Mr. Justice Bailey
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The question is raised by counsel and discussed at some length, whether membership in the Chicago Law Stenographic Association established a contractual relation between the plaintiffs and defendants which gives to the plaintiffs a right of action against the defendants, for a violation of any of the rules of said association, as for a breach of contract; and, also, whether the only remedy for a violation of said rules is not that provided by the by-laws of the association, viz, a fine, to be imposed upon the offender, after a trial and conviction before an arbitration committee, duly appointed for that purpose. But as we view the case, it will be unnecessary for us to consider these questions, since, admitting that the constitution and by-laws of the association were in the nature of a contract as between the members, inter se, we are of the opinion that the contract thus established is so far obnoxious to well settled rules of public policy as to render it improper for the courts to lend their aid to its enforcement.
Whatever may be the professed objects of the association, it clearly appears, both from its constitution and by-laws, and from the averments of the declaration, that one of its objects, if not its leading object, is to control the prices to be charged ■ by its members for stenographic work, by restraining all competition between them. Power is given to the association to fix a schedule of prices which shall be binding upon all its members, and not only do the members, by assenting to the •constitution and by-laws, agree to be bound by the schedule thus fixed, but their competition with each other, either by taking or offering to take a less price, is punishable" by the imposition of fines, as well as by such other disciplinary measures as associations of this character may adopt for the •enforcement of their rules.
The rule of public policy here involved is closely analogous to that which declares illegal and void contracts in general restraint of trade, if it is not indeed a subordinate application of the same rule. As said by Mr. Tiedeman-; “Following the reason of the rule which prohibits contracts in restraint of trade, we find that it is made to prohibit all contracts which in any way restrain the freedom of trade or diminish competition, or regulate the prices of commodities or services. All combinations of capitalists or of workmen for the purpose of influencing trade in their especial favor, by raising or reducing prices, are so far illegal, that agreements to combine can not be enforced by the courts.” Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, sec. 190.
Many cases may be found in which the doctrine here stated has been laid down and enforced. Thus, in Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, where an association among the whole of a large part of the proprietors of boats on the Erie and Oswego canals was formed under an agreement to regulate the price of freight and passage by a uniform scale to be fixed by a committee chosen by themselves, and to divide the profits of their business according to the number of boats employed by each, with provisions prohibiting the members from engaging in similar business out of the association, it was held that, as the tendency of such agreement was to increase prices and to prevent wholesome competition, as well as diminish the public revenue, it was against public policy and void by the principles of the common law.
In Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349, the proprietors of five several lines of boats engaged in the business of transporting persons and freight on the Erie and Oswego canals, entered into an agreement in which, “for the purpose of establishing and maintaining fair and uniform rates of freight, and equalizing the business among themselves, and to avoid all unnecessary expense in doing the same,” they agreed to run for the residue of the season of navigation at certain rates of freight and passage then fixed upon, but which should be changed whenever the parties should deem expedient, and to> divide the net earnings among themselves according to certain fixed proportions, and it was held, in a suit on the agreement against a party who failed to make payment according to its terms, that the agreement was a conspiracy to commit an act injurious to trade, and was illegal and void.
In Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Penn. St. 173, five coal companies in Pennsylvania entered into an agreement in New York, to divide two coal regions of which they had control; to appoint a committee to take charge of their interests, and decide all questions, and appoint a general agent at a certain point in the State of New York, the coal mined to be delivered through him, each company to deliver its proportion at its own cost at the different markets, at such time and to such persons as the committee should direct, the committee to adjust all prices, rates of freight, etc., and settlements to be made between the several companies monthly, and it was held in a suit brought by one of said companies against another, to enforce a liability arising under said contract, that the contract was in violation of a statute of New York making it a misdemeanor to conspire to commit any act injurious to trade or commerce, and was also against public policy and therefore illegal and void, the court laying down the rule, among other things, that every association formed to raise or depress prices beyond what they would be if left without aid or stimulus, was criminal.
In Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, a contract was entered into by all the grain dealers in a certain town, which, on its. face, indicated that they had formed a partnership for the purpose of dealing in grain, but the true object of which was to form a secret combination which would stifle all competition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means, to. control the price of grain, costs of storage, and expense of shipment at such town, and it was held on bill filed for an accounting and distribution of profits, that such contract was in restraint of trade and consequently void on grounds of public policy. In discussing the principles involved, this court said: “While these parties were in business in competition with each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and sale. They could pay as high or low a price for grain as they saw proper, and as they could make contracts for with the producer. So long as competition was free, the interest of the public was safe. The laws of trade, in connection with the rigor of competition, was all the guaranty the public required, but the secret combination created by the contract destroyed all competition and created a monopoly against which the public interest had no protection.”
The doctrine of the foregoing decisions may, in our opinion, be fairly applied to the facts in the present case. While some of the cases cited involve elements not present here, the determining circumstance in all of them seems to have been, a combination or conspiracy among a number of persons engaged in a particular business, to stifle or prevent competition, and thereby to enhance or diminish prices to a point above or below what they would have been if left to the influence of unrestricted competition. All such combinations are held to be contrary to public policy, and the courts therefore will refuse to lend their aid to the enforcement of the contracts by which such combinations are sought to be effected.
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Mr. Justice Bailey
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The question is raised by counsel and discussed at some length, whether membership in the Chicago Law Stenographic Association established a contractual relation between the plaintiffs and defendants which gives to the plaintiffs a right of action against the defendants, for a violation of any of the rules of said association, as for a breach of contract; and, also, whether the only remedy for a violation of said rules is not that provided by the by-laws of the association, viz, a fine, to be imposed upon the offender, after a trial and conviction before an arbitration committee, duly appointed for that purpose. But as we view the case, it will be unnecessary for us to consider these questions, since, admitting that the constitution and by-laws of the association were in the nature of a contract as between the members, inter se, we are of the opinion that the contract thus established is so far obnoxious to well settled rules of public policy as to render it improper for the courts to lend their aid to its enforcement.
Whatever may be the professed objects of the association, it clearly appears, both from its constitution and by-laws, and from the averments of the declaration, that one of its objects, if not its leading object, is to control the prices to be charged ■ by its members for stenographic work, by restraining all competition between them. Power is given to the association to fix a schedule of prices which shall be binding upon all its members, and not only do the members, by assenting to the •constitution and by-laws, agree to be bound by the schedule thus fixed, but their competition with each other, either by taking or offering to take a less price, is punishable" by the imposition of fines, as well as by such other disciplinary measures as associations of this character may adopt for the •enforcement of their rules.
The rule of public policy here involved is closely analogous to that which declares illegal and void contracts in general restraint of trade, if it is not indeed a subordinate application of the same rule. As said by Mr. Tiedeman-; “Following the reason of the rule which prohibits contracts in restraint of trade, we find that it is made to prohibit all contracts which in any way restrain the freedom of trade or diminish competition, or regulate the prices of commodities or services. All combinations of capitalists or of workmen for the purpose of influencing trade in their especial favor, by raising or reducing prices, are so far illegal, that agreements to combine can not be enforced by the courts.” Tiedeman on Commercial Paper, sec. 190.
Many cases may be found in which the doctrine here stated has been laid down and enforced. Thus, in Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434, where an association among the whole of a large part of the proprietors of boats on the Erie and Oswego canals was formed under an agreement to regulate the price of freight and passage by a uniform scale to be fixed by a committee chosen by themselves, and to divide the profits of their business according to the number of boats employed by each, with provisions prohibiting the members from engaging in similar business out of the association, it was held that, as the tendency of such agreement was to increase prices and to prevent wholesome competition, as well as diminish the public revenue, it was against public policy and void by the principles of the common law.
In Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349, the proprietors of five several lines of boats engaged in the business of transporting persons and freight on the Erie and Oswego canals, entered into an agreement in which, “for the purpose of establishing and maintaining fair and uniform rates of freight, and equalizing the business among themselves, and to avoid all unnecessary expense in doing the same,” they agreed to run for the residue of the season of navigation at certain rates of freight and passage then fixed upon, but which should be changed whenever the parties should deem expedient, and to> divide the net earnings among themselves according to certain fixed proportions, and it was held, in a suit on the agreement against a party who failed to make payment according to its terms, that the agreement was a conspiracy to commit an act injurious to trade, and was illegal and void.
In Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Penn. St. 173, five coal companies in Pennsylvania entered into an agreement in New York, to divide two coal regions of which they had control; to appoint a committee to take charge of their interests, and decide all questions, and appoint a general agent at a certain point in the State of New York, the coal mined to be delivered through him, each company to deliver its proportion at its own cost at the different markets, at such time and to such persons as the committee should direct, the committee to adjust all prices, rates of freight, etc., and settlements to be made between the several companies monthly, and it was held in a suit brought by one of said companies against another, to enforce a liability arising under said contract, that the contract was in violation of a statute of New York making it a misdemeanor to conspire to commit any act injurious to trade or commerce, and was also against public policy and therefore illegal and void, the court laying down the rule, among other things, that every association formed to raise or depress prices beyond what they would be if left without aid or stimulus, was criminal.
In Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346, a contract was entered into by all the grain dealers in a certain town, which, on its. face, indicated that they had formed a partnership for the purpose of dealing in grain, but the true object of which was to form a secret combination which would stifle all competition, and enable the parties, by secret and fraudulent means, to. control the price of grain, costs of storage, and expense of shipment at such town, and it was held on bill filed for an accounting and distribution of profits, that such contract was in restraint of trade and consequently void on grounds of public policy. In discussing the principles involved, this court said: “While these parties were in business in competition with each other, they had the undoubted right to establish their own rates for grain stored and commissions for shipment and sale. They could pay as high or low a price for grain as they saw proper, and as they could make contracts for with the producer. So long as competition was free, the interest of the public was safe. The laws of trade, in connection with the rigor of competition, was all the guaranty the public required, but the secret combination created by the contract destroyed all competition and created a monopoly against which the public interest had no protection.”
The doctrine of the foregoing decisions may, in our opinion, be fairly applied to the facts in the present case. While some of the cases cited involve elements not present here, the determining circumstance in all of them seems to have been, a combination or conspiracy among a number of persons engaged in a particular business, to stifle or prevent competition, and thereby to enhance or diminish prices to a point above or below what they would have been if left to the influence of unrestricted competition. All such combinations are held to be contrary to public policy, and the courts therefore will refuse to lend their aid to the enforcement of the contracts by which such combinations are sought to be effected.
Counsel seek to distinguish this case from those cited, by the circumstance alleged in the second count, of the declaration, that but a small portion of the law stenographers of Chicago belong to said association. An analogy is thereby sought to be raised between the contract in this case and thoke contracts in partial restraint of trade which the law upholds. We think the analogy thus sought to be raised does not exist. Contracts in partial restraint of trade which the law sustaihs are those which are entered into, by a vendor of a business and its good-will, with his vendee, by which the vendor agrees not to engage in the same business within a limited territory, and the restraint, to be valid, must be no more extensive than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the vendee in the enjoyment of the business purchased. But in the present case there is no purchase or sale of any business, nor any other analogous circumstance giving to one party a just right to be protected against competition from the other. All of the members of the association are engaged in the same business within the same territory, and the object of the association is purely and simply to silence and stifle all competition as between its members. No equitable reason for such restraint exists, the only reason put forward being, that under the influence of competition as it existed prior to the organization of the association, prices for stenographic work had been reduced too far, and the association was organized for the purpose of putting an end to all competition, at least as between those who could be induced to become members. True, the restraint is not so far-reaching as it would have been if all the stenographers in the city had joined the association, but so far as it goes, it is precisely of the same character, produces.the same results, and is subject to the same legal objection.
It may also be observed that, by the constitution of the association any reputable stenographer regularly engaged in law reporting in Cook county is eligible to membership, and if all or a major part of the stenographers in said county engaged in that business are not already members, it is because the association has not yet fully accomplished the purposes •of its organization. We can see no legal difference between -the restraint upon competition which it now exercises and that which it will exercise when it is in a position to dictate terms to all who are engaged in the business, and to all who may wish to obtain the services of law stenographic reporters.
We are of the opinion that the demurrer to the declaration was properly sustained, and the judgment will therefore be .affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.