 2 of the form and dated it April 30, 2020. Thereafter, Moreci
completed Section 1 of the form by entering his address, social security number, and telephone
numbers. However, he left blank the entry on the form that stated: “In accordance with the
provisions of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, I elect to transfer
$________ from my 457 Deferred Compensation plan to: [the Fund.]” Moreci signed and dated
the form May 4, 2020.
¶8 On or about May 4, 2020, Moreci went to a post office in Evergreen Park, Illinois and
mailed the form by regular mail via the United States Postal Service (USPS) to Nationwide at its
Chicago address provided on the form. According to the information stamped on the envelope, the
form went to a postal service facility in Carol Stream, Illinois on May 9, 2020. Then, the form
went to Nationwide’s office in Columbus, Ohio on May 19, 2020.
-3- No. 1-24-2373
¶9 On June 3, 2020, Nationwide issued a check for $7,576.14 to the Fund. The Fund received
this check on June 8, 2020. In response to Moreci’s inquiry, Nationwide sent him a letter dated
August 6, 2020, stating that Nationwide had received the form on May 22, 2020.
¶ 10 On December 28, 2020, the Fund determined that Moreci was not eligible to purchase the
permissive service credits. Moreci timely filed in the circuit court a complaint for administrative
review.
¶ 11 In December 2022, the circuit court remanded the case to the Board to hear evidence and
argument pertaining to whether Moreci established that he exercised due diligence in timely
remitting payment to the Board and/or that extraordinary circumstances existed preventing the
transfer of funds as required by statute. The Board conducted a hearing on October 5, 2023.
¶ 12 Moreci testified that under normal circumstances he would have personally delivered the
form to Nationwide’s Chicago address, but that office was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Moreci did not know that Nationwide was not accepting or processing mail at its Chicago address.
Moreci acknowledged that he did not use any certified or priority mail options or a courier
company like UPS or FedEx to send the form to Nationwide. Also, Moreci did not contact
Nationwide to check on the status or processing of his request. Furthermore, he did not contact the
Fund to verify whether it had received a check from Nationwide as payment for his service credit.
Moreci testified that the first time he learned that the form was rerouted to Nationwide’s Ohio
address was when Nationwide contacted him for the first time on June 2, 2020.
¶ 13 Brent Lewandowski, the executive director of the Fund, had served as the director of
member services in May 2020. Lewandowski testified that when the Fund received Moreci’s late
payment on June 8, 2020, Lewandowski was directed to contact Nationwide to inquire as to why
-4- No. 1-24-2373
there was a delay in processing Moreci’s transfer request. Accordingly, Lewandowski contacted
Neil Cook, the Nationwide representative for the Fund. Lewandowski testified that Cook informed
him that Cook “was told” that Nationwide had reached out to Moreci on May 22, 2020, because
his form was incomplete and confusing, but Moreci did not return Nationwide’s call until June 2,
2020. After Moreci communicated with Nationwide, it issued the $7,576.14 check to the Fund on
June 3, 2020. Further, Cook told Lewandowski that the only information in Moreci’s file at
Nationwide was the form. Cook was not provided with any call log and had no information
pertaining to the person who tried to contact Moreci on May 22, 2020. Cook did not have any
personal knowledge about any telephone call placed to Moreci on May 22, 2020, whether an e-
mail had been sent to Moreci, or the phone number Nationwide had used to contact Moreci.
Lewandowski testified that throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, including the period between
April 2020 and July 2020, he was aware of other members using their deferred compensation
accounts at Nationwide to purchase service credits and no member, other than Moreci, was unable
to have their deferred compensation transfer forms processed by Nationwide in a timely manner
to meet the 30-day requirement dictated by statute.
¶ 14 On November 2, 2023, the Board issued a decision, stating that the Illinois Pension Code
did not authorize the Board to apply equitable considerations in applying plain statutory language.
