Mopecha 353472 v. Romo

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided July 21, 2025·No. 2:24-cv-02663·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Taboh Mopecha, No. CV-24-02663-PHX-JAT

Petitioner, ORDER

v.

Unknown Romo, et al.,

Respondents. Pending before the Court are Petitioner Taboh Mopecha’s motions for reconsideration. (Docs. 18, 19). The first motion asks the Court to “review the Magistrate Judge’s determinations de novo or under a lesser standard.” (Doc. 18 at 2). The second motion asks the Court to “amend it’s [sic] decision to deny discovery.” (Doc. 19 at 2). Respondents did not file a response to either motion. For the following reasons, the Court will deny both of Petitioner’s motions. This case began in October 2024 when Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1). The relevant procedural history is as follows. Petitioner filed a motion for discovery on March 18, 2025. (Doc. 12). The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned denied this motion on April 15, 2025. (Doc. 14). On the same day, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied. (Doc. 15). Petitioner did not file any objections to the R&R. The Court accepted the R&R on May 16, 2025. (Doc. 16). Petitioner filed his first motion for reconsideration on June 16, 2025, (Doc. 18 at 7), and his second on June 18, 2025, (Doc. 19 at 5). II. LEGAL STANDARD1 a. Interlocutory Orders Local Rule Civil 7.2(g) applies to interlocutory orders. See Kaufman v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., No. CV-16-02248-PHX-JAT, 2019 WL 1150953, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 13, 2019); Parker v. Arizona, No. CV-17-00887-PHX-DWL, 2019 WL 2579404, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 24, 2019). An order is interlocutory if it does not end the litigation on the merits. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521–22 (1988). “Absent good cause shown, any motion for reconsideration [under Local Rule 7.2(g)] shall be filed no later than fourteen (14) days after the date of the filing of the Order that is the subject of the motion.” LRCiv 7.2(g). The Court will not grant a motion for reconsideration unless the movant shows “manifest error” or “new facts or legal authority” that could not have been discovered earlier. LRCiv 7.2(g). b. Judgments Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) applies to motions to alter or amend a judgment. A motion under Rule 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A district court has discretion to alter or amend a judgment if: “1) the motion is necessary to correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based; 2) the moving party presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; 3) the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice; or 4) there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Turner v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R. Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted) (citing McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). However, a motion to alter or amend should not “be used to ask the court to rethink what the court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Smith

1 Petitioner did not specify the rule under which Petitioner seeks relief. The Court finds that his motions invoke LRCiv 7.2(g) and Rule 59(e). While Rule 60(b) could also be implicated, because Petitioner does not argue any of the Rule 60(b) categories for relief, the Court will not analyze Petitioner’s motions under that rule. v. Ryan, No. CV 12-318-PHX-PGR, 2014 WL 2452893, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 2, 2014) (citing United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998)). Further, a Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been made prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008). a. Motion to Reconsider Court’s Order Denying Discovery Because the Court’s Order denying Petitioner’s motion for discovery, (Doc. 14), did not end the litigation on the merits, the Order was an interlocutory order. As such, under LRCiv 7.2(g), a motion for the Court to reconsider that Order must have been filed on or before April 29, 2025 (14 days after the date of the filing of the Order). Here, Petitioner filed his motion on June 18, 2025. (Doc. 19 at 5). Thus, Petitioner’s motion is untimely without good cause.2 Even if timely, Petitioner does not show that the Court made a “manifest error” in denying his motion for discovery, nor does Petitioner introduce new facts or legal authority that could not have been discovered earlier. Instead, Petitioner takes the opportunity to repeat3 an argument made in his original motion for discovery; Petitioner argues he showed “good cause” for the Court to order polygraphs of three witnesses. (Doc. 19 at 2). Repeating arguments already made is not grounds for reconsideration. Smith, 2014 WL 2452893, at *1. Petitioner then appears to argue that the Court was incorrect to apply the standard for an evidentiary hearing under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and the Court should have instead applied the Rule 6 limited discovery standard. (Doc. 19 at 3). As the Court explained, both Rule 6 and AEDPA guided the Court’s analysis. (Doc. 14 at 2–5). Petitioner cites Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967, 970 (W.D. Tenn. 2000), for the idea that “a petitioner may show good cause under Rule 6

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Related

Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard
486 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
128 S. Ct. 2605 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Charles E. McDowell Jr. v. Arthur Calderon, Warden
197 F.3d 1253 (Ninth Circuit, 1999)
United States v. Rezzonico
32 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (D. Arizona, 1998)
Payne v. Bell
89 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Tennessee, 2000)