MOORE v. SARVER

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 16, 2026
Docket2:23-cv-02052
StatusUnknown

This text of MOORE v. SARVER (MOORE v. SARVER) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MOORE v. SARVER, (W.D. Pa. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LESTER MOORE,

2:23-CV-02052-CCW Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT SARVER, SERGEANT GULLISPE,

Defendants.

ORDER

This case has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Patricia L. Dodge for pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(l)(A) and (B), and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72. On February 13, 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report (the “R&R”), ECF No. 68, recommending that the Defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 49, be granted. Service of the R&R was made on the parties, and neither party filed Objections. See ECF No. 68. After a de novo review of the pleadings and documents in the case, together with the R&R and the Objections thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. The Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 49, is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.1

1 As noted in the R&R, while Plaintiff nominally brings excessive force claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and claims for “deprivation of property, freedom, [and] liberty” under the Fifth Amendment, the substance of each of these claims is properly construed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. ECF No. 40 at 4–5. “Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will liberally construe his complaint as attempting to set forth [Fourteenth Amendment] claim[s], regardless of his confusion of legal theories.” Haynes v. Thompson, No. CV 16-285, 2016 WL 6995654, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2016) (Eddy, M.J.) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)) (construing claims brought nominally under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as being brought under the Fourth Amendment); see also Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 2. The R&R, ECF No. 68, is ADOPTED as the Opinion of the District Court. 3. Defendants shall answer the remaining claims, which are against them in their individual capacities, by March 30, 2026. IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2026.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christy Criswell Wiegand CHRISTY CRISWELL WIEGAND United States District Judge

cc (via ECF email notification):

All Counsel of Record

cc (via US mail):

Lester Moore, pro se 38998510 FCI Thompson P.O. Box 1002 Thompson, IL 61285

704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that courts should “apply the relevant legal principle even when the [pro se] complaint has failed to name it”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s individual-capacity constitutional claims for excessive force and “deprivation of property, freedom, [and] liberty” will be allowed to proceed into discovery under a Fourteenth Amendment framework.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
MOORE v. SARVER, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-sarver-pawd-2026.