Nevertheless, the Board followed the circuit court’s direction on remand to consider equitable
tolling and concluded that Moreci failed to establish that he exercised due diligence in timely
remitting payment to the Board or that extraordinary circumstances existed preventing the transfer
of funds as required by statute. The Board found that the evidence established that the reason for
the delay in processing Moreci’s fund transfer request was not due to circumstances arising from
-5- No. 1-24-2373
COVID-19 precautions but, rather, arose from Moreci’s failure to complete the required
paperwork necessary to transfer money from his deferred compensation account in a timely
manner. Further, the Board found that the evidence established that Moreci took no action to follow
up or inquire about the status of his request to Nationwide after he put his request in the USPS
regular mail. Moreover, despite Nationwide’s outreach to Moreci on May 22, 2020, well within
the 30-day window, Moreci did not return Nationwide’s call until June 2, 2020, after the 30-day
window had closed.
¶ 15 After briefing and oral argument, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision on October
31, 2024. Moreci timely appealed.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Section 9-219(2)(f) of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/9-219(2)(f) (West
2018)), provides the mechanism by which a Cook County employee may apply for and receive
service credit for annuity purposes for accumulated sick leave as of the date of the employee’s
withdrawal from service, stating in relevant part that an eligible employee
“may receive service credit for annuity purposes for accumulated sick leave as of the date
of the employee’s withdrawal from service, not to exceed a total of 180 days, provided that
the amount of such accumulated sick leave is certified by the County Comptroller to the
Board and the employee pays an amount equal to 8.5% *** of the amount that would have
been paid had such accumulated sick leave been paid at the employee’s final rate of salary.
Such payment shall be made within 30 days after the date of withdrawal and prior to receipt
of the first annuity check.” (Emphasis added.) Id.
-6- No. 1-24-2373
Here, it is undisputed that, absent the application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, Moreci’s
payment to the Fund was due May 30, 2020, but was received by the Fund on June 8, 2020.
¶ 18 The initial question we address is purely legal: whether the 30-day deadline of section 9-
219(2)(f) of the Code can be subject to equitable tolling. See Williams v. Board of Review, 241 Ill.
2d 352, 359 (2011). Rulings on questions of law are reviewed de novo. Branson v. Department of
Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254 (1995).
¶ 19 The equitable tolling doctrine may be applied to suspend the running of a statute of
limitations period or other statutory and administrative deadlines in certain limited circumstances.
Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 362-63. Although equitable tolling is recognized in Illinois, it has been said
to be “rarely applied.” American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Plunkett, 2014 IL App (1st)
131631, ¶ 32. Further, because equitable tolling is fact-based, it “must be applied with caution”
(Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1052 (1996)), and our caselaw
seems to suggest that it may have been actually applied only once by our supreme court. See City
of Rockford v. Giles, 2022 IL App (2d) 210521, ¶ 65; Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 361, 370 (statutory
deadline in the Federal Trade Act of 1974 (Federal Trade Act) (19 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. (2006))
equitably tolled given the language of the statute, its subject and purpose, and the practical
implications of applying equitable tolling).
¶ 20 Equitable tolling under Illinois’s doctrine may be appropriate under three circumstances:
(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, (2) if the plaintiff has been prevented
from asserting his or her rights in some extraordinary way, or (3) if the plaintiff mistakenly asserted
his or her rights in the wrong forum. Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 614 (2000). Extraordinary
barriers that may warrant equitable tolling include legal disability, an irremediable lack of
-7- No. 1-24-2373
information, or circumstances where the plaintiff could not learn the identity of the proper
defendants through the exercise of due diligence. Doe v. Hastert, 2019 IL App (2d) 180250, ¶ 48;
see Ralda-Sandem v. Sanden, 2013 IL App (1st) 121117, ¶¶ 18-26 (finding extraordinary
circumstances where, under the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2020)), the
uncontroverted affidavit of the plaintiff in a paternity proceeding established that the defendant
had threatened the plaintiff’s mother to withhold identity of parentage, which resulted in the
plaintiff failing to learn of the defendant’s existence until well past the two-year statute of
limitations period). Additionally, when assessing whether equitable tolling should be applied,
courts also consider whether the applicable statutory deadline is procedural or substantive in nature
based on the statute’s purpose, legislative intent, and remedial enforcement mechanisms. See
Ciers, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 1052.
