Moore v. Maley

2025 NY Slip Op 05304
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedOctober 2, 2025
DocketIndex No. 22507/18; Appeal No. 4240; Case No. 2024-02148
StatusPublished

This text of 2025 NY Slip Op 05304 (Moore v. Maley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Maley, 2025 NY Slip Op 05304 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

Moore v Maley (2025 NY Slip Op 05304)

Moore v Maley
2025 NY Slip Op 05304
Decided on October 02, 2025
Appellate Division, First Department
Michael, J.
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.


Decided and Entered: October 02, 2025 SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION First Judicial Department
Dianne T. Renwick
Sallie Manzanet-Daniels John R. Higgitt LlinÉt M. Rosado Marsha D. Michael

Index No. 22507/18|Appeal No. 4240|Case No. 2024-02148|

[*1]Christina Moore etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v

Charles Maley et al., Defendants, Roger Wood et al., Defendants-Appellants.


Certain defendants appeal from the order of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Patsy Gouldborne, J.), entered March 11, 2024, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendants Roger Wood and K&B Transportation Inc.'s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against them on the ground that plaintiff's decedent did not sustain serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d).



Lester Schwab Katz & Dwyer, LLP, New York (Thomas V. Backis and Paul M. Tarr of counsel), for appellants.

Lisa M. Comeau, Garden City, for respondents.



Michael, J.

Defendants Roger Wood and K&B Transportation Inc. moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint as against them on the ground that plaintiff's decedent, Kenneth Moore (Moore), did not sustain serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident. In support of their motion, defendants established prima facie that Moore's injuries were not causally related to the subject accident by submitting evidence of Moore's myriad preexisting conditions. In opposition, however, plaintiff raised issues of fact as to causation through deposition testimony, medical records, and conflicting expert reports opining that the accident caused Moore to suffer new injuries and exacerbated his preexisting injuries. Supreme Court thus correctly denied summary judgment and we affirm.

On April 24, 2017, Moore was driving in the middle lane on the Cross Bronx Expressway with his daughter and granddaughter when his vehicle was struck from the right side by a tractor-trailer operated by defendant Roger Wood and owned by defendant K&B Transportation Inc. (collectively, defendants). The impact from the right side pushed Moore's vehicle into another tractor-trailer traveling in the left lane. The impacts caused Moore's head to strike the steering wheel and dashboard.

Moore commenced this action on February 18, 2018, alleging that defendants' negligence caused the motor vehicle accident from which he sustained serious injuries within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d). Moore's initial bill of particulars, dated June 12, 2018, alleged that due to the accident, Moore suffered injuries to his cervical spine, lumbar spine,[FN1] right shoulder, and both knees, including the exacerbation of preexisting conditions. Moore's preexisting conditions included sickle-cell anemia, osteomyelitis of his cervical spine, early spinal stenosis, and prior vertebral compression fractures at C5-C6.

Unfortunately, Moore died on May 25, 2019 from complications following surgery to his cervical spine. His daughter, Christina Moore, was substituted as plaintiff and filed an amended complaint and supplemental bill of particulars alleging that Moore's death was caused by the injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident.

Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. They argued that Moore's alleged injures and death were not causally related to the accident but were instead caused by his multitude of preexisting conditions — namely, sickle cell anemia and osteomyelitis of his cervical spine. In support of their motion, defendants relied on their experts' reports, medical records, and Moore's deposition testimony.

Plaintiff opposed, arguing that the evidence demonstrated that the accident caused Moore to suffer new injuries, aggravated his preexisting injures, and severely diminished his ability to manage daily living. He complained that after the accident, he developed significant neck pain and headaches; was diagnosed with cervical spine, shoulder, and knee sprains and later with myelopathy (a spinal injury); and suffered significant progression of spinal stenosis at the C2-3 level. Plaintiff argued that Moore's injures led to his rapid decline, with him ultimately losing the ability to walk or care for himself. In support of these arguments, plaintiff relied on her expert's initial and supplemental reports, medical records, and Moore's and plaintiff's deposition testimony.

Supreme Court granted defendants' motion in part. It found that defendants were entitled to summary judgment regarding the injuries to Moore's lumbar spine, which were not addressed by plaintiff's expert. However, the court denied defendants' motion as to the injuries relating to Moore's cervical spine, right shoulder, and knees, finding issues of fact as to causation.

Under Insurance Law § 5104(a), there is no right of recovery for noneconomic loss in any action between covered persons for personal injuries arising out of the negligent use or operation of a motor vehicle "except in the case of a serious injury." Insurance Law § 5102(d) defines "serious injury" as a personal injury which results in, among other things, death, a fracture, permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, significant limitation of use of a body function or system, or a "medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for not less than [90] days during the [180] days immediately following the occurrence of the injury or impairment," also known as the 90/180 day rule.

Summary judgment "is a drastic remedy, to be granted only where the moving party has tendered sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact" (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499, 503 [2012] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Failure to meet this burden requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). Moreover, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (see Vega, 18 NY3d at 503). In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to require a trial of material questions of fact. . . mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment under Insurance Law § 5102(d), the defendant must prove with competent evidence that the plaintiff's injuries are not "serious" within the meaning of the statute or that the injuries were not caused by the accident (Spencer v Golden Eagle, Inc., 82 AD3d 589, 590 [1st Dept 2011]).

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Bluebook (online)
2025 NY Slip Op 05304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-maley-nyappdiv-2025.