Moore v. DeGuire

43 F. Supp. 70, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2067
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 23, 1940
StatusPublished

This text of 43 F. Supp. 70 (Moore v. DeGuire) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Moore v. DeGuire, 43 F. Supp. 70, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2067 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).

Opinion

HULBERT, District Judge.

Plaintiff filed a Bill in Equity, before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, to rescind a contract for the purchase and sale of certain shares of stock in the Ajax Hand Brake Company, an Illinois corporation, and for an accounting.

The complaint is a voluminous and loosely drawn document. Basically it alleges fraud, fraudulent representations, conspiracy and concealment of facts. Upon the trial plaintiff apparently determined to abandon that theory and presented proof, received without objection, upon which it was argued, that the defendant had been guilty of constructive fraud arising from a violation of a fiduciary relationship on the part of the defendant and Lee, as the plaintiff’s agent.

The defendant’s objections thereto are without merit in view of the liberal provisions of Rule 15(c) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c.

Plaintiff’s counsel has summarized the allegations of the complaint, upon this phase of the action, as follows:

“At and prior to his death, plaintiff’s husband was President of Ajax. Defendant was an employee thereof, standing in a confidential and fiduciary relation to Ajax and to plaintiff (par. 5). Defendant was a close personal friend of plaintiff’s husband, in whom both plaintiff and her husband had imposed trust and confidence (par. 7). Lee, who for many years prior to the death of plaintiff’s husband, acted as his attorney (par. 8), thereafter represented plaintiff both individually and as Executrix of her husband’s estate and was her trusted and confidential attorney and adviser (par. 9).
“After the death of plaintiff’s husband, defendant was elected a director and President of Ajax and as its President and general- manager dominated and controlled its business policies and affairs and had full and complete knowledge of its assets, good will and franchises, of the business conducted by it, and of the value of said assets and business (par. 15).
[71]*71“Plaintiff, during her husband’s lifetime, was never acquainted with the business and operations of the Company and had had no business experience whatever and was totally unfamiliar with the affairs of the Company at the time of her husband’s death. She was advised by the defendant that he completely controlled the business of the Company and could take it away if he so desired, rendering her 'stock valueless, since the value of the stock depended solely upon his ability to sell the brakes produced by the Company and that he, defendant, could be trusted to do what was right by plaintiff and that if she would put her trust and confidence in him her stock interest would be protected in every way. (par. 19).
“Plaintiff placed her trust and confidence in defendant and in Lee and relied implicitly on them and upon the confidential relationship which they bore to her (par. 20). Defendant thereafter importuned the plaintiff to sell him her stock and, knowing that Lee was her attorney in whom she had great trust and confidence, defendant sought out and conspired with Lee to use his confidential relationship with plaintiff to induce her to sell her stock for a grossly inadequate consideration and on terms advantageous to defendant; and Lee and defendant personally conducted the negotiations with plaintiff which ultimately induced her to sell and transfer to defendant her said shares of stock (par. 22). Some time during 1935, defendant, knowing of the trust and confidence which plaintiff reposed in Lee, started negotiations with him to buy his stock in the Company and the stock of Bosworth and of the plaintiff, both of whom were represented in said negotiations by Lee. These negotiations were carried on continuously between Lee and defendant and were in large part without plaintiff’s knowledge. Unknown to plaintiff Lee negotiated a sale of his stock for $30 a share in cash upon the understanding and agreement that he would negotiate for defendant a purchase of plaintiff’s stock on an instalment basis at a price of $5 a share less; and pursuant to this understanding Lee did so negotiate with plaintiff, but did not advise her that in order to obtain $30 a share for his stock, he had to obtain her signature to a contract of sale for $25 a share. Having the utmost confidence in Lee and believing she was helpless to do anything on her own behalf and that Lee had negotiated on her behalf to the best of his ability, plaintiff entered into a contract (the contract here sought to be rescinded) which Lee prepared in accordance with the wishes and instructions of defendant, whereby she agreed to sell her stock at $5 a share less than that obtained by her attorney for himself and for his other client Bosworth (par.27).
“At and prior to the time of the execution of said contract, plaintiff had no knowL edge of the value of the assets or the earnings of the Company and had no knowledge of the terms of the negotiations between defendant and Lee for the sale of the latter’s stock to defendant (par. 31).
“Defendant, exercising a position of dominance and control and of trust and confidence, and utilizing the trust and confidence which plaintiff reposed in her attorney Lee, negotiated through Lee as his secret agent for the purchase of her stock, holding out to Lee the inducement of $5 a share more for his stock in the event that her signature to the contract was procured (par. 40).
“Plaintiff was subjected to constant solicitation from Lee to execute said contract. In negotiating and drafting said contract Lee was in fact acting as the secret and undisclosed agent of defendant; and defendant and Lee failed to disclose to plaintiff the fact that defendant would not purchase Lee’s stock unless and until he could purchase plaintiff’s stock at a substantially lower price than that offered to Lee (par. 40). Plaintiff had no independent representation in the negotiations of said contract, but the same was negotiated by defendant through the undisclosed agency of Lee, an attorney supposedly representing Bosworth and plaintiff, to defendant’s knowledge, and while so representing plaintiff, Lee negotiated, with the complete knowledge and acquiescence of defendant, for a sale of his own stock at a higher price than that offered for plaintiff’s stock and, unknown to plaintiff, the sale of Lee’s shares at said higher price was contingent on Lee’s successfully negotiating the aforementioned contract with plaintiff (par. 42).”

Then follow formal allegations of recission and tender (pars. 43, 44), in conformity with which the plaintiff testified that she was ready, willing and able to pay any monies that would be due the defendant in the event the contract was rescinded.

The trial has been an unnecessarily protracted one. The record contains a great [72]*72deal of repetitious matter. Elaborate briefs and reply briefs have been submitted by counsel. It seems desirable, in disposing of this litigation, to state the facts at some length.

The plaintiff is a resident of the City of Chicago, State of Illinois. After a course in stenography in a Chicago business college about 1903 or 1904 she became secretary to Mr. Charles B. Moore, who was then employed by the American Locomotive Equipment Company. A year and a half or two years later she and Mr.

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Related

§ 723c
28 U.S.C. § 723c

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Bluebook (online)
43 F. Supp. 70, 1940 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2067, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/moore-v-deguire-nysd-1940.