¶ 21 In Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 354, the supreme court addressed whether equitable tolling could
be applied where the plaintiff, a terminated worker, missed a federal statutory deadline to enroll in
an approved training program and, as a result, the Board of Review of the Illinois Department of
Employment Security denied her request for supplemental benefits. In its analysis, Williams noted
that Congress is presumed to draft nonjurisdictional federal statute of limitations periods in light
of a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling, and that equitable tolling had been applied
to toll various time limits contained in the statute at issue, i.e., the Federal Trade Act. Id. at 361-
62. Williams considered whether there was a good reason to believe that Congress did not want
the equitable tolling doctrine to apply, noting there was no guidance from the agency charged with
administering the Federal Trade Act on the applicability of equitable tolling. Id. at 365.
Accordingly, Williams considered the language establishing the statutory deadline, the underlying
-8- No. 1-24-2373
subject matter and purpose of the statute, and the practical effect of applying the doctrine. Id. In
concluding that the presumption in favor of equitable tolling applied to the Federal Trade Act’s
enrollment deadline, Williams noted that the statutory deadline was relatively straightforward and
was not set forth in repetitive or unusually emphatic language. Id. at 366, 370. Moreover, tolling
the deadline would not create the potential for administrative problems or affect the substance of
a worker’s supplemental benefits but, rather, would (consistent with the remedial purpose of the
Federal Trade Act) simply remove a procedural obstacle to obtaining a worker’s benefits. Id. at
367, 369-70.
¶ 22 Moreci argues that the 30-day deadline at issue here is not written in a repetitive or
unusually emphatic manner and is not as technical as the time requirement at issue in Williams.
Moreover, the Fund received the check remitted by Nationwide only about one week late, and
Moreci had not received his first annuity check yet. Furthermore, the Fund’s acceptance of
Moreci’s payment about one week after it was due would not place an additional administrative
burden on the Fund because this matter was an isolated incident resulting from the disruption of
regular business practices caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and Nationwide’s failure to transmit
funds upon receipt of the transfer form.
¶ 23 The Board argues that the plain, clear, and concise language of section 9-219(2)(f) does
not allow for any exception to the 30-day deadline and this court cannot rewrite a statute under the
guise of statutory construction or depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it
exceptions, limitations, or conditions not expressed by the legislature. See In re Michelle J., 209
Ill. 2d 428, 437 (2004). The Board argues that it is improper to apply equitable tolling in this case
because the Board has only the authority conferred upon it by the Code (see Alvarado v. Industrial
-9- No. 1-24-2373
Commission, 216 Ill. 2d 547, 553 (2005)), and a decision in favor of Moreci would undoubtedly
be an unauthorized act beyond the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction (see Julie Q. v. Department
of Children & Family Services, 2013 IL 113783, ¶ 24). The Board also argues that, unlike in
Williams, here, the option to purchase service credit for unused sick time is not designed to make
whole a worker who has suffered a loss. Instead, like other creditable service activities, such as
military service, unused sick time is available to purchase for those who did not take advantage of
the paid time when it was available during the normal course of employment. See 40 ILCS 5/15-
113 (West 2018). The Board argues that the Code is not rooted in an equitable purpose; rather, it
defines the mandatory calculations and permissive credits available to employed and retiring
government employees. The Board argues that the underlying purpose of the 30-day deadline is
most likely to limit the time for employees to purchase additional service credit to relieve the Fund
of any administrative burdens that arise from dealing with untimely requests and to establish
stability and finality in administrative pension matters.
¶ 24 We conclude that the doctrine of equitable tolling can be applied to toll the 30-day time
limit in section 9-219(2)(f) of the Code. Neither the parties nor this court is aware of any provision
in the Code or bulletin from the Public Pension Division of the Illinois Department of Insurance
that addresses the applicability of equitable tolling. Tolling this deadline would remove a
procedural obstacle for Moreci to purchase service credit for unused sick time, but would also
affect the substance of his benefit by significantly increasing the amount of the pension the Fund
would pay him on a monthly basis. Nevertheless, the 30-day deadline of section 9-219(2)(f) of the
Code is neither complex nor set forth in repetitive or unusually emphatic language. Cf. United
States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1997) (equitable tolling did not apply to time limits in
- 10 - No. 1-24-2373
section 6511 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Revenue Code) for filing tax refund claims
where the time limits were highly detailed, technical, reiterated several times in different ways,
and contained explicit exceptions to its basic time limits that did not include equitable tolling).
