MOORE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 22, 2022
Docket2:21-cv-02695
StatusUnknown

This text of MOORE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (MOORE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MOORE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, (E.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEREMIAH MOORE, et al., : Plaintiff, : : v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-CV-2695 : DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, : et al., : Defendants. :

ORDER AND NOW, this 22nd day of June, 2022, upon consideration of Plaintiff Jeremiah Moore’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 9) and his pro se Complaint (ECF No. 2), it is ORDERED that: 1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 2. The Complaint is DEEMED filed. 3. The Complaint is DISMISSED IN PART WITH PREJUDICE AND IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated in the Court’s Memorandum as follows: a. All claims for declaratory relief, as well as all claims based on the handling of prison grievances, a violation of his First Amendment freedom of religion, and a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) b. Moore’s claim against Defendant Durand based upon exposure to environmental tobacco smoke, and any claim based upon deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). c. Moore’s moot claim for injunctive relief, his claims against the Department of Corrections, the DOC’s Chief Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals, and SCI Phoenix, and all state law negligence claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate the Department of Corrections,

the DOC’s Chief Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals, SCI Phoenix, K. Owens, K. Sorber, and D. Varner as Defendants. 5. Moore may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Moore’s claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his amended complaint, Moore should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in his initial Complaint as explained in the Court’s

Memorandum. Moore may not reassert (1) any claim that has already been dismissed with prejudice, (2) any claim determined to be moot, or (3) any claim for money damages against the Department of Corrections, the DOC’s Chief Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals, or SCI Phoenix. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court. 6. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Moore a blank copy of the Court’s form complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Moore may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.1 7. If Moore does not wish to amend his Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of

the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court

“expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”). 8. If Moore fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Moore intends to stand on his Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.2 See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be

1 This form is available on the Court’s website at http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmc1983f.pdf.

2 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint). BY THE COURT:

/s/ Juan R. Sánchez JUAN R. SÁNCHEZ, C.J.

court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).

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Related

Mrs. Carmella M. Borelli v. City of Reading
532 F.2d 950 (Third Circuit, 1976)
Kevin Dickens v. Deputy Warden Klein
700 F. App'x 116 (Third Circuit, 2017)
Amy Weber v. Frances McGrogan
939 F.3d 232 (Third Circuit, 2019)
Baker v. Accounts Receivables Management, Inc.
292 F.R.D. 171 (D. New Jersey, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
MOORE v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-department-of-corrections-paed-2022.