Morales-Hernandez v. United States

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 31, 2020
• Docket: 4:20-cv-00091
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Luis Morales-Hernandez, No. CV-20-00091-TUC-RCC

10 Petitioner, No. CR-18-01457-RCC-BGM-1

11 v. ORDER

12 United States of America,

13 Respondent. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Luis Morales-Hernandez’s Motion Under 16 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal 17 Custody. (Doc. 1 in Case No. CV-20-00091-TUC-RCC (“CV”); Doc. 47 in Case No. CR- 18 18-01457-RCC-BGM-1 (“CR”).)1 Respondent filed a response to the petition. (Doc. 8.) 19 Petitioner did not file a reply. 20 I. Factual and Procedural History 21 Petitioner was indicted on one count of illegally reentering the United States on 22 June 30, 2018, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). (Doc. 7.) The charge was enhanced by 23 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) due to a previous removal on May 2, 2017 from San Ysidro, 24 California. (Id.) Petitioner was appointed counsel, (Doc. 4), who later filed a motion to 25 withdraw. (Doc. 12.) At the hearing for the motion, defense counsel informed the 26 Magistrate Judge that Petitioner wanted new counsel appointed because his range under 27 the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or “Guidelines”) was extremely high

28 1 Unless otherwise noted, citations reference Morales-Hernandez’s criminal case CR-18- 01457-RCC-BGM-1. 1 and he was unsatisfied with the resulting plea agreement range. The Magistrate Judge 2 informed Petitioner that it was irrelevant which attorney he was provided; no attorney 3 could erase Petitioner’s extensive criminal history. Nevertheless, the judge permitted 4 counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel. (Doc. 23.) Petitioner then pled guilty to 5 reentry with an enhancement on February 8, 2019. (Doc. 24.) The plea agreement stated 6 the Petitioner was pleading guilty to reentry under 1326(a), with a possible sentencing 7 enhancement under “1326(b)(1) or 1326(b)(2) for Reentry of Removed Alien.” (Id. at 1.) 8 During Petitioner’s change of plea hearing, he stated that he understood the plea 9 agreement and that his sentencing range could be up to 125 months’ incarceration. (Doc. 10 50 at 3.) Petitioner also confirmed that he had previously been removed from the country 11 in 2017. (Id. at 5.) 12 The Presentence Report (“PSR”) stated that Petitioner was charged with reentry 13 after previously being excluded, and that this charge was enhanced by 8 U.S.C. § 14 1326(b)(2). (Doc. 41 at 3.) Petitioner had several prior convictions that affected his 15 criminal history points: including Louisiana state burglary and theft convictions, a 2013 16 reentry conviction, and a federal felony marijuana conviction (Id. at ¶¶ 27-30.) These 17 priors placed Petitioner in a criminal history category VI with a Guidelines range 18 between 110-137 months’ incarceration. (Id. at ¶ 69.) However, the plea agreement 19 reduced this range to 100-125 months’ incarceration. Id. 20 Defense counsel filed a motion for variance, requesting the Court sentence 21 Petitioner to a maximum 48 months’ incarceration. (Doc. 42.) Counsel’s motion focused 22 on the § 3553 factors, arguing that Petitioner was a non-violent offender, that the 23 sentence he faced did not fairly reflect his criminal history, and that a term of 48 months 24 would serve the purposes of deterrence and prevent unwanted disparities in sentencing. 25 (Id.) 26 At sentencing, Petitioner stated that he had discussed his case with his attorney in 27 Spanish, and he understood the attorney without exception. (Doc. 51 at 2-3.) He 28 professed that his attorney had explained the PSR and the Guidelines, and that he 1 understood his right to a jury trial, and affirmed he was waiving his right to appeal by 2 proceeding with the plea agreement. (Id. at 3-4.) He also admitted he reentered the 3 United States without permission and when he did, he knew that reentry was a crime. (Id. 4 at 9.) Finally, Petitioner acknowledged that he was aware of the sentencing range in the 5 plea agreement of 92-105 months. (Id.) 6 The Court granted a downward variance, and sentenced Petitioner below the plea 7 agreement range to 60 months’ incarceration, with 3 years of supervised release to 8 follow. (Id. at 12.) 9 II. Standard of Review 10 A petitioner may raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim in a 11 § 2255 habeas petition if the petitioner has not expressly waived this right. See United 12 States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 2000). A successful IAC claim must 13 demonstrate both that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the petitioner 14 suffered prejudice because of counsel’s actions. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 15 686-90 (1984). To be ineffective, counsel’s assistance must have been objectively 16 unreasonable. Id. at 688. In its analysis, “[the] court must indulge a strong presumption 17 that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 18 assistance[.]” Carrera v. Ayers, 670 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Strickland, 19 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, prejudice occurs when there is “a reasonable probability that, 20 but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 21 different.” Id. at 694. