Moorer v. Putnam Lumber Co.

12 So. 2d 370, 152 Fla. 520, 1943 Fla. LEXIS 959
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedMarch 9, 1943
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 12 So. 2d 370 (Moorer v. Putnam Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moorer v. Putnam Lumber Co., 12 So. 2d 370, 152 Fla. 520, 1943 Fla. LEXIS 959 (Fla. 1943).

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

The record in this case discloses that Ernest Moorer on May 18, 1942, was accidently killed when an employee of the Putnam Lumber Company, at Shamrock, Florida. He was a colored man about 35 years of age and unmarried. He was earning $14.00 per week and had worked only a day or so when meeting his tragic death. Henrietta Moorer, his .mother, claimed compensation as a dependent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Testimony was taken and her claim was by the deputy commissioner denied. The decision of the deputy commissioner was reviewed on appeal and affirmed by the Florida Industrial Commission. An *522 appeal to the circuit court was perfected and the order of the commission was affirmed on October 22, 1942. An appeal therefrom by the claimant (appellant) has been perfected to this Court.

The question for decision is whether or not the testimony adduced established dependency within the meaning of our statutes and decisions. The rule as to the dependency enunciated by this Court in the case of Panama City Stevedoring Co., Inc., v. Padgett, 149 Fla. 687, 6 So. (2nd) 822, is viz:

“. . . The decided current of opinion on this point is to the effect that the question of who are dependents is one of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the case. It is settled law that dependency is not supported by moral or statutory obligation of the child to support the parent. It must be shown that the claimant is from physical or mental incapacity or lack of means, dependent on the deceased for support, that actual and substantial support must have been received by claimant from deceased, that such support must be shown to have been made regularly with reasonable expectation to be made in the future and that casual gifts at irregular intervals will not support a claim on dependency.”

Under the rule, sufra, actual dependency must be established at the time of the injury and assistance or contributions by the decedent is not required to be in the form of money, but gifts of the necessities, of life are sufficient to meet the requirements of our controlling statutes. Schneider on Workmen’s Compensation Law, Vol. II (2nd) Ed. par. 337, p. 1195, treating the question of dependency, in part, said:

“Dependency being a question of fact, at least until the facts are found, and the facts as varied as the number of cases, each case must be decided upon its own facts. The first question to be determined is whether or not the claimant suffered loss in respect to his or her support or maintenance. This being found in the affirmative, it is then necessary to determine whether or not the claimant was entitled, legally or morally, to consider the contributions received from deceased as a part of his or her necessary livelihood; that is, whether such contributions formed a part of the sort of support to which the claimant, within considerable radius of *523 reason; was entitled. While no exact standard of living can be fixed to a certainty for any given class, still some standard is necessary. If a janitress expended all the contributions received from a son on a wardrobe of silks, no one would likely contend that she was entitled to do so, and that such contributions were a necessary part of her support, at least not to the full amount of the contributions. On the other hand, a little more latitude might be allowed a stenographer, or other persons whose employment or station in life require better clothes . . . .”

Section 440.16 Fla. Stats. 1941, provides that if death results from an accident within one year, or there follows continuous disability resulting from the accident within five years thereafter, the employer will pay designated sums to the persons named. Subsection (e) of Section 440.16 provides for payments to the parents.

The undisputed testimony discloses that Ernest Moorer, at the- time of his death, was working for the Putnam Lumber Company at Shamrock. He was receiving at the time of his death on May 18, 1942, for his labor or services compensation based on an average weekly earnings of $14.00 per week for 40 hours service, or $2.00 per day of eight hours labor per day. A stipulation in the record viz:

“The carrier and the attorney for the claimant stipulate that the accident in question arose out of and occurred in the course of employment. Also the injury resulted in the death of Ernest Moorer on May 18, 1942. It is also stipulated that the average weekly wage was $14.00.”

The parents of the deceased separated about 25 years ago. The age of the deceased at that time is estimated at from 7 to 10 years. He was raised by his mother (claimant here), and began work at an early age. He was reared at St. George, Dorchester County, S. C. The claimant now lives at St. George. The deceased is shown to have worked from place to place where employed and good wages were obtainable. The testimony shows that the mother (claimant) owns a hut and one acre of land on the outskirts of St. George; has a garden, pigs, chickens, etc., and has lived there with her two daughters — one being practically an invalid — while *524 the other works about the county and' receives $2.00 per week for her labor.

The claimant, in part, testified viz:

“Q. Tell us whether or not Ernest ever contributed to your support? A. Yes, sir, he did. He was the only help I had. Q. When did he first start contributing to your support ? About how old was he ? A. When he was little we all picked cotton and did the best we could. After he got about 15 or 16 or 17 he started working in a mill at Batton, Dorchester Lumber Company. ... Q. When he first started to work at Batton you testified that he was about 15 or 16 years old? A. Yes. Q. Did he start then contributing to you? A. Yes, sir. Q. Bringing his money in? A. Yes, sir. Q. Testify now from that time on whether or not he contributed to your support; that is, the money he made, did he give you a portion of it to live on? A. Yes, sir, he did. Q. Testify whether or not his contributions to your support lasted right on through the years up until the time of his death? A. You mean did he give me anything up to the time of his death? He surely did, yes sir. Q. Just before he died was he contributing to your support? A. Yes, sir, about 2 weeks— Q. Two weeks before he died. What do you mean? A. Just about two weeks before he died he sent me some money. Q. About how much did he send you a month, Henrietta? A. Well, just to put it all together, sometimes about $15.00 or $20.00 a month. Q. Fifteen or twenty dollars a month? A. Yes. Q. Did he mail it to you? A. Yes, just put it in a letter and sent it to me like that. Q. Would it be bills or silver money? A. No, not silver — paper money, I calls it. Q. How old are you, now Henrietta? A. I am around sixty-five (65). Q. How is your health? A. Very poor. I am not able to do anything at all. The doctor tells me not to pick up the .broom. ... Q. You never married again? A. No, I have never had the idea. . . . Q. Have you got any other source of livelihood or living than the support you were getting from your son? A. No, that is all the support I had. Q. Of your own knowledge, did you ever know of your son, Ernest Moorer, having ever married? A. No. Q. Do you know whether or not he left any children? A,. No.”

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Bluebook (online)
12 So. 2d 370, 152 Fla. 520, 1943 Fla. LEXIS 959, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moorer-v-putnam-lumber-co-fla-1943.