Moore v. Garnand

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedMarch 17, 2025
Docket4:19-cv-00290
StatusUnknown

This text of Moore v. Garnand (Moore v. Garnand) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Garnand, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Greg Moore, et al., No. CV-19-00290-TUC-RM (MAA)

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Sean Garnand, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 On January 3, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 526), 16 asking the Court to reconsider its December 20, 2024 Order granting a stay in the above- 17 captioned matter pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (“Younger Order”) 18 (Doc. 525). On January 21, 2025—while their Motion for Reconsideration remained 19 pending—Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal of the Younger Order. (Doc. 20 527.) 21 The Court ordered the parties to brief the issue of whether the filing of Plaintiffs’ 22 interlocutory appeal divested this Court of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Motion for 23 Reconsideration. (Doc. 529.) In their brief, Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue an indicative 24 ruling pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a)(3), stating that the Court 25 would grant the Motion for Reconsideration if the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals were to 26 remand for that purpose. (Doc. 530.) Plaintiffs contend that such a ruling would save 27 judicial and party resources. (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs divested this Court of 28 jurisdiction to rule on their Motion for Reconsideration when they filed their Notice of 1 Interlocutory Appeal, and that an indicative ruling under Rule 62.1 is inappropriate. 2 (Doc. 531.) 3 “[T]he filing of a notice of interlocutory appeal divests the district court of 4 jurisdiction over the particular issues involved in that appeal.” City of Los Angeles, 5 Harbor Div. v. Santa Monica Baykeeper, 254 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs’ 6 interlocutory appeal involves the same issues raised in Plaintiffs’ Motion for 7 Reconsideration, and therefore Plaintiffs’ filing of the Notice of Interlocutory Appeal 8 divested this Court of jurisdiction to grant the Motion for Reconsideration. 9 “If a timely motion is made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant 10 because of an appeal that has been docketed and is pending, the court may” defer 11 considering the motion, deny it, or “state either that it would grant the motion if the court 12 of appeals remands for that purpose or that the motion raises a substantial issue.” Fed. R. 13 Civ. P. 62.1(a). Indicative rulings under Rule 62.1(a) may be appropriate when new 14 developments, such as the discovery of new evidence, put the district court in a better 15 position to decide certain issues. See Silbersher v. Allergan Inc., No. 18-cv-03018-JCS, 16 2024 WL 2044626, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2024). However, numerous courts have 17 found that it is improper to issue an indicative ruling resolving the same issues raised in a 18 pending appeal when the district court has “nothing special to offer” in resolving those 19 issues. Id. at *5-8. 20 Here, there are no intervening changes in law, newly discovered evidence, or other 21 circumstances rendering an indicative ruling appropriate under Rule 62.1(a)(3). 22 Furthermore, even if there were, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration fails on the 23 merits. See Out of the Box Enters., LLC v. El Paseo Jewelry Exchange, Inc., 737 Fed. 24 App’x 304, 305 (9th Cir. 2017) (mem.) (district court retains jurisdiction under Rule 62.1 25 to deny motion on the merits). 26 Motions for reconsideration should be granted only in rare circumstances. 27 Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). “The Court 28 will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of 1 manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been 2 brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1); see also Sch. 3 Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty,, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) 4 (“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly 5 discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly 6 unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.”). 7 In their Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiffs argue that Younger abstention is 8 inappropriate in this case because Defendants urged and secured a ruling on the merits of 9 Plaintiffs’ claims when Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal in the Ninth Circuit on 10 the issue of qualified immunity. (Doc. 526.) However, in the prior interlocutory appeal 11 addressing the issue of qualified immunity, the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction only “to 12 consider the purely legal issue of whether, taking as true Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, it 13 was clearly established that Defendants’ conduct” violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional 14 rights. Moore v. Garnand, 83 F.4th 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2023); see also Moore v. Garnand, 15 No. 22-16236, 2023 WL 6372972, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 2023) (mem.) (“we have 16 jurisdiction to consider the purely legal question whether, assuming Plaintiffs’ facts to be 17 true, Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights”). The Ninth Circuit did 18 not adjudicate the facts underlying Plaintiffs’ claims. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ contentions 19 in the Motion for Reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of purely legal qualified 20 immunity questions does not render clearly erroneous this Court’s conclusion that, as of 21 the date the state indictment was issued against Greg Moore, there had been no 22 adjudication on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. (Doc. 525 at 5-6.)1 Furthermore, 23 Plaintiffs have not shown that this Court clearly erred in finding that Defendants did not 24 urge this Court and the Ninth Circuit to adjudicate the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims when 25 they sought dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims based on qualified immunity. See id. at 4 26 (finding that, in urging qualified immunity, Defendants “argued that they were immune 27 1 Furthermore, Plaintiffs do not argue that this Court erred in assessing the proceedings in 28 this case as of the date Greg Moore was indicted in state court. (See Doc. 525 at 5.) As of that date, the Ninth Circuit had not issued its qualified immunity rulings. || from suit and that this Court should therefore not adjudicate the merits of Plaintiffs’ || claims’). 3 IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 526) is 4|| denied. 5 Dated this 17th day of March, 2025. 6 7 ff eh by) 9 MNYAC Honorable Rosemary □□□□□□□ 10 United States District □□□□□ 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-4-

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation E.J. Bartells Company, a Washington Corporation A.P. Green Refractories Company, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and Fibreboard Corp., a Delaware Corporation as Successor in Interest to the Paraffine Companies, Inc., Pabco Products, Inc., Fibreboard Paper Products Corporation, Plant Rubber & Asbestos Works and Plant Rubber & Asbestos Co., School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Keene Corporation, a New York Corporation Individually and as Successor in Interest to the Baldwin Ehret Hill Company, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Us Gypsum Company, a Delaware Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Flintkote Company, a Delaware Corporation, School District No. 1j, Multnomah County, Oregon v. Acands, Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation Atlas Asbestos Company, Inc., a Canadian Corporation, and Armstrong Cork Company, Inc., a Delaware Corporation
5 F.3d 1255 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner
909 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Arizona, 1995)
Greg Moore v. Sean Garnand
83 F.4th 743 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Moore v. Garnand, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-garnand-azd-2025.