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test obviates the 22 need to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805 (9th Cir. 2002). 23 In addition, “a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has 24 preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in 25 open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not 26 thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that 27 occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and 28 intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from 1 counsel was [deficient].” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see also 2 United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). 3 III. Ground One 4 Ground One of Petitioner’s § 2255 Habeas Petition alleges counsel rendered 5 ineffective assistance because counsel failed to inform Petitioner that he was subject to a 6 sentencing enhancement. (CV Doc. 1 at 4.) Petitioner believes, without explaining why, 7 he should only have a total offense level of 14, with 8 criminal history points, resulting in 8 a sentencing range of 27-33 months. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner claims his plea was involuntary 9 because counsel did not make him aware that any enhancements applied, and because no 10 facts were alleged supporting the enhancements. (Id.) 11 Petitioner has not demonstrated that counsel’s actions were ineffective or that he 12 was prejudiced by an alleged miscalculation. Petitioner was well aware that he faced a 13 long sentence given his criminal history; both his original counsel and the magistrate 14 judge informed him that his previous criminal record was elevating his sentencing range 15 significantly. 16 Furthermore, Petitioner has not explained how he has formulated the lesser 17 sentencing range. The PSR shows that Petitioner had a base offense level 8 for the illegal 18 reentry under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. (Doc. 41 at 4, ¶ 14.) He was given +4 for committing the 19 offense after being convicted for a felony illegal reentry offense. (Id. at 5 ¶ 15.) Petitioner 20 admitted that he had previously entered the country illegally and subsequently been 21 removed. (Doc. 51 at 9.) Petitioner had two prior felony convictions, one for burglary and 22 one for theft of over $500.00, both committed in Louisiana-this added +8 points. (Doc. 23 41 at 5, ¶ 16.) In addition, Petitioner received +8 points for a possession with intent to 24 distribute marijuana in the District of Arizona. (Id. at ¶ 17.) This resulted in an adjusted 25 offense level of 28. (Id. at ¶ 21.) He received -3 points for acceptance of responsibility, 26 and so his total offense level was 25. (Id. at ¶ 23-24.) His previous criminal history 27 resulted in 12 criminal history points, and a criminal history category VI. (Id. at 8, ¶ 33.) 28 Therefore, Petitioner’s Guidelines range prior to the plea agreement was 110-137 1 months’ incarceration, not the 27-33 months he alleges. Failing to notify Petitioner of a 2 sentence he was not eligible for was not deficient. 3 Furthermore, Petitioner’s claim that he was unaware he was subject to an 4 enhancement lacks credibility. At sentencing, Petitioner indicated that he had reviewed 5 the PSR and plea agreement with his attorney, and had no difficulty understanding his 6 attorney’s explanations. (Doc. 51 at 2-3, 9.) The plea indicated that an enhancement of up 7 to 92-125 months’ incarceration was a possibility. (Doc. 24 at 1-2, 8.) Petitioner signed 8 the plea and indicated it had been read to him and he understood the contents. (Id.) The 9 PSR clearly indicated under which offenses his sentence would be enhanced. Petitioner 10 did not object to the factual statements in the PSR and did not indicate he had difficulty 11 understanding the terms of the plea or the PSR. 12 It seems that Petitioner is trying to argue that his priors should not have been 13 counted towards his criminal history because of subsequent changes to the law that 14 affected sentences based on the categorical approach. Petitioner alleges that he should be 15 able to be resentenced without any enhancements for “priors of WEED UNDER USSG 16 Amendment 808 or Burglarie (sic) Johnson, Dimaya v. Sessions, Descamps, Mathis.” 17 (CV Doc. 1 at 4.) Amendment 808, as explained by Respondent, is inapplicable to 18 Petitioner’s sentence. (See Doc. 8 at 8.) Moreover, Petitioner’s attempt to reduce his 19 sentencing range based on a change in law is inapposite to his situation because by the 20 time he was sentenced on August 29, 2019, the Guidelines no longer used the categorical 21 approach. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, April 28, 2016, at 24. 22 Petitioner, therefore, cannot demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient, or 23 that he was prejudiced. 