Morean v. United States Insurance
This text of 14 U.S. 219 (Morean v. United States Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
delivered the opinion of the .court, and, after stating^ the facts, proceeded as follows:..
■ All considerations connected with, the loss of the cargó, in respect to quantity qr value, ihay, at once, be dismissed from the case. As to memorandum articles, The insurer agrees to pay, for a total loss only, the in- ' sured taking upon himself all partial losses without exception..
If the property arrive at the port of.'discharge, 'reduced in quantity dr value, to any amount, the loss cannot be said to be total in reality, and the insured cannot treat it. as a. total, and demand an indemnity for a partial loss. There is no instance where .the insured can demand as for a toit'l loss that he might not have declined an abandonment,' and demand a partial loss. But if the property insured be included within the memorandum, he cannot, under any circumstances,' call upon the insurer for a partial loss, and, consequently, he cannot' elect to turn it into a total loss. These' principles are clearly established by the case of Mason v. Skurray, d Neilson *225 y’. The Columbian Insurance Company, e Cocking v. Frazer, f M‘Andrews v. Vaughan/Dyson v. Row-croft, and Magrath and Huggins v. Church. i The only question that can possibly arise, in relation to memorandum articles, is, whether the Joss was total or not; and this can never happen where the cargo, or a part of it, has been sent on by the insured, and reaches the original port of its destination; Being there specifically, the insurer has complied with his engagements; every thing like a promise of indemnity against loss or damage to the cargo being excluded from'the policy. If'the question turn upon the totality of the loss; unconnected with the subject, of loss by deterioration of the cargo in yalue, or. reduction in quantity, there is no difference between memorandum and other articles.! If the loss be total in reality, or is such as the insured is permitted to treat as such, he is entitled to aoandon and recover as for a total loss in the case of memorandum articles, but always with this exception, that he is not permitted to turn a partial, into a total loss. Keeping this distinction in view, the loss of the voyage by capture, shipwreck, or otherwise, may. be'treated as á total loss. This is the doctrine in the case of Dyson v. Rowcroft, in which the right to abandon was placed, not-upon the ground of deterioration of the cargo, but upon the justifiable necessity which resulted from it of throwing the cargo overboard? *226 tliis was, In effect, ilie same tiling as if it had, in a storm, been swept from the deck. Such, too, was the case of Manning v. Newnham. j In Cocking v. Frazer no such necessity existed, and the breaking up of the voyage was attempted to be justified by the damaged- state of the cargo, which, per sc, did not justify the.insured in putting an end to the voyage, and thus to turn a partial loss, for which the insurer was not liable, into a total loss. Magrath and Huggins v. Church establishes the same doctrine. Now, what is the present case ?' The ship being thrown on shore, within a mile or two from her port of destination, the agent of the insured employs persons to unlade as much of the cargo as could be saved, and nearly one half was, by his exertions, landed, dried, find sent to the market at Lisbon, and sold by the consignees at about one quarter the price of sound corn, leaving a very inconsiderable sum for the owner, after paying the expenses. Is not this precisely the case of Neilson v. The Columbian Insurance Company, and Anderson v. the same, k with this difference only, .that in the first'case the insured declined sending on the corn,- when ho might have done so, and, consequently,' he was not permitted to turn a partial into' a total loss by his own neglect; and, in ,the latter case, part of the cargo having been rescued from the wreck, before the offer to abandon was made, the insured could not claim as for a total loss, either on account of the injury which *227 the corn had sustained, or of his own act in not sending it forward to its port of destination. In the case now before the, court, the cargo which was saved was sent forward, and sold at the port of its destination.
In addition to the cases above referred to, the cases of Biays v. the Chesapeake Insurance Company, l *228 and Marcardier v. the same, m in this court, arc strongly applicable to the present, and seem, in a *229 great measure, to settle it. But it is contended, by the counsel for the plaintiff, that if the loss be such *230 as that the insured might at one time have treated it as total, it continues to be so, unless at the time *231 when, the offer to abandon is made clpar of thé effects of the peril, and jn a condition to prosecute the voyage, it is restored to his possession. Now, this is certainly not the condition of property, which, at the time of the offer to abandon, is in the possession of a recaptor, who has. a right to retain it until he is paid his salvage. But, in the present case, the corn never was out of the possession of the agents of the insured, w'ho exercised,every act of ownership over it, subject, nevertheless, to the taws f¡.nd customs of the country to which it was sent, with which the insurer and insured are supposed to have been acquainted at the time they entered into this contract, and to which they impliedly agreed to submit. The cargo.which was landed, riot only continued in the possession, and under the direction, of the agents of the insured, but it was relieved from the effects-of the •peril, as between the.insurer and insured, and it was not only in a condition to prosecute the voyage, but it did in reality complete it. Upon the whole, it is the opinion of the court that this is not such a,loss as the defendants engaged to indemnify, against, and that judgment should be given in their favour.
Judgment affirmed. n
At. N. P. 1780. Park. 116. Marshall, Condy’s ed. 223.
3 Caines' Rep. 108.
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14 U.S. 219, 4 L. Ed. 75, 1 Wheat. 219, 1816 U.S. LEXIS 325, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morean-v-united-states-insurance-scotus-1816.