Moore v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co.

504 S.W.2d 373, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedMarch 22, 1972
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 504 S.W.2d 373 (Moore v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Standard Life & Accident Insurance Co., 504 S.W.2d 373, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

CARNEY, Presiding Judge.

The defendant below, Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, has appealed from an order of the Circuit Court granting the plaintiff a voluntary nonsuit after first directing a verdict for defendant.

The plaintiff below, Gladys M. Moore, recovered a judgment in the General Sessions Court of Dyer County in the amount of $892.65 against the defendant, Standard Life and Accident Insurance Company, and the defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. Trial was held in the Circuit Court before a jury. At the conclusion of all the evidence the Trial Judge granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and directed the jury to retire from the courtroom and to return a verdict finding the issues in favor of the defendant as instructed by the Court. The jury retired to the jury room for deliberations. After the jury had been absent about twenty minutes and before the jury returned to the courtroom to announce their verdict, attorney for the plaintiff moved for a voluntary nonsuit which was overruled.

“Thereafter, the jury returned to the Courtroom and announced in open Court that they were unable to agree on a verdict in the case; and thereupon the Court charged the jury further with regard to its duty to return a verdict for the defendant pursuant to the instructions of the Court, the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict having been granted and allowed; and thereafter the Court undertook to receive from the jury its verdict for the defendant, at which time the attorney for the plaintiff requested that the jury be polled; and the Court, at the request of the attorney for the plaintiff, called the roll of jurors and asked each of said jurors if he found the issues in favor of the defendant as instructed by the Court; and eight of said jurors responded negatively with four of said jurors responding positively.

“Thereupon, the attorney for the defendant moved the Court to enter judgment for the defendant in the case notwithstanding the refusal of the jury to return its verdict for the defendant pursuant to the instructions of the Court; and the attorney for the plaintiff renewed his motion for a voluntary nonsuit; and after consideration and deliberation, the Court overruled and the said motion of the defendant and allowed and granted the said motion of the plaintiff.” (Transcript Vol. I, page 12)

The bill of exceptions contains all of the evidence heard below. However, the only two assignments of error are as follows:

“I. The learned trial court erred in failing to enter judgment of record for the defendant after properly granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict when the jury failed to return a verdict for the defendant pursuant to the instructions of the Court.
“II. The learned trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for a voluntary nonsuit after previously granting defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.”

Defendant did not file a motion for new trial averring error on the part of His Honor the Trial Judge either in refusing to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant or in granting the plaintiff a voluntary nonsuit.

The action of His Honor the Trial Judge in directing the jury to retire and [375]*375formulate a verdict in favor of the defendant was mere surplusage. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Burton, 167 Tenn. 606, 72 S.W.2d 778. The jury was in contempt of court. Higgins & Crownover, Tennessee Procedure, Section 1394.

The facts of this case demonstrate that the better practice is for His Honor the Trial Judge to announce to the jury that he is directing a verdict in favor of one of the parties and that such verdict will be entered. Then he should discharge the jury with thanks. See Barnhill v. Grisham, Western Section of the Court of Appeals, decided August 5, 1971, unpublished.

It appears that His Honor the Trial Judge correctly overruled the motion for a voluntary nonsuit made by the plaintiff while the jury was out. T.C.A. Section 20-1311. The motion must be made before the jury retires. It is also the rule in Tennessee that after the Trial Judge has directed a verdict in favor of the defendant that the plaintiff may not be awarded a voluntary nonsuit. Graves v. Union Railway Co., 177 Tenn. 699, 152 S.W.2d 1026.

A verdict has no finality until judgment thereon has been entered upon the minutes of the Court. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor Implement, 138 Tenn. 28, 195 S.W. 762; Neely v. State, 210 Tenn. 52, 356 S.W.2d 401.

However, we are cited to no authority which holds that after a Trial Judge has directed a verdict that he may not change his mind and refuse to enter a judgment for the defendant.

His Honor the Trial Judge, on his own motion, could have set aside a directed verdict and judgment thereon at any time before the end of the term or within thirty days after the entry of the judgment whichever occurred first. Parks v. McGuire (1954), 197 Tenn. 32, 270 S.W.2d 347.

In the case at bar when the Trial Judge first directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, the trial was terminated. Normally, judgment would have been entered on the minutes. The plaintiff could have reviewed the action of the Trial Judge by a motion for new trial as a prerequisite for appeal. Higgins & Crown-over, Tennessee Procedure, Section 1596; Bostick v. Thomas, 137 Tenn. 99, 191 S.W. 968; Hamburger v. Railroad, 138 Tenn. 123, 196 S.W. 144. A motion for new trial must also be filed by any party against whom a directed verdict has been granted after motion for new trial of the opposing party was sustained by the Trial Judge. Scott v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway (1954), 39 Tenn.App. 534, 286 S.W.2d 347; Howell v. Wallace E. Johnson (1956), 42 Tenn.App. 15, 298 S.W.2d 753.

In the case at bar after the Trial Judge on his own motion revoked his former order directing a verdict in favor of the defendant and granted plaintiff’s nonsuit, the defendant did not file a motion for new trial. This was fatal to defendant’s right to review.

In the case of Barnes v. Noel (1914), 131 Tenn. 126, 174 S.W. 276, the defendant Noel made a motion for directed verdict which was overruled and subsequently the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff Barnes. A motion for new trial was filed by the defendant and granted by the Trial Judge but the Trial Judge again refused to direct a verdict for defendant. The defendant, of course, was, at that time, not entitled to appeal the action of the Trial Judge in refusing to grant a directed verdict because the action of the Trial Judge was not final. The defendant had prepared a wayside bill of exceptions.

When the case came on for retrial, the plaintiff Barnes moved for a nonsuit which was overruled and subsequently the jury returned a verdict for the defendant Noel. The plaintiff Barnes made a motion for new trial which was overruled. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court [376]

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Bluebook (online)
504 S.W.2d 373, 1972 Tenn. App. LEXIS 270, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-standard-life-accident-insurance-co-tennctapp-1972.