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. Grounds Two and Three 2 Second, Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to argue to the 3 Court that his 2008 burglary and 2014 marijuana convictions were not deportable 4 offenses and could not be used for the purpose of enhancement. (CV Doc. 1 at 5.) 5 Petitioner’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2), which 6 applies to a defendant “whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for an aggravated 7 felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). In 2015, Petitioner was convicted of federal felony 8 possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Morales-Hernandez v. United States, Doc. 9 44, CR-14-01954-RM-2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 20, 2015). The possession of marijuana 10 conviction constituted an aggravated felony that subjected him to mandatory removal. 11 See United States v. Gonzalez-Corn, 807 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2015). Subsequently, 12 Petitioner was removed on May 2, 2017, this was the prior deportation charged in the 13 indictment. (Doc. 7.) Therefore, defense counsel had no reasonable basis to attack the 14 underlying offense that subjected Petitioner to mandatory deportation, and his 15 representation was not ineffective. See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994) 16 (“A lawyer’s zeal on behalf of his client does not require him to file a motion which he 17 knows to be meritless on the facts and the law.”). 18 In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges that defense counsel should have collaterally 19 attacked the indictment by challenging the validity of the underlying removal proceeding 20 in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). (CV Doc. 1 at 7.) “Because the underlying 21 removal order serves as a predicate element of [a § 1326 illegal reentry offense], a 22 defendant charged with that offense may collaterally attack the removal order under the 23 due process clause.” Gonzalez-Corn, 807 F.3d at 993 (quoting United States v. Camacho- 24 Lopez, 450 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 2006). However, a defendant may not launch a 25 collateral attack on an underlying deportation order unless he can show he has exhausted 26 his administrative remedies, the “deportation proceedings . . . improperly deprived [the 27 defendant] of the opportunity for judicial review,” and “the entry of the order was 28 fundamentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d). 1 It appears that Petitioner may be attempting to argue that the 2017 deportation 2 proceedings were fundamentally unfair because his prior convictions should not have 3 subjected him to deportation. However, as noted above, his prior drug trafficking 4 conviction constituted an aggravated felony which called for mandatory deportation. See 5 Gonzalez-Corn, 807 F.3d at 993. Petitioner has not shown that the underlying deportation 6 was fundamentally unfair, nor alleged that the underlying deportation lacked judicial 7 review. Thus, Petitioner cannot show he was prejudiced, and counsel’s failure to raise 8 these non-meritorious issues was not ineffective. See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d at 346. 9 V. Ground Four 10 In Ground Four, Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge 11 the mens rea element of the re-entry offense. (Doc. 1 at 8.) He believes since he simply 12 wandered into the country unknowingly, counsel should have argued one of the elements 13 was missing. (Id.) Petitioner’s own concessions at sentencing belie this assertion. See 14 Doc. 24 at 8; Doc. 50 at 5; Doc. 51 at 2, 5.) Where the allegations of a petitioner 15 contradict statements made in court, credibility must be assessed. Shah v. United States, 16 878 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Petitioner admitted in Court that he knew crossing 17 into the country was illegal when he did it, his subsequent recanting is unpersuasive. 18 Counsel’s failure to suggest Petitioner was factually innocent of reentry, therefore, did 19 not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 20 Likewise, insofar as Petitioner alleges he was ill advised about his right to appeal, the 21 record reflects otherwise. (See Doc. 50 at 3; Doc. 51 at 4.) 22 In conclusion, Petitioner has raised no viable claims for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 2255. 23 Therefore, IT IS ORDERED: 24 1. Petitioner Luis Morales-Hernandez’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, 25 Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody is DENIED. (Doc. 1 26 in Case No. CV-20-00091-TUC-RCC; Doc. 47 in Case No. CR-18-01457-RCC- 27 BGM-1.) 28 /// 1 2. Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Cases, in the event Movant 2 files an appeal, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability because 3 reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s ruling debatable. See Slack v. 4 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 5 3. The Clerk of Court shall docket accordingly and close the case file in this matter. 6 Dated this 30th day of July, 2020. 7 8 9 (J Dp CFR - Cyl □ 10 Honorable Raner ©. Collins 11 senior United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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