Also, tolling section 9-219(2)(f)’s deadline does not seem likely to create the potential for severe
administrative problems. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 352-53 (equitable tolling did not apply
because it would toll not only section 6511’s procedural limitations, but would also affect the
Revenue Code’s substantive limitations on the amount of recovery and “could create serious
administrative problems by forcing the [Internal Revenue Service] to respond to, and perhaps
litigate, large numbers of late claims”). Considering the language establishing the 30-day deadline,
the underlying subject matter and purpose of the statute, and the practical effect of applying the
doctrine of equitable tolling, we do not conclude that the 30-day deadline of section 9-219(2)(f) of
the Code must be followed in all cases and can never be relaxed, no matter the equities.
¶ 25 Next, we address whether Moreci established facts sufficient to warrant the application of
equitable tolling to section 9-219(2)(f)’s 30-day deadline. “[W]e apply the clearly erroneous
standard for mixed questions of law and fact to the issue of whether the deadline should be tolled.”
(Emphasis in original.) Williams, 241 Ill. 2d at 370. “Under this standard, we will reverse the
Board’s decision only if, after review of the entire record, we are left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Equitable
tolling requires due diligence on the part of the claimant. Id. “Due diligence is a fact-specific
inquiry, guided by reference to the hypothetical reasonable person, or, in this case, a reasonably
prudent claimant similarly situated.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 372.
- 11 - No. 1-24-2373
¶ 26 Moreci argues that he acted with due diligence by promptly following the Fund’s
procedures, and the request for transfer of funds form was out of his hands on May 9, 2020, when
the mailed form was routed to Carol Stream. He argues that the COVID-19 pandemic was an
extraordinary circumstance that disrupted not only global business operations but everyday life.
Moreci contends that, but for the COVID-19 pandemic, he would have personally appeared at
Nationwide’s Chicago office on May 5, 2020, to personally request that Nationwide immediately
transfer the funds to the Fund. He adds that Nationwide’s failure to follow the clear instructions of
the transfer form and process it after receiving it on May 22, 2020, could be considered an
extraordinary barrier because he had no control over Nationwide once it received his request and
he had no means of knowing that a representative from Nationwide would not be available at the
Chicago office to receive mail. Moreci also argues that the record is devoid of competent evidence
to establish that Nationwide contacted him on May 22, 2020, and the Board relied on double
hearsay when it found that he failed to respond to Nationwide’s attempt to contact him until June
2, 2020.
¶ 27 Hearsay aside, the evidence establishes that Moreci did not act with due diligence and the
COVID-19 pandemic did not prevent the timely processing of his fund transfer request. Moreci
failed to accurately complete the form he sent to Nationwide because he failed to specify the
amount of money he elected to transfer from his deferred compensation account to the Fund before
he signed and mailed the form to Nationwide. When Nationwide received the form on May 22,
2020, enough time remained to remit the check to the Fund by the 30-day deadline, but Moreci’s
omission on the form caused confusion and required clarification before Nationwide could remit
the check. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic was not an extraordinary circumstance that
- 12 - No. 1-24-2373
prevented Moreci from timely arranging for the transfer of funds because other members had used
their deferred compensation accounts at Nationwide during the relevant time period to purchase
service credits and no member, other than Moreci, was unable to have their deferred compensation
transfer forms processed by Nationwide in a timely manner to meet the 30-day requirement
dictated by statute.
¶ 28 It was Moreci’s burden to establish that the Illinois doctrine of equitable tolling applied to
his claim based on his exercise of due diligence and the fact that an extraordinary circumstance
prevented him from timely purchasing his service credits. He did not meet that burden.
Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision that Moreci
was not entitled to purchase service credits.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court that affirmed the
Board’s decision that Moreci was not entitled to purchase additional service credits.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
- 13 -