Morales-Gonzalez v. Bondi

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR MORALES-GONZALEZ, No. 24-3156 Agency No. Petitioner, A208-766-490 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 20, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: TALLMAN, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Hector Morales-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for

review of the denial of his application for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the

petition.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Where, as here, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) affirms

without opinion, we review the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) decision as if it were the

Board’s. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2003). We

review whether the IJ failed to apply a controlling legal standard de novo. See

Mendez-Castro v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 975, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on

other grounds by, Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024).

1. Morales-Gonzalez argues that the IJ failed to conduct a cumulative

analysis of all evidence relevant to hardship. The government contends we cannot

consider this argument because it was not properly exhausted. We conclude that

we can consider Morales-Gonzalez’s argument, but we uphold the agency’s

decision.

In his notice of appeal and brief to the BIA, Morales-Gonzalez argued the IJ

failed to address all relevant hardship factors—specifically, his wife’s medical

condition and that if removed, he would financially support his mother living in

Mexico, which in turn would result in additional hardship to his qualifying

relatives. While he now asserts that the IJ overlooked additional hardship factors,

his general contention that the IJ did not cumulatively assess all hardship factors

was sufficient to exhaust the issue. See Gonzalez-Castillo v. Garland, 47 F.4th

971, 980 (9th Cir. 2022) (explaining that “general contentions” can satisfy the

exhaustion requirement where “they put the BIA on notice of the contested

2 24-3156 issues”).

Although exhausted, this argument fails on the merits because the IJ applied

the correct legal standard and assessed the hardship factors individually and

cumulatively before determining that Morales-Gonzalez failed to show his removal

would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his U.S.-citizen

wife and son.

2. Morales-Gonzalez also contends that the IJ’s hardship determination

was based on speculation and therefore not supported by substantial evidence. We

cannot consider this argument, however, because Morales-Gonzalez did not raise it

before the BIA (even in general fashion) and thus failed to exhaust administrative

remedies. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Gonzalez-Castillo, 47 F.4th at 980.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 24-3156