Moore v. Flack

108 N.W. 143, 77 Neb. 52, 1906 Neb. LEXIS 13
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedJune 20, 1906
DocketNo. 14,378
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 108 N.W. 143 (Moore v. Flack) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. Flack, 108 N.W. 143, 77 Neb. 52, 1906 Neb. LEXIS 13 (Neb. 1906).

Opinion

Oldham, C.

On the 18th day of August, 1889, Robert Moore, a former resident of the state of Kentucky, died intestate in Kearney county, Nebraska, seized in fee of a quarter section of land situated in that county. Thereafter J. W. Grilman was duly appointed administrator of the estate, and administration of the estate was finally closed and the administrator discharged in January, 1891.. During the progress of the administration the right of heirship to the estate was contested between one John F. Moore, who claimed the estate as a half brother of the deceased, and a minor named Daisy D. Moore, plaintiff herein, who claimed to be the daughter and sole heir of the deceased. The minor claimant was represented in the contest by a guardian ad litem, who is her attorney in the present suit. The contest over the heirship was continued from term to term in the county court, and evidence was taken, and the county court found in favor of the alleged half brother and against the claims of Daisy D. Moore. Thereafter the lands in controversy passed by mesne conveyances from John F. Moore to the present defendant, Henry J. Flack, [54]*54who purchased them on July 12, 1892, and has since occupied and cultivated the lands as his own. In January,' 1903, Daisy D.. Moore filed her petition in the district court for Kearney county, alleging ownership of the lands in dispute as the daughter and sole heir at law of Robert Moore, deceased. The petition was subsequently amended and asked, in substance, to set aside the former decree of the county court that declared John F. Moore the sole heir at law of Robert Moore, deceased, alleging that said decree was procured by fraud and perjury, and asking to have all mesne conveyances from John F. Moore to defendant Flack canceled and held for naught, and that the title to the lands in controversy be quieted in her. Another alleged child of Robert Moore, named Thomas Moore, intervened in the suit, and filed a petition in which he alleged that he was the illegitimate son of the deceased, that he had been recognized in writing as such by the deceased in the presence of a competent witness, and that because of such recognition he was entitled to the inheritance as the sole heir at law of Robert Moore, deceased. He further alleged that he was an infant in Kentucky at the time of the proceeding in the probate court of Kear-ney county, Nebraska, and that he had neither personal nor constructive notice of such proceeding, and that within one year after his arriving at his majority he had intervened in the suit to assert his rights. He also alleged that John F. Moore, to whom the inheritance had been awarded in the county court, was a bastard and not a legitimate half brother of Robert Moore, deceased. Defendant answered each of these petitions, alleging his ownership of the lands by mesne conveyances from John F. Moore, and pleaded the proceeding in the county court as a bar to the claims of both plaintiff: and intervener. On issues thus joined there was a trial to the court, and a judgment for the defendant, and the petitions of both plaintiff and intervener were dismissed. To reverse this judgment the plaintiff and the intervener have prosecuted their separate appeals to this court.

[55]*55We will separately examine tbe claims of each of the contestants in the light of the evidence revealed in the bill of exceptions. The proof offered in support of the claims of heirship is contained in depositions taken at various places, and from these depositions it appears that Robert Moore, deceased, was born and raised in Kowan county, Kentucky; that he was never married; that his father and mother had each departed this life before his death; that he was the natural father of both plaintiff and intervener, the former by a widow, named Mrs. Steele, and the latter by Miss Omie Oney.

Plaintiff, in support of her claim of heirship, alleged a common law marriage between the deceased and her mother. This claim, however, is wholly unsupported by competent testimony. The evidence of Mrs. Steele, the mother of plaintiff, shows that she never was married to the deceased; that she never claimed to be his wife while she lived with him"in Kentucky; that, while he visited her frequently and was the father of her child, yet she makes no claim that they lived together as husband and wife, or that he ever held her out to the world as such. What she does claim is that the deceased promised that he would marry her if she would come to Nebraska with him, and that he would get a minister to perform the ceremony, but that soon after arriving in this state he took sick and died without having any ceremony performed. According to Mrs. Steele’s testimony the deceased only lived about ten days after arriving in Nebraska. She further testified that she was drawing a pension as the widow of her former husband (Steele), who was a soldier in the United States army during the rebellion. To our minds this evidence is wholly insufficient to support the claim of a common law marriage between plaintiff’s mother and the deceased, and it will therefore be unnecessary to determine whether or not plaintiff is estopped by the judgment of the county court to again assert her right of heirship in the lands of the deceased.

As. this disposes of plaintiff’s petition, we will now [56]*56examine the contention of the intervener and the sufficiency of the testimony offered to support his claim under section 31, ch. 23, Comp. St. 1903, which provides: “Every illegitimate child shall be considered as an heir of the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, have acknowledged himself to be the father of such child.” It appears from the testimony that the deceased had been adjudged the father of the inter-vener in a bastardy proceeding instituted against him in the county court of Rowan county, Kentucky; and it was the recollection of the county judge presiding at the trial that the deceased had admitted in'court that he was the father of the child. But there is no evidence that such admission was made, if at all, in writing. The intervener also introduced the deposition of one Allan G-earheart, who testified that he had resided for many years in Rowan county, Kentucky, and that he had known the deceased, Robert Moore, since 1870; that he last saw him at Farmers, Rowan county, Kentucky, shortly before he went to Nebraska, and he further testified as follows: “(6) The last time you saw Robert Moore, did you or not have any conversation with him relative to Omie Oney’s bastard child Thomas? If so, state all the facts fully. A. Yes, sir. We were talking about Omie Oney’s bastard child in Farmers, Rowan county, Kentucky, and he (Robert Moore) said he Avanted to get the child away from her. He said it was his child. He said he had had the child adopted by her consent and he wanted me to assist him in getting the child aAvay. (7) Did he or not say or do anything else on that occasion in this connection? A. Yes, sir.. He Avrote her (Omie Oney) a note. (8) Where is that note, if you know? A. I don’t knoAV where it is. I gave it to Omie Oney. (9) Do you remember what Avas in the note, or the substance of .what Avas in it? A. Yes, sir; in part. (10) Do you remember the substance of Avhat was in the note? A. Yes; sir. (11) Please state all that was in the note, or substance of same; what you did with the note. A. It says: T am going to leave. I have to leave you.. I [57]*57bid old Kentucky good bye for a while. I don’t just know when I will be back. Take good care of our boy, and call him Thomas Moore, and I will give him a good start some day.’ And I gave the note to Omie Oney, and read it for her. She could not read.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Estate of McCollum
88 So. 2d 537 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1956)
Peetz v. Masek Auto Supply Co.
74 N.W.2d 474 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1956)
Peetz v. MASEK AUTO SUPPLY COMPANY
70 N.W.2d 482 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1955)
In Re Ragan's Estate
62 N.W.2d 121 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1954)
Barber v. Barber
1947 OK 148 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1947)
Ashman v. Fisher
160 Wash. 669 (Washington Supreme Court, 1931)
In Re Beekman's Estate
295 P. 942 (Washington Supreme Court, 1931)
Hoover v. Hoover
105 S.E. 91 (Supreme Court of Virginia, 1920)
Campbell v. Carroll
124 N.E. 407 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1919)
Holloway v. McCormick
50 L.R.A.N.S. 536 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1913)
Van Hove v. Van Hove
143 N.W. 815 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1913)
Richmond v. Taylor
139 N.W. 435 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1913)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
108 N.W. 143, 77 Neb. 52, 1906 Neb. LEXIS 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-flack-neb-1906.