Morales v. Turman

569 F. Supp. 332, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1294, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15935
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedJune 28, 1983
DocketCiv. A. 1948
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 569 F. Supp. 332 (Morales v. Turman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morales v. Turman, 569 F. Supp. 332, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1294, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15935 (E.D. Tex. 1983).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTICE, Chief Judge.

The joint motion of the parties for approval of a proposed settlement agreement has been presented for consideration by the court.

This civil action was filed on February 12, 1971, by a plaintiff class of children who had been adjudicated “delinquent,” and involuntarily committed to the custody of the Texas Youth Council (hereinafter “TYC”). Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2338-1 (Vernon 1971), repealed (1973); cf. Tex.Family Code Ann. § 51.01, et seq. (Vernon 1982 Supp.); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5143d (Vernon 1971), repealed (1979); cf. Tex.Human Resources Code § 61.001, et seq. (Vernon 1980). In the suit, the children challenged adjudicatory and post-adjudicatory procedures of the juvenile justice system, as well as the conditions of confinement at the TYC institutions. In August 1973, a preliminary injunction was issued prescribing that TYC meet certain minimum standards concerning the use of physical force, corporal punishment, the conditions of segregation and solitary confinement, visitation, mail, and internal due process. Morales v. Turman, 364 F.Supp. 166 (E.D.Tex.1973); see also, 364 F.Supp. at 175, n. 1. On August 30, 1974, after a six weeks trial, this court issued a seventy-page memorandum opinion and order, finding that TYC had subjected or was subjecting plaintiffs to cruel and unusual punishment, and also to deprivations of due process, equal protection, and their constitutional right to treatment. Morales v. Turman, 383 F.Supp. 53 (E.D.Tex.1974). ■ On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case, finding that a three-judge district court should have considered it. Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.1976); see former 28 U.S.C. § 2281, repealed (1976). The Supreme Court thereafter granted a writ of certiorari as to the three-judge court issue and'summarily reversed the Court of Appeals. Morales v. Turman, 430 U.S. 322, 97 S.Ct. 1189, 51 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977), rehearing denied, 430 U.S. 988, 97 S.Ct. 1690, 52 L.Ed.2d 384 (1977). On remand, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to this court, “for a further evidentiary hearing concerning changes that have occurred at TYC,” suggesting that if conditions had, in fact, improved as much as defendants claimed, injunctive relief would no longer be appropriate. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 996 (5th Cir.1977). The Court of Appeals also expressed “doubts about the legal theory of a right to treatment”, as asserted by involuntarily committed juvenile delinquents.

The parties proceeded to engage in extensive formal and informal discovery between 1978 and late 1981, including inspection by counsel for plaintiffs, the United States (as amicus), and their “experts in the fields of corrections, medical care, and education.” Amended Settlement Agreement, p. 340. During 1982, counsel for plaintiffs and defendants fashioned and formalized a proposed settlement agreement, which they tendered to the court on March 3, 1983. After preliminary approval and notice to class members, a hearing was held April 15, 1983. Although there were no objections from class members, the settlement was disapproved from the bench, because of certain flagrant legal infirmities with the settlement as drafted. 1 The parties sought to cure those flaws, and now have tendered the Amended Settlement Agreement *334 (“Agreement”) for this court’s approval, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e).

The Agreement

The Agreement, it appears, has four major components: (1) dismissal of the case from this court’s docket; (2) substantive provisions setting forth TYC commitments, policies, and goals, in numerous areas in which its prior practices had been challenged; (3) a Committee of Consultants, 2 empowered to monitor, and if necessary, to enforce the substantive provisions, by bringing a new lawsuit, in the nature of an action upon a contract; and (4) payment of stipulated attorney’s fees to plaintiffs’ counsel in the sum of $295,000.00. (The amount of attorney’s fees was negotiated after conclusion of the other components of the settlement.)

Although such a structure seems a logical and plausible approach to settlement of an injunctive institutional reform suit, close legalistic inspection of the Agreement reveals that the actual powers of the Committee of Consultants are quite limited, and the success of the settlement depends entirely upon the good faith cooperation of the defendants. Indeed, the Agreement itself recognizes this dependence:

The parties agree that conditions and the programs in the TYC training schools have improved greatly since the trial of this action.
* * ^ * * *
The parties agree that since the trial of this cause the defendants have proceeded in good faith to improve the TYC facilities and to protect the rights of plaintiffs, and therefore the parties have jointly agreed that the following Settlement Agreement is in the best interests of the parties.

Agreement, Parts IB and ID, p. 341.

No reason to doubt the present good faith of the current personnel of the TYC, or their counsel, or plaintiffs’ counsel is apparent. However, legal instruments are executed precisely because good faith and social mores are often insufficient to insure that promises are kept, and to make certain that the precise contours of given promises are fully understood by the promisors and the promisees. The trust accorded the current state defendants on the basis of their present good faith must be tempered, nonetheless, by the recognition that personnel will inevitably change, and that, just over a decade ago, many of the individuals who then comprised the officialdom of TYC, and at least one of the attorneys who represents them, unregenerately and callously endeavored to preserve and perpetuate debased, execrable institutions in which juveniles were tortured and terrorized. See Morales, 383 F.Supp. 53. Further, few or none of the asserted reforms regarding the conditions of confinement affecting the class were placed in operation before the orders of this court.

Among the specific weaknesses and defects perceived in the language describing the Committee of Consultants (“The Committee”) and its powers are these:

Fault 1:

The Committee will perform its obligations by means of personal inspections of relevant Agency operations. Inspections of each TYC facility .. . will be performed once annually (except as more frequent inspections may be provided hereinafter)....

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Bluebook (online)
569 F. Supp. 332, 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1294, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15935, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morales-v-turman-txed-1983.