Moore v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
This text of 650 F. App'x 406 (Moore v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Robert Moore brought this diversity action against Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. and ReconTrust Company, NA (collectively, “MERS”), contending that MERS recorded a fraudulent assignment of the note and deed of trust.on Moore’s home. Moore’s operative first amended complaint contained four causes of action: one count of violating Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.372, which prohibits mortgage-lending fraud, and three counts of common-law fraud. The district *407 court granted MERS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the applicable version of Nevada Revised Statutes § 205.872 did not include a private right of action and that Moore had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to his justifiable reliance on any misstatement by MERS, which is one element of common-law fraud. Moore filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Moore appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. We are satisfied that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been met. Moore filed his original complaint in federal court, alleging an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, and the amended complaint, which alleges a reduced amount in controversy of $10,000 or more, does not. establish to a “legal certainty” that the amount-in-controversy requirement has not been met. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 400-04 (9th Cir.1996). We therefore discharge the order to show cause issued on February 22, 2016.
2. Moore’s notice of appeal includes only the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration. More importantly, the notice of appeal was untimely as to the district court’s judgment in favor of MERS. The district court entered judgment on July 15, 2013, and a notice of appeal from that judgment was due within 30 days of that date. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Moore filed the notice of appeal on October 21, 2013, well after the 30-day deadline.
Although a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b) can extend the time to file a notice of appeal, such motion must be .filed in the district court within 28 days of entry of judgment. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(4)(A); Fed. R.Civ.P. 59(e); see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1097-1101 (9th Cir.2008), adopted in pertinent part, 621 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (per curiam). Here, Moore’s motion for reconsideration of the district court’s order granting MERS’s motion for summary judgment, which we construe as filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), 1 was filed on August 14, 2013, or 30 days after the district court entered judgment. Moore’s motion for reconsideration was thus ineffective to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from the district court’s judgment.
A late notice of appeal deprives us of jurisdiction to review the judgment, as well as the orders producing it. See, e.g., Cruz v. Int’l Collection Corp., 673 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir.2012); Comprehensive Drug Testing, 513 F.3d at 1097-1101. And an appeal from an order denying a motion for reconsideration “brings up only the denial of the motion for review, not the merits of *408 the underlying judgment.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
3. We do have jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying Moore’s motion for reconsideration, as the notice of appeal was timely as to that order. However, the parties have presented no argument regarding the district court’s order denying Moore’s motion for reconsideration, the only order over which we have jurisdiction. We therefore deem the issue waived. See, e.g., Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir.2006). And, even if the issue were not waived, Moore neither raised nor established any grounds for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in his motion for reconsideration, and the district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying that motion. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993) (“Rule 60(b) ‘provides for reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) extraordinary circumstances which would justify relief.’ ” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (a district court abuses its discretion if it fails to “identify] and applfy] the correct legal rule to the relief requested” or if it resolves a motion based on a “factual finding that [is] illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record”). We affirm the district court’s decision.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 2
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE DISCHARGED; AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
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