Morales-Alfaro v. CoreCivic, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedJanuary 15, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-00082
StatusUnknown

This text of Morales-Alfaro v. CoreCivic, Inc. (Morales-Alfaro v. CoreCivic, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Morales-Alfaro v. CoreCivic, Inc., (S.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RUBIA MABEL MORALES- Case No.: 20cv82-LAB (BGS) ALFARO 12 ORDER OF DISMISSAL Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 15 OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et 16 al. 17 Defendants. 18 19 20 Plaintiff Rubia Mabel Morales-Alfaro, who is represented by counsel, filed a 21 complaint against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, various federal 22 officers in their official capacities, and CoreCivic, sued as the Corrections 23 Corporation of America, Inc. 24 Morales-Alfaro, a Salvadoran national who is currently in the U.S. on 25 immigration bond, brings claims arising from conditions of confinement at the Otay 26 Mesa ICE Detention Center. She was pregnant when she applied for asylum, and 27 suffered a miscarriage while in custody. The complaint identifies diversity as the 28 basis of jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants are citizens of the District of 1 Columbia, Maryland, and Tennessee and that Morales-Alfaro currently resides in 2 Arkansas. 3 Morales-Alfaro brings claims against all Defendants based on violations of 4 the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (claims one and two), 5 and against CoreCivic based on various theories of negligence under California 6 law (Claims three, four, and five). She seeks compensatory and punitive damages, 7 as well as unspecified injunctive and equitable relief. 8 The Court is inquired to confirm its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary, 9 whenever a doubt arises. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 10 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). As the party invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, Morales-Alfaro 11 bears the burden of establishing it. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 12 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998). Among other things, she is required to include in her 13 complaint a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction 14 . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 15 Jurisdiction 16 Diversity 17 Diversity jurisdiction is impossible here, in part because diversity jurisdiction 18 does not lie against federal agencies, which are not citizens of any state. See 19 Hancock Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 492 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 20 1974). 21 Sovereign Immunity 22 Absent a waiver, the United States and its agencies enjoy sovereign 23 immunity from suit. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988). The same is true 24 of federal officers sued in their official capacities. Nurse v. United States, 226 F.2d 25 996, 1004 (9th Cir. 2000). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, and the 26 government’s consent to being sued is a prerequisite for jusidiction. United States 27 v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Because the complaint does not allege 28 waiver of sovereign immunity for the Department of Homeland Security or any of 1 the officers — all of whom are sued in their official capacities — the complaint fails 2 to establish subject matter jurisdiction over any claims against them. 3 Although Morales-Alfaro seeks injunctive relief, she has not pled facts 4 reasonably suggesting she has standing to do so. See Lujan v. Defenders of 5 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). She had already been released on bond when 6 she filed this action, and has not alleged facts she is reasonably likely to be 7 returned to a detention center at all, much less one operated by CoreCivic. See 8 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (standing requires showing 9 of “real or immediate threat” of being subject to challenged practices). Nor has she 10 alleged she is reasonably likely to be in need of medical care in such a facility. She 11 has not brought this as a class action, nor is it clear she could do so. See Dilley v. 12 Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a prisoner’s release from 13 custody generally moots claim for injunctive relief based on prison conditions, 14 unless a class action has been certified); Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 350 F.3d 1018, 1022–23 (holding that class representatives must have standing 16 to bring all claims by the putative class they purport to represent). 17 Other Defects 18 The Court might have jurisdiction over claims against CoreCivic, although 19 the complaint fails to articulate a comprehensible theory of liability against it. While 20 the Court is not conducting a screening, Morales-Alfaro should consider these 21 issues if she amends her complaint. 22 CoreCivic was allegedly acting on behalf of the federal government, not 23 under color of state law. The complaint does not clearly explain whether it 24 CoreCivic being sued as a federal actor or as a private corporation, or under what 25 theory it would be liable. According to the complaint, the claims arise under both 26 the U.S. and California constitutions, under unspecified federal and state law, and 27 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. 28 / / / 1 Morales-Alfaro is not bringing any kind of race-based claim under § 1981. 2 See Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 536 3 (9th Cir. 1982) (section 1981 claims limited to prohibition of racial discrimination). 4 Because CoreCivic was a federal contractor operating a federal detention center 5 under the auspices of the U.S. government, it was not acting under state law for 6 purposes of § 1983. Nor can Morales-Alfaro bring claims against it under a Bivens 7 theory. Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that 8 Bivens action does not lie against private entities acting under color of federal law). 9 The complaint alleges that when imposing harsh conditions in the detention 10 center and in detaining pregnant women, CoreCivic was carrying out long-standing 11 federal policy. (Complaint, ¶¶ 31–49.) These, of course, are not subject to state 12 regulation, including by state tort law. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies 13 Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507–12 (1988). The complaint goes on to allege other 14 negligent practices not required by federal policy, or even permitted by federal 15 policy. But the complaint appears to blame federal policies in great part for 16 Morales-Alfaro’s injuries, and do not delineate between deprivations caused by 17 adherence to federal policy and negligent deprivations. (See, e.g., Complaint, 18 ¶¶ 89 (blaming CoreCivic for denial of medical care); 94, 98 (blaming federal policy 19 for denial of medical care).) 20 Finally, the complaint does not correctly identify CoreCivic as a Defendant. 21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a).

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Morales-Alfaro v. CoreCivic, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/morales-alfaro-v-corecivic-inc-casd-2020.