Moran v. General Fire Extinguisher Co.

102 A. 501, 259 Pa. 168, 1917 Pa. LEXIS 535
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedOctober 8, 1917
DocketAppeal, No. 391
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 102 A. 501 (Moran v. General Fire Extinguisher Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moran v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 102 A. 501, 259 Pa. 168, 1917 Pa. LEXIS 535 (Pa. 1917).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Stewart,

The action was for the recovery of damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employment of the defendant company and engaged in the line of his duty. The .claim is based, on alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to provide a place reasonably safe for plaintiff while engaged at his work. The business of the defendant, as its name indicates, was the equipping of buildings with an improved sprinkler system for fire protection. A thread company operating a plant in Philadelphia determined on an enlargement of its plant by the construction of an additional story and the building of a fire tower in connection with the plant proper, the latter being designed to support a tank to be used for the storage of water. It entered into a contract with an experienced builder for the erection of the additions in accordance with the plans and specifications prepared by competent architects, and into a separate contract with the defendant company for the equipment of the plant with its sprinkler system, which included among other things the construction and erection of a white cedar water tank with a capacity of 20,000 [171]*171gallons, upon foundations and supports to be provided by the owners. The defendant company sublet the building of the tank to an independent contractor long experienced in the business. Upon the completion of the building proper the defendant entered for the purpose of installing its sprinkler system. It had put in place a large water tank on the supports provided, and had introduced its; entire system in the building, when, for the purpose of testing its sufficiency, it caused the water to be turned into the tank on the afternoon of December 26, 1911$ to the depth of four feet, and on the morning following it caused the tank to be filled to its capacity. About an hour thereafter the foundation or supports on which the tank rested gave way, and the whole structure, including the tank, fell to the ground, and the plaintiff, who was at the time engaged in doing some work on pipes beneath the tank, was seriously injured by the collapse. At the close of plaintiff’s case, the trial judge, affirming the ninth point submitted by the defendant, gave binding instructions in favor of the defendant and a verdict was rendered accordingly. The appeal raises but a single question calling for our consideration : Did the evidence submitted by the plaintiff touching the negligence charged show a case requiring submission to the jury? That the collapse which occasioned the plaintiff’s injury resulted from a defective construction of the base on which the water tank was to rest, is conceded. There is a diversity of view, however, expressed as to just what the defect was that was the initial operating cause; but the witnesses all agreed that the base, constructed as it was, and as the event proved, was inadequate for the support of the tank carrying 20,000 gallons of water. There is not a- suggestion that the collapse occurred because of any defect or imperfection in any of the work done or materials furnished by the defendant; these conformed in all respects to the plans and specifications. The defendant had nothing whatever to do in furnishing the supports [172]*172for the tank. So that it may clearly appear what the issue was, we quote from the plaintiff’s statement of claim. After reciting the facts we have given, it proceeds : “Whereupon it then and there became the duty of the said defendant, before permitting the said work to be so placed and filled with water*, to ascertain and provide that the supports of the said tank be sufficient to safely carry'the weight of the said tank and water it was designed to contain, and that said tank was properly superimposed upon said supports, and thereby to observe its duty to furnish to the plaintiff and other employees reasonably safe premises in which to perform their duties and work.” We may dismiss from consideration so much of the statement as by innuendo suggests that the tank was not properly superimposed upon the supports. Nowhere in the evidence do we find a suggestion that the collapse was due to any such circumstance, or that in point of fact any such circumstance existed. With this feature of the case eliminated, the only negligence charged was failure on the part of the defendant before permitting the tank to be put in place and filled Avith water to ascertain and provide that the supports were sufficient to safely carry the weight of tank and Avater the latter was designed to contain. If any such legal duty rested on the defendant, then manifestly the case was one for the jury, and on the evidence it was error to withhold it. We know of no legal principle from which any such rule of duty as is here sought to be applied can be derived; nor do we know of any accepted authority which asserts it. True it is that where an employer in disregard of actual or constructive notice of a defect in the supports threatening danger on which his work is' designed to rest, proceeds without correcting the same and injury results to his employee in consequence of this disregard, the law will hold him guilty of culpable negligence; but in such case no legal presumption of negligence arises in the first instance from the accident itself to take the place of [173]*173proof of negligence or to shift the burden of proof. Allison Manufacturing Co. v. McCormick, 118 Pa. 519; McKenna v. William H. Nixon Paper Co., 176 Pa. 306. An indispensable condition of plaintiff’s right to recover is that the evidence discloses such facts as will warrant a reasonable inference that the injury resulted directly from a failure of duty on the part of the employer. There are cases where certain facts being shown, or admitted, the law will presume negligence, such as involve neglect of a statutory duty and the like; but in the present case not a single fact alleged or proved is in itself inconsistent with the plaintiff’s entire freedom from responsibility in connection with the accident, and therefore the real and only question in the case is, what was the measure of this defendant’s duty towards the plaintiff as its employee, for until this be ascertained, the question of its negligence admits of no discussion. Once this is ascertained the question of negligence is to be determined in the light of the evidence adduced or the admitted facts. This measure of duty is nowhere more clearly and satisfactorily defined than in Thompson’s Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, where in Sec. 3785 it is said: “Judicial holdings unite upon the proposition that the master is not liable for an injury to his servant caused by hidden defects or dangers in the machinery, appliances or premises furnished to a servant, when such defects or dangers were unknown to the master and Avere not discoverable by the exercise of that reasonable care and skill in inspecting them already spoken of, and Avhen there is nothing in external appearances to create a suspicion of their presence; otherwise, if the defect could have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable or ordinary care or diligence.” In the light of this clear statement of the law, how stands the present' case? As betAveen the owner of the premises and the defendant company, upon the facts of the case, the latter stands free from all liability; he had no share in the construction of the tower, foundations or supports, [174]

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Bluebook (online)
102 A. 501, 259 Pa. 168, 1917 Pa. LEXIS 535, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moran-v-general-fire-extinguisher-co-pa-1917.